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“We Are the Thing Itself”: Embodiment in  






 This dissertation is a study of the relationship between the modern 
Künstlerromane of Arnold Bennett, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf and issues of 
embodiment. Born of the field of aesthetics, the literary genre of Künstlerroman inherits 
its conflicts. The chief dilemma of the form is how an isolated artistic consciousness 
connects with the world through a creative act. Bennett, Joyce, and Woolf offer different 
and contradictory resolutions. By examining how each writer conceives the body, I 
discover in Woolf the idea of an ethical aesthetics that contravenes the assumed polarity 
between mind and body, between self and other, and between material and ideal. 
Written only a few years apart, Clayhanger (1910), A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man (1916), and The Voyage Out (1915) tell a compelling story of the relationship 
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The absolutely sharp edge of this beginning is absolutely roomless 
of other than action; the first transcendental reality—which itself 
is not unnameable—is absolute act. If it is not action entire, the 
necessity of the new beginning is infinite self-division, the 
absolute self-severing of self in the rest which is death. To stand 
on this absolutely sharp edge of beginning is perpetually to create. 
 









 In the novels examined in this study, three major twentieth-century writers 
address the obstacles that young artists face in their quest to create. In the process, each 
writer faces the same questions. What characterizes the artistic consciousness? What is 
the nature of art? How does an artist connect with the world through a creative act? 
Arnold Bennett, James Joyce, and Virginia Woolf offer different possibilities for the 
relationship between an artistic consciousness and the world it encounters. Integral to 
each of their conceptions of the artist is their understanding of the body. Each of the 
protagonists of Clayhanger, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, and The Voyage 
Out suffers the same crisis: the conflict between their increasingly disembodied 
consciousness and their heightened sensory experience of the world.  
 
The Künstlerroman: A Definition and Brief History 
 The artist novel arises as a distinct genre in eighteenth-century Germany at the 
same time as the field of modern aesthetics. A variation of the Bildungsroman, the 
Künstlerroman focuses on the development of an artistic consciousness from adolescence 





of self. Oftentimes, these budding artists find themselves in families and societies that 
either don’t understand them or are openly hostile to them. In the course of their 
development, the young protagonists usually experience various social and romantic 
setbacks. Their first sexual experiences are conflicted and sometimes carry a sense of 
shock. Unlike the endings of traditional Bildungsromane, where the protagonist integrates 
with prevailing social norms, the endings of artist novels are often ambivalent. 
 All novels that have characters who are suffering artists are not Künstlerromane. 
The artist figure needs to be young, to be the central consciousness of the novel, and to 
be developing in his or her awareness.1 The development need not be linear, stable, or 
complete. In many cases, it proceeds in fits and starts, making incremental and 
equivocal progress. These, then, are the two markers of the genre: a young artist figure 
as the central consciousness and some kind of development from beginning to end. 
Many other conditions might be considered customary to the genre, but these two are 
essential.2 Various critics find important that Künstlerromane tend to be 
                                                 
1 Some critics define the genre more loosely, deeming the existence of any artist figure in a novel 
as sufficient for the designation. For the purposes of this study, I mean Künstlerroman in the 
stricter sense of a development novel—a narrative centered on a young artist figure whose 
consciousness develops in some way as the novel progresses. 
 
 
2 Jerome Buckley lists six defining characteristics of Bildungsromane and Künstlerromane: a 
sensitive child growing up in a provincial setting; an antagonistic father; inadequate education; a 
move from rural to urban environment; at least two love affairs—one degraded, the other 
exalted; and a mature return home. Season of Youth: The Bildungsroman from Dickens to 





semiautobiographical first novels.3 That is the case for Joyce and Woolf. Bennett, though, 
writes nearly a dozen books before Clayhanger. Bennett also does not set out as explicit 
a theory of art in his novel as do Joyce and, to a lesser degree, Woolf. All three 
Künstlerromane do, however, reveal aesthetic preoccupations and allegiances that 
animate these writers’ future works. 
 The novel widely cited as the prototype of the genre is Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehrjahre (1795-96). In it, Goethe tells the story of young man who leaves home in search 
of life, joins an acting troupe, has love affairs, and finally becomes a member of a secret 
society dedicated to public works. More sentimental than artistic, Wilhelm learns 
through his adventures and eventually settles into married life. The Künstlerroman 
adopts this model of development and focuses on characters on the verge of being artists 
of one kind or another. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is the standard example 
of the genre in English. Other earlier or contemporary examples are: Schlegel’s Lucinde 
(1799), Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1802), Sand’s Consuelo (1842), Chopin’s The 
Awakening (1899), Browning’s prose-poem Aurora Leigh (1856), Pater’s Marius the 
Epicurean (1885), Mann’s novella “Tonio Kröger” (1903), Hesse’s Peter Camezind (1904), 
Lawrence’s Sons and Lovers (1913), Cather’s The Song of the Lark (1915), Maugham’s Of 
Human Bondage (1915), and Lewis’s satirical Tarr (1918). These novels feature men and 
                                                 
3 See Roberta Seret, Voyage into Creativity: The Modern Künstlerroman; Christine Froula, 
Modernism’s Body: Sex, Culture, and Joyce; and György Bodnár, “The Künstlerroman as an Early 





women, poets, painters, and singers as their protagonists.4 They vary stylistically from 
traditional third-person narration to more experimental forms. Their artist-protagonists 
face different challenges and come to different ends. 
  There are two full-length studies in English of the Künstlerroman: Roberta Seret’s 
Voyage into Creativity: The Modern Künstlerroman (1992) and Evy Varsamopoulou’s 
The Poetics of the Künstlerinroman and the Aesthetics of the Sublime (2002).5 Seret 
defines the Künstlerroman as an autobiographical Bildungsroman, where “the real journey 
is that of the author-artist, who by writing the Künstlerroman, voyages into the most 
demanding realm of all—the voyage into creativity.”6 Like the authors, the protagonists 
undergo psychological, social, and artistic voyages during the course of their formation 
as artists. The modern Künstlerroman is an anti-Wilhelm Meister, adopting its structure 
                                                 
4 Many critics focus on the differences between male and female artists. For the purposes of this 
study, I am more concerned with issues that pertain equally to both. For feminist perspectives on 
the genre, see Linda Huf, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Woman: The Writer as Heroine in 
American Literature; Bonnie Braendlin, “‘I Have Had My Vision’: Teaching To the Lighthouse as 
Künstlerroman”; Elizabeth Abel, Marianne Hirsch, and Elizabeth Langland, The Voyage In: 
Fictions of Female Development; Susan Gubar, “The Birth of the Artist as Heroine: 
(Re)Production, the Künstlerroman Tradition, and the Fiction of Katherine Mansfield”; Pamela 
Caughie, “‘I Must Not Settle into a Figure’: The Woman Artist in Virginia Woolf’s Writing”; and 
Lyn Pykett, “Portraits of the Artist as a Young Woman: Representations of the Female Artist in 
the New Woman Fiction of the 1890s.” 
 
 
5 In German, Peter Zima has recently written Der europäische Künstlerroman: Von der 
romantischen Utopie zur postmodernen Parodie (2008), and there is Marcuse’s foundational 
study, Der Deutsche Künstlerroman (1922). 
 
 





of development but rejecting its ending of integration into society.7 Instead, Seret uses 
the trope of an endless voyage, characterized mainly by the artist’s alienation from 
society and concerned only with reflexive theories of creativity. She distinguishes 
between novels that come out on the side of life (Goethe, Hesse, and Lawrence) and 
those that favor art (Joyce, Dreiser). 
  Varsamopoulou takes issue with Seret’s narrow definition of the Künstlerroman 
as simple aesthetic autobiography. She proposes the sublime—an otherworldly, magical, 
mythical, and infinite conflation of terror and pleasure—as the ruling category of the 
genre. The artist, refusing to fulfill his social and economic duties, instead seeks solace in 
the sublime. Focusing on Künstlerromane by and about women, Varsamopoulou regards 
the linguistic constitution of subjectivity in these novels as a metafictional discourse on 
the experience of the sublime.8 Interestingly, along with intersubjectivity, she identifies 
the experience of death and of love as particular hallmarks of the sublime. In the chapter 
on The Voyage Out, I also discuss love and death as integral to the Künstlerroman, but 
from the perspective of embodiment.  
  In addition to these two books dealing explicitly with the Künstlerroman genre, 
there are countless studies of the artist figure in literature. Maurice Beebe’s Ivory Towers 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 145. 
 
 





and Sacred Founts: The Artist as Hero in Fiction from Goethe to Joyce (1964) is perhaps 
the most widely cited of these. Beebe isolates three dominant themes in novels with 
artist heroes: the artist as a divided self (the archetypal realm); the equation of art with 
experience (the realm of life); and a conflicted ideal of attachment (the religious realm).9 
Tracing the social history of art from decorative to didactic to self-expressive, Beebe sees 
the Victorian period as the end of revolutionary notions of the artist. As people become 
interested more in wealth than in art, the artist retreats from participation in social life. 
He has two choices: to withdraw into a self-conscious interiority (the ivory tower) or to 
grapple with a life of intense experience (the sacred fount).10 All artists confront this 
dilemma and resolve it differently. 
  Like Beebe’s more general account of artist fiction, Jed Esty writes panoramically 
about modern fictions of development. In his book, Unseasonable Youth: Modernism, 
Colonialism, and the Fiction of Development (2012), Esty reads both The Voyage Out 
and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man as examples of “frozen youth,” where the 
characteristic development of the Bildungsroman genre is stunted or stalled.11 Esty 
equates this failure of self-making with the era’s failure of nation-making. Development 
                                                 











is conceived primarily in terms of social, political, national, and economic progress. That 
Stephen and Rachel fail to grow up, according to Esty, reflects a modern resistance to the 
imperialist fiction of adulthood. This is part of a larger argument about “the unsettling 
effects of the colonial encounter on humanist ideals of national culture,” which includes 
the erosion of any sense of development or progress.12 
 None of these critics, whether writing specifically about the Künstlerroman or 
more generally about artists and development, consider issues of embodiment central to 
the genre. Because of that, each account is partial. The Künstlerroman depicts a young 
artistic consciousness that is (1) central, and (2) developing in some way. Seret and 
Varsamopoulou both focus exclusively on the centrality of the artistic consciousness. 
They regard the aesthetic as imaginative, linguistic, semiotic, and discursive. They chart 
the artistic consciousness along autobiographical (Seret) and ideological 
(Varsamopoulou) axes. Neither critic focuses much on the aspect of development. Beebe 
does focus on the development of the artist, but casts it as a vast struggle between 
opposing archetypes. The creative consciousness is engaged in an eternal struggle 
between solipsistic withdrawal from life (the ivory tower) and intense surrender to it 
(the sacred fount).  
  Esty, on the other hand, questions development altogether. Focusing more 
broadly on modern Bildungsromane, he equates development with imperialism. He can 
                                                 





do this because he “[takes] the bildungsroman as a generic ideal more than an empirical 
object or set in literary history.”13 The “frozen youth” of early twentieth-century 
development novels constitute a modern critique of the notion of national progress. For 
Esty, development is primarily social, political, economic, and national progress. He 
neglects any idea of personal or ethical development, of development in consciousness. 
Also, because he assumes a model of development that is linear, stable, and complete, he 
reads any disturbance of development as antidevelopment, rather than as an integral 
moment of development. Posing twentieth-century cultural difference as antidote to 
nineteenth-century historical progress, Esty fails to see that difference is the basis of 
ethical development, that difference and progress can go hand in hand. This becomes 
most clear in my analysis of Rachel’s relationships with Helen and Terence in The 
Voyage Out.14 It is in that novel that Esty’s account falters most. He considers both 
Portrait and The Voyage Out “novels without arcs,” where Stephen and Rachel do not 
develop in any appreciable way.15 Although Stephen’s ultimate flight might reasonably 
be considered stalled development (which, nevertheless, is development), Rachel’s 
                                                 
13 Esty, p. 18. 
 
 
14 See below, pp. 158-73.  
 
 





death is definitely not a “lyric” withdrawal from life.16 A close reading of the novel 
makes clear that her death is neither lyric nor regressive. 
  All of these critics acknowledge the centrality of the artistic consciousness. None 
of them adequately tells the story of development in the modern Künstlerroman. I believe 
that is because they do not sufficiently consider the nature and role of embodiment. 
Development in these novels proceeds along a number of different trajectories, which 
correspond to different ways in which the body is conceived. When characters are 
primarily determined by physical sensation and characteristics, development is 
described in terms of evolution and historical progress. When they are determined by 
pre-existing patterns and language, development is described in terms of repeating 
cycles and endless play. When characters are considered individuals relating to other 
individuals, development becomes a matter of personal maturation. The primary 
dilemma that these developing protagonists face is how to connect with the world and 
with others through the creative act.17 To do this, Edwin, Stephen, and Rachel must 
confront their bodily experience. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 2. 
 
 
17 Many critics cite this problem of connection as a central theme in the genre. For a clear account, 






 What is the body? Why is it central to this account of the Künstlerroman? Most 
basically, the body is the center of our lived experience of the world—sensations, 
emotions, thoughts, actions, and interactions. Less basically, in reading The Voyage Out, 
I identify six narrative modes that Bennett, Joyce, and Woolf use to describe the body 
and physical experience: the natural, the historical, the archetypal, the semiotic, the 
philosophical, and the ethical.18 Each of these dimensions of conscious experience 
corresponds to different ideas of time and space, of union and difference, of self and 
other. The natural mode has to do with immediate physical sensations and, at its other 
extreme, evolution. Various categories of experience—race, class, gender, nationality, 
and so on—characterize the historical mode. Archetypal consciousness is an atemporal 
iteration of established cycles and patterns. Linguistic play, displacement, and deferral 
are the emblems of semiotic consciousness. The philosophical mode of describing 
conscious experience values concentrated moments of significance, what Woolf has 
called “moments of being.”19 Finally, the ethical mode of bodily consciousness is based 
on autonomous action and interaction. So the body has at least these six dimensions of 
experience, and likely many more. Although I’ve isolated them here, in the novels, these 
                                                 
18 See below, pp. 139-57. 
 
 





aspects of physical existence and experience are layered and interpenetrating. The body 
can be understood as the entirety of these kinds of experiences as well as any one 
particular mode. 
 As to the question of what the body has got to do with the Künstlerroman, that is 
the subject of the first chapter of this study. To give an abbreviated answer, the 
Künstlerroman is intimately tied to the field of aesthetics. The genre arises on the heels of 
modern aesthetics in eighteenth-century Germany and assumes issues of the artist, art, 
and creativity as its defining topoi. Modern aesthetics, in turn, is founded on a deviation 
from, a near reversal of, the traditional sense of aesthetics.  
Aisthesis originally refers to the entire range of sensory and bodily perception, 
not to art in specific. In 1750, the German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten uses the 
term “aesthetic” to refer to “the art of beautiful thought” and “the criticism of good 
taste.”20 All subsequent thinkers, despite Kant’s objections to the contrary, adopt 
Baumgarten’s sense of the word. So at the heart of aesthetics is the removal of the body 
and the senses from their rightful place. This, then, is the sense of aesthetics that the 
Künstlerroman inherits. What is excised etymologically returns in the themes, structures, 
and resolution of the genre based on notions of the modern aesthetic. Senses, the body, 
and embodiment dominate the three Künstlerromane I will examine. 






 In addition to this etymological link between the body and the Künstlerroman, the 
fact of growing from adolescence into adulthood makes prominent issues of sexuality, 
physical sensation, autonomy, and connection. In these novels, the body also acts as a 
counterweight to the protagonists’ impulse to withdraw into disembodied vision. Most 
body-oriented criticism of these novels tends to draw on the first four ways of 
conceiving the body: as natural and physiological, as historically determined category, 
as cyclical pattern and archetype, and as linguistic sign. In writing about The Voyage 
Out, I demonstrate why basing our understanding of the body on only these dimensions 
of experience gets us no closer to solving the riddle of the Künstlerroman—namely, how a 
disembodied consciousness connects with the world in a creative act. 
 
Selection and Method 
 Of all the modern British Künstlerromane, why have I chosen these three? 
Clayhanger, Portrait, and The Voyage Out are representative of the genre and, taken 
together, tell a compelling story. Bennett, Joyce, and Woolf, as major writers of the 
period, express its prevalent concerns. And yet they are enough at odds with each other 
that considering them together offers a sweeping view of the issues that accompany 
embodiment. Each writer approaches the question of the body and of creativity from a 





create. Edwin is preoccupied with his drawings and watercolors until he is compelled to 
take over the family printing business and settle into marriage. As Stephen’s childhood 
fascination with words, sounds, and rhythms develops, he begins to value language and 
poetry above all else. Rachel’s love of music transforms from a solitary preoccupation to 
a creative activity that connects her with others.21 Each of these novels follows the 
development of these young artists along various arcs—from cognition to sensation, 
from interaction to solipsism, from withdrawn reflection to active creation. 
Proceeding loosely from a material to an ideal to an ethical aesthetics, these 
novels tell an evolving story of the relationship between consciousness and world, 
between self and other. In the course of doing so, notions about what constitutes art and 
the artist are challenged and reworked. Each of these novels also embodies overlapping 
perspectives that work with and against each other. It is Woolf who first considers 
Clayhanger and Portrait together in her essay “Modern Fiction.”22 She deems Bennett a 
materialist, Joyce a spiritualist, and remains unsatisfied with either alternative as the 
model for good fiction. By adding The Voyage Out to the conversation that she began, 
we begin to see what Woolf’s literary solution to her critical quandary is. 
                                                 
21 Although we often see Rachel simply playing the piano, she does create a daring piece of music 
during the dance at the hotel. She strings together bits of a sonata, a minuet, and old English 
hunting songs and hymns, and creates an exaggerated rhythm for which the guests invent a new 
dance. The Voyage Out, p. 152. 
 
 
22 In The Common Reader, pp. 146-54. This essay first appears in 1919 as “Modern Novels” in the 





In no way is this an exhaustive account of these novels. I say nothing of the 
beauty and originality of Joyce’s prose, or of the power with which Bennett writes about 
landscape, industry, and class in the Potteries, or of the colonialist implications of 
Woolf’s setting. Other critics have written extensively on these topics. Nor am I saying 
that these novels are only Künstlerromane and, as such, that their literary value rests on 
whether or not these artists manage to connect with the world in the act of creation.23 
Each novel presents a different possibility of what it means to be an artist. I read these 
novels with a particular focus: how the experience of the body is understood and how 
that understanding relates to creative action. I offer not a plenary account of these novels 
but a magnification of a single thread, whose implications reverberate throughout these 
writers’ works.  
 My argument relies foremost on a close reading of issues of embodiment within 
these novels. I focus on the development of character and the ways in which the body is 
narrated. I use letters, journals, and autobiographical material not to establish intent but 
to demonstrate relevance and resonance. Where possible, I have read the works that are 
referred to in these novels. With the exception of the first chapter, I have mostly 
relegated critical perspectives on relevant issues to the footnotes. I have done this 
primarily to make the story as readable as possible. 
                                                 
23 These novels can be and have been read fruitfully within other generic contexts—travel, 






 The body of this dissertation consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, I trace 
the development of notions of the aesthetic from classical to modern thinkers. I do this 
briefly and with a particular focus on how different thinkers conceive and deal with 
notions of the body and of sensation. Beginning with Descartes, we begin to see the 
various ways, both materialist and idealist, in which the body becomes objectified and 
loses its central role in the field of aesthetics. The Künstlerroman genre inherits this 
disembodied idea of aesthetics. 
The second chapter is a close reading of Edwin Clayhanger’s development from 
a demure, disembodied artist to a burdened, disembodied husband. Edwin’s increased 
awareness of physical sensation and pleasure does not grant him the autonomy that is 
necessary to create. Being embodied requires more than having heightened sensory 
experiences. Although he learns to relate to another person, Edwin does so at the 
expense of his own creative life—autonomy and connection remain opposed at the end 
of the novel.  
Stephen Dedalus, likewise, remains disembodied throughout Portrait, but 
instead of reaching out for connection, he withdraws completely into an inner world. 
Although he compulsively and graphically reports the experiences of his body, Stephen 
does so always from the safe remove of a reflecting mind. His body is something that 
needs to be managed and controlled, from without as well as from within. Stephen 





Of these artist-protagonists, it is Rachel Vinrace who learns how to connect self 
and world in a creative act. Her development, neither easy nor stable, requires 
consistent effort and exertion, in both what she does and how she relates. As Rachel’s 
sense of self develops from vague to definite, her consciousness also develops from 
enclosed and reflexive to shared and creative. In this first novel, we see the 
underpinnings of the roving, shared consciousness that comes to define Woolf’s major 
novels. In the final chapter, I examine Woolf’s new possibility for the genre—an 





Chapter 1:  Aesthetics and the Body 
 
“Aesthetics is born as a discourse of the body.” 
 
Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic  
 
 
 The novel of artistic development is a narrative of the protagonist’s increasing 
awareness of his body in relation to, often in conflict with, his evolution as an artist. A 
literary counterpart to the study of aesthetics, the genre deals with many of the same 
issues and conflicts.1 Chief among them is the relationship between mind and body. The 
Greek origin of the word “aesthetic” supports this assertion. Originally meaning “the 
perception of the external world by the senses,” aisthesis refers to the entire range of 
sensory and bodily perception, and not to art in particular or to reason in general.2 
Nevertheless, modern aesthetics has become an account of the relationship between the 
                                                 
1 Eagleton makes the connection between aesthetics and the body in order to argue that aesthetics 
is simultaneously an instrument of capitalist ideology and the place from which to launch a 
challenge against it (The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 13). Aesthetics becomes a central 
philosophical category so that the German feudal state in the eighteenth century can secure its 
authority over the daily sensory lives of the people. Perception is wrested away from the subject 
and inserted under the firm grip of reason. Although Eagleton’s argument is compelling, his 
purpose in linking the body with aesthetic theory diverges from that of the present study. 
Eagleton’s interest in the body is as a site of political challenge; my interest in the body is as the 








self-conscious mind, which has been the prevalent concern of Western thought since 
Descartes, and the world. The body and sensory perception are ignored, denigrated, or 
turned into a fetish. The conflation of aesthetics with matters of taste and art gains 
prominence in eighteenth-century Germany, and reaches its apex with Pater’s use of the 
term to describe the late nineteenth-century movement that advocated “art for art’s 
sake.”3 So the distinction that is originally made in the field of aesthetics is not between 
self-consciousness and the world with art as the mediating term, but between self and 
world with the body as the mediating term. 
Beginning with eighteenth-century German idealism, a disembodied notion of 
art replaces the body as the middle term between consciousness and the external world. 
This is the model inherited by the modern Künstlerroman, which is mainly concerned 
with how an artist-protagonist might connect with the world through creative activity. 
Although this model is based on the suppression of the body, which as the mediating 
factor between mind and world was central to the original sense of aisthesis, the genre 
cannot escape the body. What is formally excised from the genre—the mediating role of 
the body—returns in these novels as a central thematic concern and also as the basis for 
                                                 
3 Kant tries unsuccessfully to return to the original sense of the word as sensuous perception 
“after Alexander Baumgarten had taken it in German to mean ‘criticism of taste’ (1750s), but 
Baumgarten’s sense attained popularity in English c.1830s (despite scholarly resistance) and 
removed the word from any philosophical base.”  Etymonline.  7 May 2012.  
<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=aesthetic&searchmode=no





the most compelling resolution of the genre’s dilemma. The question of the protagonist’s 
relationship to his body is key to any account of the Künstlerroman. 
 A brief history of the field of aesthetics will be useful in seeing how the body lost 
its mediating function between consciousness and the world. The modern preoccupation 
with aesthetics finds its center in eighteenth-century Germany, where at the same time 
the genre of the Künstlerroman is born. With the philosophy of Kant, and later Hegel, 
German idealism finds its fullest expression. Both philosophers, although to different 
effect, regard the aesthetic as the mediation between cognitive understanding and 
sensory perception. British thinkers take up these issues with characteristic common 
sense. Unlike the German philosophers, the British writers do not construct 
comprehensive philosophical systems. Their approach is empirical, more a psychology 
of the aesthetic than a philosophy of art. Perception and sensation, whether exalted or 
degraded, dominate the thought of writers from Shaftesbury to Wilde. Neither the 
modern disregard of nor obsession with the body gets at the issue of embodiment, 
because both attitudes consider the body an object divorced from personal agency. 
 There remains the question of where to begin the story of aesthetics. Since this is 
a study of modern British novels written within a genre founded in eighteenth-century 
Germany, it would be useful to examine the aesthetic tradition of the period in both 
countries. The period is from the Enlightenment to the early twentieth century. I mean 





human consciousness and the world. Although the study of aesthetics reaches a certain 
climax during the Enlightenment, it owes a great debt to the thought of Descartes. And, 
in order to avoid the impression that aesthetics was immaculately conceived by 
Enlightenment philosophy, I begin the story of the aesthetic tradition with the Greeks. 
 
Classical Aesthetics  
 In Plato, we find intact the distinction between mind and body, intellect and 
sensation. In his figure of the divided line, Plato illustrates a hierarchy of cognition that 
ranges from pure intellection, the realm of Form, to mere imagination, the realm of art.4  
Art is equated with image, shadow, and reflection as twice removed from the Idea. The 
sensible world, itself cast out from the realm of knowledge (noesis) into the realm of 
opinion (pistis), occupies the intermediary position between Form and image. Neither 
sensation nor imagination can have any knowledge of the essence of things: “The artist, 
we say, this maker of images, knows nothing of the reality, but only the appearance.”5   
Essential knowledge is available only to intellect, whose chief agent is the philosopher. 
 Although he inherits Plato’s conception of art as mimetic, Aristotle rejects the 
notion of a realm of Form that is unaffected by the sensible world and a realm of 
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imagination that has no effect on reason. For Aristotle, the senses are man’s primary 
source of knowledge. Sensation occupies the mediate position between imagination and 
judgment. In De Anima, he writes, “For imagination is different from either perceiving 
or discursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or judgment without 
it.”6  The imagination organizes sensory perceptions into images that are then available 
to discursive knowledge. Plato and Aristotle represent two positions regarding the 
function of art that persist in different ways in subsequent Western thought on aesthetics: 
imagination and sensation either as degraded forms of reason or as mediators between 




                                                 
6 Book 3, Chapter 3, 427. 
 
 
7 For a more detailed account than is possible here of the relationship between classical aesthetics 
and the modern tradition, see M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, where the author 
distinguishes the classical from the modern tradition as a move from a mimetic to a creative view 
of art. Also, for a panoramic consideration of the historical relationship between mind and body 
from the perspective of the soul, see Roy Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason. In The Theory of the 
Novel, Georg Lukács distinguishes between classical “integrated civilizations” where self and 
world were in concert and the modern “problematic civilization” where the self experiences an 
irremediable break with the world. It is best to let Frank Kermode have the last word. In 
Romantic Image, he argues that the sheer diversity of where various critics choose to place the 
rupture between a golden period of classical unity and modern fragmentation renders suspect 
each attempt at such totalization. In fact, Kermode identifies this myth of rupture as the defining 






 This brief excursion into classical thought prepares us for the radical departure of 
Descartes. In his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Descartes invents the modern 
subject. He denies the existence of the external world only in order to assert it more 
forcefully as the product of the human mind. Gone is the classical notion of an external 
world that is mediated in various ways. What remains is the independent human subject 
reflecting on his own existence and creating the world for himself in the process of this 
reflection. The only thing the human subject can be immediately certain of is his own 
existence: not what he is but that he is. The world and the body recede; the reflecting 
mind creates whatever exists. 
 Having established his own existence, Descartes sets out to prove the existence of 
God. His proof of the existence of God in the “foremost argument” is that God must 
exist because the idea of God as an infinite being cannot be created by the finite human 
mind. Something infinite, namely God, must have caused the idea in his mind. Just as 
the existence of God is founded on the idea of God in the mind of “I”, so is the existence 
of “I” founded on the idea of God in the mind of “I.”  In other words, the idea of God as 
an infinite being in the human mind proves both the existence of God as well as the 
existence of man. Something caused the idea and something different is having the idea. 





innovation of Descartes—that one can proceed directly from idea to existence, from 
mind to being, cogito ergo sum. God created the subject; the subject creates the world.8 In 
other words, Descartes bypasses the body and the external world as altogether 
immaterial to existence. 
 For Descartes, against the Greeks, imagination is neither degraded reason nor 
mediation between reason and sensation. In the second Meditation, he writes that his 
perception of wax “is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, and has 
never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so, but only an intuition 
of the mind [. . .].”9 Descartes completely does away with the body as a source of 
knowing. The mind knows the substance of itself and the substance of the wax directly, 
that is without recourse to either sensation or imagination. By making the substantiality 
of the sensible world a function of the human mind, Descartes enshrines self-conscious 




                                                 
8 Porter argues that Descartes’s innovation is to transform the Christian soul into the modern 
cogito, removing it from the domain of religion and making it an object of philosophy and science. 
See Flesh in the Age of Reason, p. 68. 
 
 





The British Reaction to Descartes: Empiricism 
By rejecting both sensation and imagination, Descartes both incites and divides 
subsequent champions of the body and of imagination. Thomas Hobbes’ refutation of 
Descartes initiates the enduring British tradition of reliance on empirical inquiry. In 
Leviathan (1651), Hobbes argues that sensory perception precedes human consciousness. 
He writes that “there is no conception in a man’s mind, which hath not at first, totally, or 
by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.”10 An absolute materialist, Hobbes 
denies the existence of anything that cannot be empirically determined. He does not, 
though, deny the existence of human consciousness. Rather, he identifies the nature of 
consciousness as material. Nothing immaterial exists. Human consciousness, therefore, 
is the result of various biological and sensory processes that mechanically give rise to 
ideas, imagination, and memory. As Descartes denies materiality independent of 
consciousness, Hobbes denies consciousness independent of materiality. One is bound 
by a circular abstract speculation that allows no connection to the world and the other 
by an essentialism that allows no freedom from physiological determinism. These are 
the two poles of the aesthetic tradition. 
 It is up to John Locke to mediate. Following Hobbes, Locke dismisses the 
possibility of knowledge that exists apart from sensory experience. Man is born a tabula 
rasa, an unformed mind without any impressions of the world. Knowledge is a process 
                                                 





of sensory accretion whereby man reaches sufficient, if not absolute, truths. Sensation, 
though, is divided into two parts: external sense and internal sense. By internal sense 
Locke means “that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of 
them, by which means there come to be ideas of those operations in the 
understanding.”11  Locke adopts Hobbes’ eminence of sensory experience but includes 
within it Cartesian reflection as an internal sense. Locke rescues man from mere 
corporeality by positing consciousness, not substance, as the source of identity. It is the 
continuity through time of a self-reflecting consciousness, rooted as it is in experience, 
that determines what man is. Bodily existence does not determine selfhood. 
 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, although tutored by Locke, 
does not inherit his notion of the continuity of self as a function of consciousness. Rather, 
he extols the mind’s momentary appreciation of beauty, without any concern for the 
continuity of experience. Beauty usurps sensation as the mediator between mind and 
world. Shaftesbury’s thought is considered to be more influential on the German 
tradition than on the British, and marks the beginning of the conflation of the aesthetic 
with art.12  He advances the idea of artist as Prometheus, hemmed by rules of taste and 
                                                 
11 An Essay Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion, and Assent (1690), p. 63. Book 
II, Chapter 1, Section 4. 
 
 
12 See Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 200-02. He identifies Shaftesbury as the chief British 





decorum rather than limited by an external world. Writing against Hobbesian 
materialism, Shaftesbury posits beauty as an independent value, elevating above all else 
the moments of genius and beauty as functions of intellect. Just as God creates the 
beauty of nature, the artist creates the beauty of the work of art. In his collected writings 
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), Shaftesbury writes, “[. . .] there 
is nothing so divine as beauty: which belonging not to body, nor having any principle or 
existence but in mind and reason, is alone discovered and acquired by this diviner part, 
when it inspects itself, the only object worthy of itself. For whatever is void of mind, is 
void and darkness to the mind’s eye.”13 Beauty exists only in mind and reason, not in the 
world or in the human body. Completely outside the realm of sensation, beauty is 
apprehended when the mind inspects itself. Because no external object can produce 
beauty, nothing outside of the mind’s own processes is worthy of notice. 
 Although he follows the Cartesian insistence on a self-reflecting and self-
enclosed mind, Shaftesbury takes issue with Descartes’s cogito. By founding his proof of 
existence on circular thinking, Descartes neglects the more fundamental question: what 
is the nature of the thinking “I”? Certainly not a sensate body, Shaftesbury answers. 
What distinguishes man is knowledge, beauty, and virtue, none of which has anything 
                                                                                                                                                 
growth. This is opposed to the mode of mechanical fancy, which operates by laws of association 
and combination of parts.  
 
 





to do with the gross body. Not only does beauty not belong to the body, but following 
Plato’s notion of Forms, no virtues find their source in bodily sensation: “’Tis thus the 
improving mind, slightly surveying other objects, and passing over bodies and the 
common forms (where only a shadow of beauty rests), ambitiously presses onward to its 
source, and views the original of form and order in that which is intelligent.”14 
Shaftesbury posits sentiment and feeling as the bridge between reason and world. 
Sentiment, though, is not bodily sensation. Sentiment and feeling are related to the 
imagination. Manners and politeness rule as virtue becomes a matter of taste.15   
 David Hume makes absolute Shaftesbury’s conflation of ethics and aesthetics, of 
beauty and virtue, by claiming reason itself a function of sentiment: “all the materials of 
thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment.”16 Nothing can be 
known directly or completely; all knowledge is filtered through human experience. 
Although he exalts sensibility, Hume does not dismiss bodily sensation altogether. He 
writes that “the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.”17 Following 
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15 Eagleton writes that by aestheticizing ethics, that is, by turning virtue into a matter of taste, 
ideology loses “its coercive force and reappear[s] as a principle of spontaneous consensus within 
social life.” p. 41. See Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution for an appeal to 
manners and beauty as ethical virtues. 
 
 






Locke, his concept of perception combines impressions and ideas, sensation and 
reflection. In fact, only perception exists. Human experience cannot provide any basis 
for constructing universal truths. It is impossible to move from particular subjective 
experience to general objective speculation. Since reason is mere habit of association and 
belief is fervent feeling, all that remains is custom. Although Hume dismantles the 
Cartesian monopoly of self-reflecting reason, he does not counter with immediate 
sensation. Instead, in his concepts of imagination and custom, he introduces reflection to 
the realm of sensation, rendering sensation less immediate. Hobbes’ push toward a 
sensibility that dethrones reason ends in a localized subjectivism. Descartes’s self-
conscious mind has become Hume’s self-conscious perception. 
 
The German Reaction to Descartes: Idealism 
  As Hobbes’ rejection of Descartes’s empirical idealism begins the British inquiry 
into experience and sensation, Kant’s refutation of Descartes initiates the German 
tradition of aesthetics as systematic philosophy.18 Kant is caught between Descartes’s 
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18 My understanding of the relationship between Descartes, Kant, and Hegel owes a great deal to 
a series of independent studies with D.G. Leahy. The clearest expression of this thought can be 
found in Faith and Philosophy, in which Leahy examines the foundational effect Christian faith 





disavowal of the external world and Hume’s reduction of reason to sentiment. For Kant, 
against Descartes, the sensible world exists apart from the reflecting mind. Although he 
inherits the Cartesian duality between res cogitans and res extensa as the distinction 
between the noumenal and the phenomenal, Kant, unlike Descartes, grants substance to 
both realms. He writes in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that “the simple but 
empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of 
external objects in space.”19 Inner experience means there must be an external world. 
Therefore, the mind and the world both exist. This is the practical reason that Kant 
posits against Descartes’s speculative reason. 
 Although both mind and world exist, neither can be known in particular (as 
phenomenal substance). Both subject and object (Ding an sich)20 can only be known as 
universal properties (as noumenal appearance), through a series of conceptualizations 
and judgments.21 This is because it is impossible to go from consciousness to world, from 
idea to being, from thought to thing. What is real cannot be reduced to thought 
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20 Interestingly, Woolf echoes Kant’s notion of the Ding an sich in her formulation of art and the 
artist. She writes, “[. . .] we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself.” See below, 
pp. 129-37 and pp. 208-09. 
 
 
21 Eagleton notes that although Kant “secures for the subject a real environment,” it is at the 
expense of the subject’s power. The world exists but is not fully accessible to the human mind. 





(Descartes) or to feeling (Shaftesbury/Hume). The “foremost argument” of Descartes 
depends on demonstration by causality. For Kant, causality is only operative in the 
sensible world, not in the operations of the mind. 
 With Kant’s writings, aesthetics becomes a central philosophical discipline. 
Whereas imagination was usurped by immediate cognition in Descartes, for Kant, like 
Aristotle, aesthetic judgment mediates between pure reason and the world of perception. 
In Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant advances universal subjectivity as the standard of 
aesthetic judgment. It is the form of the representations and not the sensations of the 
subject that is universal. Aesthetic judgment, based on universal form, is disinterested, 
free from concerns of utility and from responsibility to the object. It nevertheless, by 
virtue of the universality of form, is compatible with theoretical reason and the morally 
good. 
 The idealism of Descartes finds its absolute expression in Hegel. The movement 
from Descartes to Hegel is one of an expanding cogito. The Cartesian mind is 
immediately aware only of its own existence.22 In Kant, both the mind and the world are 
immediately given to the subject as phenomenal substance. With Hegel mind, world, 
and God come into immediate being as Absolute Idea, whose first sensuous appearance 
is in art. The value of art is in its position as the first moment of the unfolding of the idea 
                                                 






toward complete self-consciousness. The distinction between idea and being is finally 
obliterated. 
 Against Kantian natural reason, Hegel reinstates Descartes’s speculative reason, 
which now includes not only self-knowing but also absolute knowledge of the world 
and of God. Only cognition is immediate in Descartes. For Kant, both cognition and 
sensation are immediate. Hegel mediates both cognition and sensation through the 
infinite in an act of supreme idealism. The infinite causes the finite in Descartes. Both the 
infinite and the finite exist independently for Kant. For Hegel only the infinite is: “the 
finite has vanished in the infinite and what is, is only the infinite.”23 The nature of the 
finite is self-negation, an absolute need to transcend itself. Outside of the Absolute Idea 
there is nothing. The world exists and is available to the subject, but only as an idea, as 
the Absolute Idea. 
 In discussing the aesthetic theories of Kant and Hegel, my focus has not been 
their ideas about the function of art in the world but rather their conception of the 
relationship between mind and world, between the infinite and the finite. In keeping 
with this original sense of aisthesis, I employ the notion of the aesthetic in the particular 
sense of the creative relationship between consciousness and the world as manifest in 
the entire range of human sensory perception. Whereas the German tradition tends 
toward systematic philosophy, the British thought of the period is concerned mostly 
                                                 





with what can be determined empirically.24 British aesthetics focus primarily on the 
individual’s conscious experience of the world through sensation. 
 
 
Materialism Meets Idealism: Psychology of the Aesthetic and British  
Romanticism 
 
 In this common concern about the relationship between mind and world, there is 
a direct link between the aesthetic theories of Hobbes and Locke and the nineteenth-
century beginnings of modern psychology. Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth 
write that “mental physiology” wrests issues of cognition and sensation “away from the 
abstract realm of metaphysics, and [subjects] them to empirical criteria and practical 
application based on the study of physiology.”25 Psychology, then, as applied aesthetics. 
Both aesthetics and psychology plumb the relationship between consciousness and the 
world. Each has moments, albeit with qualification, in which it considers the sensate 
human body the center of both cognition and life.26   
                                                 
24 Eagleton attributes this difference to economic and political factors: German rationalism as a 
product of noble fiefdom and British materialism as an extension of mercantilism and a rising 
middle class. pp. 31-33.  
 
 
25 Embodied Selves: An Anthology of Psychological Texts 1830-1890, p. xiv. This is an invaluable 
collection of writings that displays the range and diversity of Victorian psychology and thinking 






 If the German tradition originates a philosophy of art, the British establishes a 
psychology of the aesthetic, focusing on the experiential relationship between mental 
processes and sensory perception.27 The mind and the world are both open to direct 
empirical inquiry conducted chiefly through an examination of the sensations of the 
body. More explicitly than his predecessors, David Hartley in his Observations on Man 
(1749) declares that all mental phenomena are founded on physiological grounds.28  
Whereas Kant takes up the ideas of Shaftesbury and Hume, Hartley refutes them in 
favor of a return to Hobbesian materialism. There are no mental ideas that are not a 
function of the brain and nervous system. Sensations become ideas through a process of 
repeated associations that create physical vibrations between the brain and nerves.29 
Hartley writes:  
   
                                                                                                                                                 
26 In a letter to J. B. Priestley, Arnold Bennett writes, “There is a lot of new observation about the 
relations of men and women—what I believe is called psychology.” Letters of Arnold Bennett, ed. 
James Hepburn, v. 3, p. 296. 
 
 
27 Along similar lines, Abrams consistently refers to the English tradition ranging from Hobbes 




28 As demonstration of the relevance of psychology to aesthetics and both to the body, Hartley’s 
two-volume work opens with, “Man consists of two parts, body and mind.” 
 
 
29 Abrams connects this mechanical model of human understanding in Hartley to Newton’s 
science of mechanics: the units of ideas are particles, the motion of ideas is like the motion of 





Since therefore sensations are conveyed to the mind, by the  
  efficiency of corporeal causes of the medullary substance, as is  
  acknowledged by all physiologists and physicians, it seems to me,  
  that the powers of generating ideas, and raising them by    
  association, must also rise from corporeal causes, and consequently  
  admit of an explication from the subtle influences of the small 
  parts of matter upon each other.30 
 
Hartley, like Hobbes, insists that the only thing that exists is matter. All else, including 
consciousness, arises from some motion of matter. By borrowing the methods of the 
physical sciences, theorists from Hobbes through Hartley consider the movement from 
sensation to idea a mechanical process: sense impressions are received particles that are 
organized by association, all of which process is governed by known physical laws.  
 Victorian studies in physiognomy, phrenology, and associationism unfold from 
this materialist conception of the human mind. The work of John Caspar Lavater 
introduces physiognomy, which regards physical form as a manifestation of the mind.31  
Although decidedly idealist in terms of advocating an animating inner spirit as the 
source of external form, Lavater nevertheless popularizes the notion of reading the body 
for meaning.32 He divides the body into three centers:  the belly and productive organs 
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31 Reminiscing about his first memory of literature, Arnold Bennett recalls a childhood scene 
where he is walking around the kitchen holding “a single leaf which had escaped from a printed 
book.” Although he was too young to read, Bennett attaches supreme significance to the contents 
of the page. “One of these three, I fancy, it must surely have been…Lavater’s Physiognomy, 






as the seat of the animal life, the chest and heart as the center of the moral life, and the 
head and eyes as emblems of the intellectual life. What remains is for the physiognomist 
to use his powers of precise observation to read human characteristics, which process 
and result inspire awe in the unity of God’s work.  
 Although his intention is idealist, Lavater’s method is wholly materialist. In 
Essays on Physiognomy (1789), he writes that man “exists and moves in the body he 
inhabits, as in his element. This material man must become the subject of observation. 
All the knowledge we can obtain of man must be gained through the medium of our 
senses.”33 Sensory perception, although in the service of a Christian holism, is the 
primary source of knowledge. Cognition does not proceed from the inside out but from 
the outside in. 
 Although it shares with physiognomy the method of reading the body as sign, 
phrenology is avowedly materialistic. Unlike physiognomy, which arbitrarily assigns 
various meanings to physical characteristics, phrenology distinguishes itself by its 
reliance on anatomy and physiology. Founded on Franz Joseph Gall’s physiological 
work on the brain, phrenology was popularized in England by George Combe’s The 
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their door knockers. In Embodied Selves, pp. 22-23. 
 
 





Constitution of Man Considered in Relation to External Objects (1829).34 The brain, 
considered the organ of the mind, houses various faculties in different locations. By 
examining the contours of the skull, the phrenologist determines the strengths and 
weaknesses of the person’s intellectual, moral, and animal faculties. Genetic inheritance 
determines the dominant portion of man’s capacities, but there remains room to exercise 
one’s will to remedy constitutional weaknesses.35   
 Whereas Hobbes and Hume posit the physical sensation of an external world as 
the means, and sometimes ends, of cognition, with Lavater and Combe the body itself 
becomes subject to external observation and analysis. It is no longer man’s sense 
impressions of the world but one man’s sense impressions of another man that animates 
these studies. While the general import and method of these studies is materialist, by 
turning the body into an object of analysis, albeit empirical, these attempts paradoxically 
lead to the ultimate usurpation of the body by modern consciousness. For these thinkers, 
embodiment is a matter of consciousness being determined by physiological processes. 
                                                 
34 Combe’s book had sold 90,000 copies by 1851 and, according to Harriet Martineau, “was 
outstripped in all-time readership only by the Bible, Pilgrim’s Progress, and Robinson Crusoe.” 
Ibid., p. 4.  
 
 
35 Combe and his followers used phrenological knowledge to campaign for various social causes:  
criminal legislation, education, industrial employment, women’s rights. It was also used to justify 





 This prevailing movement to embody the mind is accomplished at the cost of 
diminished focus on an external world.36 As the boundary of what is substantial draws 
inward to man’s body, the world recedes into background. The step from body as object 
of study to consciousness as the subject conducting this study is a short one. Whether 
speculative or empirical, whether man transcends his body or is a function of it, such 
thought has the shared effect of turning the body into an object.  
Both the idealist and the materialist approaches take self-consciousness as their 
center. The former inspects human consciousness through disembodied self-reflection, 
the latter through determined physical sensation. If the aesthetic is, as I contend, the 
creative relationship between consciousness and the world, what is lost in this focus 
inward is man’s creative relationship with the world. This loss enables the aesthetic 
dimension to be recast as the relationship between consciousness and art rather than 
consciousness and the world. 
 Even though movements in phrenology and physiognomy advance British 
materialism, Hartley does not pass without challenge. Coleridge vigorously denies 
Hartley’s insistence on the physiological basis of all mental functioning.37 Hartley’s 
                                                 
36 Although the focus here has been on physiognomy and phrenology, the science and literature 
of the period abound with various physical sensations: reflexes, hysteria, mesmerism, shock, 
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37 See Kermode, p. 112, and Abrams, pp. 158-77, where Coleridge’s innovation is characterized in 





associationist thought neglects all notions of will, reason, and imagination, subjecting 
man to “the despotism of outward impressions, and that of senseless and passive 
memory.”38 In his Treatise on Method (1818), Coleridge insists that cognition begins 
with the mind: 
  Events and images, the lively and spirit-stirring machinery of the  
  external world, are like light, and air, and moisture, to the seed of  
  the Mind, which would else rot and perish. In all processes of  
  mental evolution the objects of the senses must stimulate the Mind;  
  and the Mind must in turn assimilate and digest the food which it  
  thus receives from without.39 
 
Coleridge relegates mechanics to the external world. Spirit and mind, although 
dependent on the senses, have a separate existence that is organic like “seeds” rather 
than mechanical. Against Hartley, mind and matter are not of the same substance. Mind 
is what grows, what is active; the world is passive food. 
 In Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge assigns all of the mind’s mechanical 
properties of association to memory and fancy. For reason and imagination he reserves 
vitality and creativity, which cannot be reduced to physiological functioning. Whereas 
the empiricist tradition elevates the body, but in mechanical terms, Coleridge 
aggrandizes the consciousness, but in physical terms. His organic theory of 
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psychological invention abounds with metaphors of living plants and growth, a 
veritable “jungle of vegetation.”40  Although equally as deterministic as mechanical 
theories of mind in so far as organic growth unfolds beyond the reach of conscious 
intention, Coleridge’s theory of imagination nevertheless retains a privileged position 
for artistic design. Knowledge derives as much through revelation as through sensory 
perception. Coleridge’s response to Hartley’s associationism is important because it 
proposes a creative theory of mind to counter the prevailing physiological model. British 
Romanticism in this way is much more closely allied with German idealism than its own 
empiricist lineage. 
 Further complicating matters, Herbert Spencer introduces the idea of 
evolutionary progress into the relationship between consciousness and the world. The 
mind is neither entirely creative nor wholly determined by individual physiology. In 
The Principles of Psychology (1855), published before Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), 
Spencer argues that human consciousness is the result of a long process of man’s 
physical adaptation to the environment.41 Comparing “mental life” with “bodily life,” 
Spencer writes that, “regarded under every variety of aspect, intelligence is found to 
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41 A short time after Clayhanger is published, reading Spencer’s Autobiography, Bennett notes in 
his journal entry on September 15, 1910 that Spencer’s First Principles (1862) “by filling me up 
with the sense of causation everywhere, has altered my whole view of life, and undoubtedly 
immensely improved it…You can see ‘First Principles’ in nearly every line I write.”  The Journals 





consist in the establishment of correspondences between relations in the organism and 
relations in the environment [. . .].”42 By ascribing both man’s mental and physical 
development to evolutionary adaptation, Spencer inserts the external world between 
Coleridge’s insular notions of consciousness and sensation.  
 As Spencer interjects evolution between Hartley’s materialism and Coleridge’s 
creative imagination, George Henry Lewes intervenes with the notion of the social. In 
The Foundations of a Creed (1874), he writes: 
  If there is a valid objection against the functions of the brain being 
  investigated in the cabinets of metaphysicians, there is an equally  
  valid objection against intellectual and moral processes being  
  sought in the laboratories of physiologists. To understand the  
  Human Mind we must study it under its normal conditions, and  
  these are social conditions [. . .].43 
 
Lewes offers the palimpsest as an alternative metaphor of mind to Locke’s tabula rasa. 
The senses do inscribe impressions on the mind, but on a mind that is not blank and that 
has a history. The relationship between mind and world can be studied neither 
abstractly nor biologically. It must be studied in the context of man’s social, historical, 
and evolutionary existence.  
 Lewes adopts the associationist assertion that sensations create physical paths of 
discharge along the nervous system that spur motion and ideation. To this he appends 
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the idea that this discharge is not altogether predictable. Over time these physical paths 
become automatic and descend beneath the notice of consciousness. Beneath 
consciousness means beyond control. What begins as physiological determinism leads to 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are unexpected. 
 This unpredictable realm beneath consciousness is made explicit in the thought 
of William Carpenter. “Unconscious cerebration” accounts for those sensations and 
thoughts over which we have no conscious control.44 Uneasy at being at the mercy of 
unconscious whim, Carpenter works to regain man’s mastery. Between mind and body 
he asserts the will. Using the image of a rider trying to control a powerful horse as 
analogy to the relationship between mind and body, Carpenter bridles automatic and 
spontaneous sensation and thought. He claims the moral utility of the will in Principles 
of Mental Physiology (1874):  
  [. . .] in the control which the Will can exert over the direction of the  
  thoughts, and over the motive force exerted by the feelings, we  
  have the evidence of a new and independent Power, which may  
  either oppose or concur-with the automatic tendencies, and which,  
  according as it is habitually exerted, tends to render the Ego a free  
  agent. And, truly, in the existence of this Power, which is capable  
  of thus regulating the very highest of those operations that are  
  causally related to corporeal states, we find better evidence [. . .] 
that there is an entity wherein Man’s nobility essentially consists,  
  which does not depend for its existence on any play of Physical or  
  Vital forces, but which makes these forces subservient to its  
  determinations. It is, in fact, in virtue of the Will, that we are not  
                                                 





  mere thinking Automata [. . .].45 
 
Neither a physical nor mental phenomenon, man’s will is rather the “finite 
representative” of an infinite will.46 
 While Spencer, Lewes, and Carpenter mediate between consciousness and 
physiology, Walter Pater advances Coleridge’s idea of cognition as revelation. Pater 
takes issue though with Coleridge’s reliance on nature to characterize the artistic mind. 
By subjecting the imagination to natural laws, Coleridge undermines the volition and 
consciousness of the artist. For Pater, moments, impressions, and visions mediate 
between the mind and the world. Rather, they more than mediate; they merge thought 
and sensation.47 Although consciousness and sensation are fused, the movement 
originates with and concludes in the mind. Pater makes his most influential statement of 
aesthetic practice in the “Conclusion” to The Renaissance (1873):  
  [. . .] when reflexion begins to play upon those objects they are  
  dissipated under its influence; the cohesive force seems suspended  
  like some trick of magic; each object is loosed into a group of  
  impressions—colour, odour, texture—in the mind of the observer. 
  And if we continue to dwell in thought on this world, not of objects  
  in the solidity with which language invests them, but of 
  impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are  
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 98. 
 
 
46 Ibid., p. 99. 
 
 
47 In The Last Romantics, Graham Hough writes that Pater’s “ideal is the kind of art where 





  extinguished with our consciousness of them, it contracts still  
  further:  the whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow 
chamber of the individual mind [. . .] each mind keeping as a solitary 
prisoner its own dream of a world.48 
 
Pater’s fusion of mind and world is decidedly idealist. The mind is the agent, and objects 
dissipate into impressions. Mind and world come together, but in the medium of 
consciousness. It is not that mind is embodied but that the world is idealized. Coleridge 
challenges Hartley’s materialism; Pater reverses it completely. 
 Oscar Wilde makes absolute Pater’s idealism. Hobbes’ insistence on physical 
reality is now replaced by mental reality. The world of varied sensations has 
transformed into one of universal ideas. It is not objects that are known, but rather the 
mind’s own processes of knowing. Man is not created by the world he lives in; he creates 
the world: 
  For what is Nature? Nature is no great mother who has borne us.  
  She is our creation. It is in our brain that she quickens to life.  
  Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see 
  it, depends on the Arts that have influenced us. To look at a thing  
  is very different from seeing a thing. One does not see anything  
  until one sees its beauty. Then, and then only, does it come into  
  existence.49  
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Wilde distinguishes between sensory perception and creative conception. Sight has 
shifted from the sensory perception of an external world to the creative vision of an 
internal idea. What gives an object life is beauty. This is Shaftesbury’s Promethean ideal 
liberated from all moral and social constraints. Despite his reduction of the world to 
consciousness, Pater nevertheless grants a moral function to vision.50 Wilde refuses art 
any utility. The value of a work of art is solely its existence and beauty. Otherwise, “all 
art is quite useless.”51 
 We conclude this survey of major shifts in the field of aesthetics with an 
influential American. William James is important to this debate not only because of his 
own work but because of the influence he had on Henri Bergson, who figures 
prominently for modern writers. James’ reliance on human experience as a “stream of 
thought” presages modern narrative technique as well as the entire field of 
phenomenology.52  
In his two-volume work The Principles of Psychology (1890), James charts a 
middle course between consciousness and the world. Reality is neither mental nor 
material. It comprises a stream of moments, each experienced in a different way. 
                                                 




51Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890), in The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde, p. 17. 
 
 





Experience itself is a synthesis of sensation and thought, perception and conception. 
James recognizes the physiological basis of cognition but does not accept the 
associationist doctrine of repeated experience. Nothing happens twice in the same way:  
“no state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before.”53 On the other hand, 
James also rejects Hegel’s absolute idealism. The external world exists absolutely and 
independently of the human mind. James describes his notion of cognition as a 
“thoroughgoing dualism”: 
  It supposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and  
  treats them as irreducible. Neither gets out of itself or into the  
  other, neither in any way is the other, neither makes the other.  
  They just stand face to face in a common world, and one simply 
  knows, or is known unto, its counterpart.54 
 
Like Kant, for James the world and the mind stand apart. Whereas Kant bridges this 
chasm with the form of universal judgment, James relies on human experience. The 
method of knowing one’s experience remains, nevertheless, Cartesian introspection, the 
mind reflecting on its own processes of knowing. 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid., p. 230. This echoes Heraclitus’s fragment, “No man steps into the same river twice.”  
Whereas Heraclitus refers mainly to the external changing state of the river, James also has in 
mind the internal changing state of man. 
 
 





 Aesthetics is the study of the creative relationship between consciousness and 
the world, specifically as man’s sensory perception of an external world. We can 
understand the development of the field as a series of attempts to guard against the 
anarchy of the senses. Descartes overthrows the role of an embodied consciousness in 
favor of a self-enclosed, reflecting consciousness. After Descartes, the classical sense of 
aisthesis, which is rooted in sensory perception, becomes divorced from embodied 
experience. Even when lauded, as in Hobbes and Hartley, the senses are nevertheless 
organized by some overriding principle of physiological determinism. The line from 
Shaftesbury to Wilde, passing through Hegel, Coleridge, and Pater, simply bypasses 
sensory experience as a degraded form of reason and imagination. Modern aesthetics 
replaces embodied experience with visionary reflection as the central term between 
consciousness and the world. In the process of divorcing aesthetics from embodiment, 
many ideas intervene: Locke’s internal sense, Hume’s morality, Kant’s universal form of 
judgment, Coleridge’s organic imagination, Spencer’s evolutionary progress, Lewes’s 
social man, Carpenter’s willpower, and James’ daily experience.  
 Although art has been only one of many proposed mediations between 
consciousness and world, it has come to dominate, indeed define, the field of modern 
aesthetics. It has been my intention here to show the major shifts in response to this 
perceived dilemma between human consciousness and the external world and, thereby, 





One of the primary effects of the development of aesthetic theory has been that the 
notion of embodied experience, which was central to the field, has been abandoned. The 
modern Künstlerroman, which is the literary genre conceived out of the primary dilemma 
of aesthetics—the creative relationship between consciousness and the world—inherits 
this disembodied notion of aesthetics. Aesthetics, and by extension the Künstlerroman, 
has to do not exclusively with art but also with the entire range of man’s creative 
relationship with the world. Or, put another way, art and creativity have to do with 
more than only matters of vision, beauty, and solitary reflection. 
The fundamental question of the Künstlerroman genre is how an artist-
protagonist scales the distance between his isolated consciousness and the external 
world in a creative act. The three protagonists of the novels I examine sway between the 
poles of physiological determinism and unbridled consciousness. They resort to the 
same mediations between consciousness and world as do the preceding thinkers—
human will, social relationships, religion, beauty, evolution, sexuality, morality, the 
unconscious, and everyday experience. The modern Künstlerroman, following the 
modern aesthetic tradition, has replaced the central role of embodied consciousness with 
disembodied vision. But by closely reading these novels, we will see that the resolution 






This brief intellectual history of the relationship between aesthetics and the body 
is not a preamble to declaring Joyce a Hegelian, Bennett a disciple of Spencer, or Woolf a 
late Paterian.55 Such correlations would be schematic at best. There is also the certain risk 
in such a cursory treatment of making tidy what is invariably complicated. I have 
hazarded this risk in order to give a sense, in broad strokes, of how it was that the body 
came to lose its central role in the field of aesthetics. The consequence of the Cartesian 
invention of the modern subject, this disembodied consciousness has survived equally 
intact in both materialist challenges to Descartes as well as idealist fortifications of his 
thinking. 
Because the Künstlerroman form is founded precisely on the relationship between 
artistic consciousness and the world, it is useful to consider the contemporary theories of 
aesthetics that existed while these novelists were writing. The intellectual context of the 
genre as well as the local climate in which these novelists were writing is paramount to 
the issues raised by these Künstlerromane. Kant was being widely read as Goethe was 
writing Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795-96), the prototype Bildungsroman from which 
the Künstlerroman is derived. Bennett, Woolf, and particularly Joyce were well aware of 
the German novelistic tradition and its relationship to philosophical idealism. All three 
                                                 
55 See Barbara Laman, James Joyce and German Theory for more an argument of direct influence 
than I care to make, and Perry Meisel, The Absent Father: Virginia Woolf and Walter Pater.  
Andrew Lincoln writes about Spencer’s influence on Bennett in “The Sociology of Bennett’s 
Clayhanger” in English Literature in Transition (1880-1920) 27, no. 3 (1984): pp. 188-200, as does  
Robert Squillace in his chapter on Clayhanger in Modernism, Modernity, and Arnold Bennett, 





had direct access to the works of British thinkers as well as private exposure through 
literary circles and public journals.56 
 The question of selection may arise. Why these thinkers and not others? What 
about the British philosophers of modernism? Clearly, I do not intend this to be a 
comprehensive account of Western aesthetics. You will note that Hegel receives a mere 
two paragraphs. Such an account is beyond what is useful for this study. My main 
criterion has been to include thinkers who represent specific and divergent positions in 
the shifting understanding of the relationship between mind and body, between 
consciousness and world. This conversation spans nearly three hundred years of 
disagreements, reinforcements, and negotiations about the exact nature of consciousness 
and its relationship to physical sensation.  
Also, although I will not be making any arguments of influence, I have limited 
myself to thinkers that these novelists would have had access to, whether directly or 
indirectly. My aim is to avoid interjecting contemporary theory into the past. This is not 
to suggest that there has been no progress in thought that may illuminate what has 
preceded, but rather to be cautious about flattening a unique moment into an eternal 
now. In any case, to the extent that I myself am a product of contemporary thought, 
                                                 
56 See the introduction to Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally Shuttleworth’s anthology of nineteenth-
century psychological texts in Embodied Selves for an account of the prevalence of ideas of 
consciousness and embodiment in British culture. Also, Porter’s chapter entitled “The Spectator: 
The Polite Self in the Polite Body,” in Flesh in the Age of Reason for a description of eighteenth-





there is an implicit way in which the present necessarily reads the past from its own 
perspective. My choice to leave out contemporary theorists is an attempt to minimize 
this tendency, not only for the sake of plausibility but also for the sake of clarity. 
 As for the question then of why these particular thinkers, I answer that, read 
together, they aptly tell the story of how modern aesthetics came to abandon sensory 
experience as its defining characteristic. Each writer is representative of a specific shift in 
thinking that undermines the role of the body in aesthetic experience. These thinkers 
refer directly to each other’s work, whether through shared assumptions or outright 
refutations. Descartes is the centerpiece. There follows the German response of a 
systematic and idealist philosophy of art and the British tradition of an empirical 
psychology of the aesthetic. The two traditions meet in British Romanticism, where 
German idealist philosophy penetrates British materialism. The nineteenth-century 
focus on history and sensation gives way to the modern return to the Romantic ideal of a 
visionary artistic consciousness.57 Beginning in the eighteenth century, these thinkers 
present different possibilities for what embodiment might mean—some reduce it to a 
                                                 
57 This very curious shift in the history of the British novel from increasingly historical and 
material concerns throughout the nineteenth century to the modern fascination with 
consciousness is often viewed in terms of rupture and has not, as such, been accounted for 
satisfactorily. There are some plausible explanations: the Franco-Prussian War and World War I; 
the move from an industrializing economy to advanced capitalism; the return via the Romantics 
to German idealism; the psychology of William James and Freud. Rather than viewing 
Modernism as a break or discontinuity, I think the increasing materialism of the nineteenth 
century actually heralds the rise of consciousness. As I argue above, by turning the body into an 
object, exalted though it may be, Victorian psychology retreats from the world and confers the 





matter of physiology, some find the issue altogether irrelevant to aesthetics, and others 
offer various middle terms between mind and body. These various mediations are 
precisely the possibilities that Bennett, Joyce, and Woolf encounter in writing their 







Chapter 2:  “We must love one another or die” 
 
    “Next the long nerves unite their silver train, 
    And young SENSATION permeates the brain; 
    Through each new sense the keen emotions dart, 
    Flush the young cheek, and swell the throbbing heart. 
    From pain and pleasure quick VOLITIONS rise, 
    Lift the strong arm, or point the inquiring eyes; 
    With Reason’s light bewilder’d Man direct, 
    And right and wrong with balance nice detect. 
    Last in thick swarms ASSOCIATIONS spring, 
    Thoughts join to thoughts, to motion motions cling; 
    Whence in long trains of catenation flow 
    Imagined joy, and voluntary woe.”  
 
Erasmus Darwin, The Temple of Nature 
 
 In the continuum between consciousness and life, critics generally regard Arnold 
Bennett as squarely on the side of life. Bennett wrote prodigiously: novels, plays, short 
stories, essays, articles, journals, letters, and “pocket philosophies” that offer instruction 
in modern living. He found no contradiction in writing for critical acclaim as well as 
popular success. His decline in reputation is often attributed to the critical influence of 
Virginia Woolf. In her famous rebuke “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” Woolf declares 





houses than with the internal movements of their souls.1 She relegates him to a dying 
breed of Edwardian novelists who are out of step with the modern sensibility. Woolf is 
reacting to Bennett’s essay “Is the Novel Decaying?,” in which he accuses her of creating 
characters who “do not vitally survive in the mind because the author has been obsessed 
with details of originality and cleverness.”2 
 Although Woolf unfairly exaggerates Bennett’s attention to detail and 
underestimates his study of emotion, she correctly identifies his allegiance to life. 
Rebecca West writes that Bennett “had the first necessity for a novelist in his insatiable 
appetite for life. He loved every phenomenon which the world presented to him and 
grudged no expense of time and energy in studying it. Also, he had the right emotional 
dynamo: what he saw he loved.”3 In The Author’s Craft (1914), Bennett writes that “no 
artist is likely to be entirely admirable who is not a man before he is an artist. The notion 
that art is first and the rest of the universe nowhere is bound to lead to preciosity and 
futility in art.”4 Bennett firmly rejects the notion that art precedes life.  
                                                 
1 The essay first appears in Nation and Athenaeum on December 1, 1923. A revised version of the 
essay was given as a lecture to the Cambridge Heretics on May 18, 1924. This revised version 
appears as “Character in Fiction” in the Criterion in July, 1924. 
 
 
2 First published in Cassell’s Weekly on March 28, 1923. See The Author’s Craft and Other Critical 
Writings of Arnold Bennett, ed. Samuel Hynes, pp. 87-89. 
 
 






 The life to which Bennett is devoted is not a catalogue of negligible details, as 
Woolf suggests, but, much like for Woolf herself, the richness of ordinary events. 
Bennett emancipates everyday phenomena from meaninglessness and obscurity and 
places them at the center of his art and ethics. “The whole spectacular and sensual 
show—what the eye sees, the ear hears, the nose scents, the tongue tastes and the skin 
touches—is a cause or an effect of human conduct.”5 Sensation is taken seriously. But his 
is not a simple materialism. Rather than transforming the material into the artistic, 
Bennett recognizes the inherent art in everyday phenomena. He writes in an early 
journal entry that the “day of my enthusiasm for ‘realism,’ for ‘naturalism,’ has passed. I 
can perceive that a modern work of fiction dealing with modern life may ignore realism 
and yet be great. To find beauty, which is always hidden; that is the aim. [. . . ] My desire 
is to depict the deeper beauty while abiding by the envelope of facts [. . .]. What the 
artist has to grasp is that there is no such thing as ugliness in the world.”6   
 The problem of the Künstlerroman form is the tension between the protagonist’s 
artistic sensibility rooted in a disembodied consciousness and his increasing awareness 
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6 January 3, 1899. The Journals of Arnold Bennett, ed. Newman Flower, v.1, pp. 84-85. Bennett 






of the outside world through his heightened physical sensations. In Clayhanger, Bennett 
presents a young man thwarted from his passion to be an artist by the demands of an 
autocratic father who installs him instead as an apprentice in, and eventual heir to, his 
steam printing business. Presented with the conflict between art and life, Edwin 
Clayhanger abandons art altogether. He sacrifices his sketches, watercolors, and 
architectural designs to the family business. The life that he chooses though is not 
devoid of creativity. Although he is not fulfilled in his professional life, Edwin 
eventually finds contentment in his personal life. What he forfeits in terms of art he 
gains in human contact. In Clayhanger, Bennett presents a portrait of the artist as a 
young printer. 
 
The Unknown Body 
Bennett himself derives contentment from neither mind nor body. In Mental 
Efficiency (1911), one of his “pocket philosophies,” he advises readers how best to 
discipline the mind: 
  For me, spiritual content (I will not use the word ‘happiness,’  
  which implies too much) springs essentially from no mental or  
  physical facts. It springs from the spiritual fact that there is  
  something higher in man than the mind, and that that something  
  can control the mind. Call that something the soul, or what you  
  will. My sense of security amid the collisions of existence lies in  





  mind, so is my mind the servant of me. An unruly servant, but a  
  servant—and possibly getting less unruly every day! Often have I  
  said to that restive brain: ‘Now, O mind, sole means of  
  communication between the divine me and all external phenomena,  
  you are not a free agent; you are a subordinate; you are nothing but  
  a piece of machinery; and obey me you shall.’7 
 
Bennett constructs a hierarchy of facts. Physical facts serve mental facts serve spiritual 
facts. The body is at the bottom and the soul at the top. The mind is a mechanism that 
mediates between the divine and the worldly. Neither the mechanical mind nor the 
phenomenal body is free. They are servants whose obedience guarantees man safety 
“amid the collisions of existence.” 
 It is these “collisions of existence” between mind and body that determine the 
course of Edwin Clayhanger’s life. The novel opens in July, 1872, as young Edwin is 
going home after his last day of school. His appearance is described in particularly 
feminine terms. With “fair hair and a clear complexion,” Edwin passes the old 
townswomen as they observe that he is the “spitten image of his poor mother,” years 
ago dead of cancer.8 He is a “slim, gawky [. . .] naïve [. . .] simple creature” whose 
gestures and features have a “wistful grace” (2-3, 39). Not only are his physical features 
feminine but his character is as well. Edwin fears for his future “as a woman with a 
vague discomfort dimly fears cancer” (13). Darius Clayhanger, Edwin’s oppressive 
                                                 
7 pp. 112-13. This book is a revised version of The Reasonable Life (1907). 
 
 





father, with a mixture of anger and pride, observes that Edwin is “A cocky infant!  A girl! 
[. . . ] so young, fragile, innocent, and defenceless!” (87-88). Darius’s pride in his son 
resembles that which a man “may have in an idle, elegant, and absurdly expensive 
woman” (138). The Orgreaves, a well-to-do family from Bleakridge, take a particular 
interest in Edwin. Janet Orgreave, single and charged with the task of luring Edwin to 
dinner at the family house, remarks that Edwin’s “sister Clara was an impossible piece 
of goods, and that his sister Maggie was born an old maid. One of her brothers then said 
that that was just what was the matter with Edwin too!” (149). 
  Although physically, and in terms of his fears, innocence, idleness and reserve, 
Edwin is described by both the narrator and other characters as feminine, he himself is 
entirely unaware of his body, which fact is attributed to the shortcomings of his 
education: 
  He knew, however, nothing of natural history, and in particular of  
  himself, of the mechanism of the body and mind, through which  
  his soul had to express and fulfil itself. Not one word of  
  information about either physiology or psychology had ever been  
  breathed to him, nor had it ever occurred to anyone around him  
  that such information was needful. And as no one had tried to  
  explain to him the mysteries which he carried about  with him  
  inside that fair skin of his, so no one had tried to explain to him   
  the mysteries by which he was hemmed in, either mystically  
  through religion, or rationally through philosophy. (9) 
 
In this passage Bennett sets up the conflict that dominates the novel—between the 





between the body and the mind is a mechanism suggests that it can be known and 
explained as a machine, rationally and quantitatively.9 Its units are “information” and 
knowledge of the body is conflated with “physiology,” which is simply what he carries 
around “inside” of himself, stitched in by what is external. At the same time, his body is 
a “mystery” and what is sought is “natural” history that is “breathed” to him. This 
passage also introduces the dichotomy between inside and outside. Edwin’s mind and 
body are inside him, the province of psychology and physiology. Outside lies the realm 
of religion and philosophy. Clayhanger tells the story of how Edwin comes to know 
himself—by turns mechanical and mystical—and how he learns to relate with the world 
and with others. 
 The tension between man as mechanism and as organism is the subject of 
Bennett’s The Human Machine (1908).10 One of his many “pocket philosophies,” this 
popular book prescribes a regimen for mental training. “The human machine is an 
apparatus of brain and muscle,” Bennett writes, that allows “the Ego to develop freely in 
the universe by which it is surrounded.”11 The brain is a “highly quaint organism,” a 
                                                 
9 This echoes Hartley’s formulation that the relationship between sensations and ideas is a 
mechanical process that can be rationally known. See above, pp. 33-34. 
 
 
10 In a contemporary review in British Weekly, John Adams writes that “Mr. Bennett really treats 
his machine as an organism. The metaphor suffers a technical shock [. . .].”  In Arnold Bennett: 







servant that “can be trained, as the hand and eye can be trained; it can be made as 
obedient as a sporting dog, and by similar methods. In the meantime the indispensable 
preparation for brain-discipline is to form the habit of regarding one’s brain as an 
instrument exterior to one’s self, like a tongue or a foot.”12 Bennett’s analogy of mental 
training to physical training overlooks that the majority of physical processes take place 
outside of conscious human control. Similarly, a great deal of mental functioning 
happens beyond the realm of conscious thought. Bennett’s solution to this organic 
effusion that defies conscious intention is that of Carpenter’s: “the beginning of wise 
living lies in the control of the brain by the will.”13   
 Like Bennett, Edwin finds the constraints of his body a nuisance. One evening as 
Edwin works late at his architectural drawings “suddenly a yawn surprised him, and 
recalled him to the existence of his body” (85). Since Edwin has to work in the printing 
office before he can dedicate time to his watercolors and design practices, he finds the 
physical constraints of his tired body inconvenient. Working in spite of them, he 
“thought he had conquered the gross body, and that it was of no account” (92). Edwin is 
trying to conquer physical necessity in terms of “accounts,” reminiscent of the printing 
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accounts for which he is now responsible. But the deeper point is that what he is trying 
to overcome is not his gross body but the gross body, as if it were somehow detached 
and abstract, a category rather than integral to his sense of self. Edwin’s urge to conquer 
the body is the urge to conquer what he does not know. Reason and control are the tools 
he relies upon to rein in his physical limitations. By considering the body a mechanism, 
he can subject it to detached and rational analysis.  
 Bennett’s own relationship to his body is notoriously vexed. He suffered from a 
lifelong stammer that was never cured by any of the various therapies he attempted. 
Bennett’s journals are a detailed catalogue of physical ailments and remedies. His sexual 
relationships with women ranged from repressed to licentious.14 Bennett writes, “I see 
that at bottom, I have an intellectual scorn, or the scorn of an intellectual man, for all 
sexual-physical manifestations. They seem childish to me, unnecessary symptoms and 
symbols of a spiritual phenomenon. (Yet few Englishmen could be more perversely 
curious and adventurous than I am in just those manifestations.) I can feel myself 
despising them at the very moment of deriving satisfaction from them [. . .].”15     
                                                 
14 In her biography of Bennett, Margaret Drabble’s chapter on Marguerite Soulié, his first wife, 
gives some details of his failed romance with Eleanor Green in Paris as well as the nature of his 
marriage with Marguerite. Arnold Bennett: A Biography. See also Reginald Pound, Arnold 
Bennett, pp. 159-64, 175-80. 
 
 





 The juxtaposition between a precisely knowable and mechanical body that is 
understood through rational explanation and a mysterious and organic body that is 
revealed through the gradual experience of physical sensation is central to the novel. 
Reginald Pound insists it is central to the period. In his biography of Bennett, Pound 
writes that the first decade of the twentieth century was rife with “the neurasthenia 
induced by the ruthless doubts of thinkers like Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Clifford, 
Tyndall [. . .] who [. . .] paradoxically brought about the eclipse of reason by engendering 
the first symptoms of the modern malady of thinking with the nerves.”16 Clayhanger can 
be read as the uneasy evolution of knowledge from reason to sensation.  
 
The Sensing Body 
As the novel progresses Edwin comes into greater contact with people outside of 
his immediate family. Despite his best efforts, he increasingly comes to rely on his 
physical sensations as a mode of knowing.17 The narrator describes an encounter he has 
with Janet Orgreave, a young, attractive woman who is trying to invite him to dinner: 
                                                 
16 Arnold Bennett, p. 189. 
 
 
17 In his journals Bennett makes numerous references to his own capacity to know through 
physical sensations. On October 11, 1896, he notes, “A week of sluggish liver and disordered 
kidneys; restless nights; ill-tempered mornings.”  Listening to Wagner, he writes, “I felt those 





  The fact was that Janet had been espying him for a quarter of an  
  hour. When at length she waved her hand to him it did not occur  
  to him to suppose that she was waving her hand to him; he merely  
  wondered what peculiar thing she was doing. Then he blushed as  
  she waved again, and he knew first from the blood in his face that  
  Janet was making a signal, and that it was to himself that the signal  
  was directed: his body had told his mind; this was very odd. (168) 
 
“The gross body” is now “his face,” “himself,” and “his body.”  The episode begins with 
a “fact” that is unintelligible to Edwin’s rational “supposing” and “wondering” until his 
body responds by “blushing,” thereby revealing the meaning of the fact. Edwin “knew 
first from the blood.” He deciphers meaning by reading a series of signs written on his 
body. His usual mode of knowing has been reversed. Rather than his mind making an 
“account” of his body, it is his body that informs his mind. Like the yawn that signals to 
him that he is tired, blushing reveals to him that he is the object of Janet’s attention. 
Edwin senses his reaction before he knows what causes it.  
 It is the accumulation of such experiences of his semioticized body and his 
increasing enjoyment of them that illuminates Edwin’s identification with the luxurious 
new house that Darius is building in Bleakridge, adjacent to the home of the Orgreaves. 
The old Clayhanger house, attached to the printing office, allowed Edwin no room 
except the “inconvenient and makeshift” attic (38). Although he loves the privacy of it, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(February 13, 1897)  “There can be no knowledge without emotion. We may be aware of a truth, 
yet until we have felt its force, it is not ours. To the cognition of the brain must be added the 
experience of the soul.” (March 18, 1897)  “The whole of life ought to be covered thus by 
‘impressionists,’ and a vast mass of new material of facts and sensations collected for use by 
historians, sociologists and novelists.” (September 13, 1907)  The Journals of Arnold Bennett, v.1, 





the cramped and cold attic, particularly suited to the Edwin who aimed to “conquer the 
gross body,” no longer satisfies his newfound desire for pleasure. Edwin’s evolving 
relationship to his body is mirrored in his feelings about the house. Whereas the old 
house represents Edwin’s attempt to overcome the body, the new house is his excited 
and incipient discovery of his body. On a visit: 
  [. . .] he entered and stood in the square hall of the deserted, damp,  
  and inchoate structure. The house was his father’s only in name.  
  In emotional fact it was Edwin’s house, because he alone was  
  capable of possessing it by enjoying it. [. . .] But to Edwin it was not 
a house, it was a work of art, it was an epic poem, it was an  
  emanation of the soul. He did not realize this. He did not realize  
  how the house had informed his daily existence. All that he knew   
  about himself in relation to the house was that he could not keep  
  away from it. (163-64) 
 
The new house, like Edwin’s growing awareness of his body, is “inchoate.” But the new 
house is not simply like Edwin’s body, it is his body. It is the difference between simile 
and metaphor. No longer is Edwin interested in conquering “the gross body.” His claim 
to the house and his body is based now on pleasure. Reason is replaced by sensation, 
conquering by possession. It is true that the house remains a “structure” but it is 
simultaneously “a work of art [. . .] an epic poem [. . .] an emanation of the soul.” Edwin 
begins to seize the house—and his body—through imagination and pleasure.  
 The identification of the house as “emanation” suggests the sense in which the 
world originates by a series of descending reflections from the divine essence, one stage 





to him “houses expressed souls. People were not disembodied spirits and the houses 
that they built were as much a part of them as their bodies.”18 We are told by the 
narrator that Edwin is not yet aware of his relationship to the new house. His rational 
awareness is not yet commensurate with his sense experience. His body knows things 
that his mind does not. Edwin’s knowledge is restricted to his need to constantly visit 
the new house, his inability to “keep away from it.” 
 With his enthusiasm for the new house, Edwin’s ideas about houses in general 
evolve. He used to think of a house “as a front-wall diversified by doors and windows, 
with rooms behind it,” but comes to realize that “the front of a house was merely the 
expression of the inside of it, merely a result, almost accidental” (164). From valuing the 
surface, Edwin shifts his attention to what is “inside,” but unlike the “hemmed in 
inside” of his youth, this inside finds an “expression,” albeit a contradictory one. The 
surface is at once a “result” and “almost accidental,” caused as well as arbitrary. In other 
words, the same “inside” can have numerous outward manifestations. The body is a 
product both of definable processes as well as of random and unpredictable 
happenings.19 
                                                 
18 Arnold Bennett: A Biography, p. 31. 
 
 
19 Writing about Clayhanger, Squillace notes that Bennett’s idea of causation is founded on “the 
Spencerian model of the mutual influence of mental states and material circumstances [. . .] to 
detail the evolutionary forces that had produced the patterns of everyday living in the Potteries  





 Moreover, Edwin reconciles his idea of immaculate construction with human 
effort. The human origin of the new house is undeniable: 
  When the house began to ‘go up,’ Edwin lived in an ecstasy of   
  contemplation. I say with deliberateness an ‘ecstasy.’ He had seen  
  houses go up before; he knew houses were constructed, [. . .] he  
  knew that they did not build themselves. And yet, in the vagueness  
of his mind, he had never imaginatively realized that a house was  
  made with hands, and hands that could err. With its exact  
  perpendiculars and horizontals, its geometric regularities, and its  
  Chinese preciseness of fitting, a house had always seemed to  
  him—again in the vagueness of his mind—as something   
  superhuman. The commonest cornice, the most ordinary pillar of a   
  staircase-balustrade—could that have been accomplished in its  
  awful perfection of line and contour by a human being? How easy  
  to believe that it was ‘not made with hands’! But now he saw. He  
  had to see. [. . .]. He understood that there was no golden and  
  magic secret of building. It was just putting one brick on another  
  and against another—but to a hair’s breadth. (166) 
 
The setting apart of “go up” signals it as something representative of Edwin’s thought. 
A house that passively “goes up” lacks an agent, arising from abstract or “superhuman” 
origins. It is in this mode that Edwin lives in “ecstasy,” the state of “rapture in which the 
soul, liberated from the body” is “engaged in the contemplation of divine things.”20 The 
narratorial “I” interrupts to underscore the point, chiefly by inserting an embodied “I” 
in the middle of Edwin’s disembodied “ecstasy.” Bennett contrasts Edwin’s vague ideas 
of the superhuman quality of houses with the repeated image that a house is “made 
with hands.” Just as the passive “go up” suggests superhuman origins, the active “made 






with hands” suggests an embodied human being. Since Edwin identifies the new house 
with his new body, he realizes too that bodies are borne of other bodies, neither 
mystically nor mechanically, but simply. Edwin is beginning to see that there is no 
“golden and magic secret” but rather plainly “putting one brick on another.” 
 The narrator contrasts what Edwin “knew” with what he “imaginatively 
realized.”  This reinforces the distinction between the two modes of knowing: rational 
and imaginative. The passage begins with what Edwin “knew,” which is limited in 
understanding, and ends with what he “saw,” which is a more complete understanding. 
His understanding develops from mental to sensory, from knowing to seeing. Although 
Edwin factually knows that houses are constructed, he cannot grasp it “imaginatively,” 
cannot allow human hands and, therefore, human error to rule. The “vagueness of his 
mind,” which Bennett underscores by repetition, prohibits this imaginative 
understanding yet easily accommodates “exact” and “precise” “regularities.” To decide 
whether a “human hand” is capable of such feats, Edwin unexpectedly sets the test of 
the “commonest” and “most ordinary” of effects. Why not determine the limit of human 
fitness by invoking the rarest and grandest effects? Because the emphasis is not on 
human fitness, but rather on the “superhuman” “perfection” of the most modest 
elements of a house. 
  It is in connection to Edwin’s concern over his shabby appearance that we get 





about to occupy a house like that to be wearing garments like those” (172). The house 
demands new clothes. For Edwin, “the inauguration of the new house was to be [. . .], in 
a very deep and spiritual sense, the beginning of the new life! He had settled that. The 
new house inspired him. It was not paradise. But it was a temple” (173). What is 
imminent with the new house is “the new life,” some particular life that is not yet named, 
rather than a new life that is open-ended. The house is not “spiritual” in terms of a 
transcendent “paradise,” but is a more earthbound “temple”—literally, the “dwelling-
place or house of a deity.”  But “temple” also in the figural sense of “any place regarded 
as occupied by the divine presence, specifically the person or body of a Christian.”21 In 
the first epistle to the Corinthians, Paul says:  
  [. . .] you are God’s farm, God’s building. By the grace of God  
  which was given to me, I laid the foundations like a trained master- 
  builder, and someone else is building on them. [. . .] Do you not  
  realise that you are a temple of God with the Spirit of God living in  
  you? If anybody should destroy the temple of God, God will  
  destroy that person, because God’s temple is holy, and you are that  
  temple.22 
 
The human body is the “temple” of God. Edwin’s new house is a “temple.”  The new 
house is a body—Edwin’s by virtue of the fact that he “alone was capable of possessing 
it by enjoying it.”   









The Body of Pleasure 
 Edwin’s awakening pleasure in his body allows him to identify positively with 
his sensations. He begins to cherish the comforts that the new house will provide. The 
hot-water system “affects and inspires Edwin like a poem” (173). More than the ability 
to take a hot bath whenever he chooses, it provides the luxury “to splash—one of the 
most voluptuous pleasures in life” (174). What permits this particular gratification of his 
senses is “a cistern room, actually a room devoted to nothing but cisterns [. . .]. Out of 
[the main cistern] grew pipes, creeping in secret downwards between inner walls of the 
house, penetrating everywhere” (173). The imagery is decidedly organic. In addition to 
referring to a reservoir of water, a “cistern” also denotes a fluid-containing sac or cavity 
in an organism. The pipes “grow” and “creep in secret” and “penetrate.”  The effect is a 
house overgrown and effuse with living matter. This is an evolution of the “exact 
perpendiculars and horizontals,” the “geometric regularities,” the “Chinese preciseness 
of fitting” that characterizes Edwin’s earlier musings about the house (166). What Edwin 
realizes is that the house, like his body, is both mechanically precise and organically 
effuse. 
 With pleasure comes an anxiety over its loss, with the inhabited body a fear of its 
abrogation. As Edwin becomes increasingly embodied through sensual delight, there is 





had recovered from the catastrophe undisfigured, even unmarked. He knew not that he 
would never be the same man again [. . .]” (175).  The “catastrophe” is that of his 
disappointment at not becoming an artist, a designer of houses rather than one who 
merely enjoys a house, creator rather than created. The “honestly” signals that things are 
not as Edwin thinks. He is, in fact, “disfigured” both by the “wistful resignation” on his 
face, as well as by the shift in metaphor from the old house to the new house, from the 
rational body to the experienced body, from man as mechanism to man as organism. 
Further, he is “marked,” legible, his body inscribed in metaphor and susceptible to being 
read. 
 After his first dinner with the Orgreaves, Edwin, excited by the company, leaves 
early and, rather than going home, goes to visit the empty new house: 
  He wanted to be in full possession of himself, at leisure and in  
  freedom, and to examine the treasure of his sensations [. . .]. It was  
  the hope of pleasure that intoxicated him, the vision which he had  
  had of the possibilities of being really interested in life. He saw  
  new avenues toward joy, and the sight thereof made him tingle,  
  less with the desire to be immediately at them than with the  
  present ecstasy of contemplating them. He was conscious of actual   
  physical tremors and agreeable smartings in his head; electric  
  disturbances. But he did not reason; he felt [. . .]. Why go to gaze on  
  it again? There was no common sense in doing so. And yet he 
   felt: ‘I must have another glance at it before I go home.’ From his  
  attitude towards it, he might have been the creator of that house.  
  That house was like one of his successful drawings [. . .]. The act of 
   inspection gave him pleasure. So with the house. Strange,  
  superficially; but the simple explanation was that for some things  
  he had the eyes of love [. . .]. Yes, in his dancing and happy brain  






Whereas in the earlier passage Edwin is concerned with “possessing” the house, here it 
is “himself” he wants to possess. He possesses both the house and himself through the 
pleasure of his sensations. Being in the house means being in his body. To “possess” 
himself means to be alone in the new house.  
 Edwin no longer reasons; he feels.23 He is minutely conscious of the movements 
of his physical state. Yet, there is still distance between Edwin and his bodily sensations. 
They are something for him to “examine,” “inspect” and “contemplate.” It is the “hope” 
and “vision” and “sight” of pleasure that “intoxicate” him and make Edwin “tingle,” not 
simply the pleasure itself. His is after all not the “immediate” experience of his body as 
much as the reveling in the possibility of delayed pleasure. Unlike the earlier drive to 
“conquer the gross body,” this impulse to possess his body “was not to be conquered.”  
Edwin’s earlier detachment from his body results from his need to control and 
master it rationally, whereas now the distance comes from setting the body up as an 
object of love.24 Now he “has the eyes of love” toward his own body: he has fallen in 
                                                 
23 In his chapter on Clayhanger, George Lafourcade summarizes the novel as the “first awakening 
of sensuous pleasure in a soul long starved of beauty.” Arnold Bennett: A Study, p. 128. 
 
 
24 Bennett too lives in a state of extremes in relationship to his body. In a letter to Dorothy 
Cheston before they are married, Bennett writes in order to clarify the boundaries of their 
physical intimacy: “My idiosyncracy (or part of it) is that my relations with you have to be, 
physically, either one thing or the other. We are both sensual—thank God. I can cut the flesh 
right out, but I cannot healthily indulge in half measures.”  June 28, 1923. Letters of Arnold 





love with an identification, with identification itself in a supreme act of narcissism, the 
ego falling in love with its ego-making capacity. Edwin imagines himself the “creator” of 
the house, the architect of his own body as it becomes an aesthetic object, “like one of his 
successful drawings.” Like the nineteenth-century movement to embody consciousness, 
whether he sets out to conquer the body or to become enslaved to its sensations, Edwin’s 
actions turn the human body into an object.  
 
The Terror of the Isolated Body 
 Still regarding the body as an object, though now one to be loved rather than 
vanquished, Edwin becomes terrified of its loss. He is unable to resist going into the 
empty house because he “must localize his dream in it,” that dream of being his own 
creator, the deity of the “temple” (207). Since he does not have the key to the house, 
Edwin must enter through the cellar. He disappears into the house “feet foremost [. . .] 
as though the house were swallowing him” in a kind of reverse birth (207). Enveloped in 
darkness, he rushes through the “doorless doorway” of the cellar steps through 
“affrighting” matters: 
  His heart was beating. He trembled, he was afraid, exquisitely  
  afraid, acutely conscious of himself amid the fundamental  
  mysteries of the universe. He reached the top of the steps as the  
  match expired [. . .]. His spine thrilled, as if a hand delicate and  





  and the universe was pressing upon him, but it was he alone who  
  had created the night and the universe. He reached his room [. . .].  
  Only, now, he could not dream in the room as he had meant to   
  dream; because beyond the open door was the empty landing and  
  the well of the stairs and all of the terror of the house. The terror  
  came and mingled with the delicious sensations that had seized  
  him in the solitude of the garden of the Orgreaves. No! Never had  
  he been so intensely alive as then! He went cautiously to the  
  window and looked forth. Instantly the terror of the house was  
  annihilated. It fell away, was gone. He was not alone in his fancy- 
  created universe. The reassuring illusion of reality came back like  
  a clap of thunder. He could see a girl insinuating herself through  
  the gap in the hedge which he had made ten minutes earlier.  
  (207-08) 
 
Edwin experiences an array of physical sensations as he makes his way through the 
“damp” and “earthy” passages of the cellar toward the “doorless doorway.” He is back 
in the feminine body of his youth, of his dead mother of whom he is “the spitten image.”  
The new house very clearly has come to represent Edwin’s body. This, though, shortly 
after Edwin meets Hilda, is the first time that this body is gendered. As he goes into the 
cellar “feet first” from the garden, so he emerges from the cellar head first into the 
empty house. He is “swallowed” into the cellar and reborn inside the house. He has, in 
fact, never been “so intensely alive as then.” Edwin is unable to “dream” once he reaches 
his room because now he is aware of the “open door,” the “empty landing,” and the 
“well of the stairs.” 
 Having come through all of those voids and empty spaces, Edwin is left only 





The terror comes alive in his imagination. Yet what takes its place is equally unreal. It is 
the “illusion of reality” that intrudes with a girl who traces Edwin’s path to the house. 
What annihilates the terror is the possibility of human contact, of not being alone. 
Edwin’s youthful repudiation of physical sensation has been replaced with a complete 
absorption in it. The discovery of his body is accompanied by a sense of isolation from 
others. He is safe in his solipsism for it is “he alone who created the night and the 
universe.” He is transformed from the conqueror of the body to the sole creator of not 
only his body but also the universe. The appearance of Hilda through the hedge forces 
Edwin to acknowledge that “he was not alone in his fancy-created universe.” What 
threatens Edwin’s enjoyment of his body is no longer rational will but the existence of 
another person. As Edwin becomes more aware of his embodied experience, he becomes 
more subject to being impacted by others.  
 Whereas in the old house, Edwin is regularly surprised by his family entering his 
room, in the new house, he is rarely caught unaware. It is the difference between being 
unconscious of his body and so painstakingly conscious that he fears violation. 
Although he cannot “decipher her features,” Edwin knows “by something in her walk” 
that the girl “trespassing in his garden” is Hilda (208-09). It is “his” garden rather than 
the garden because of his increasing idea of the body as something one “possesses” and 





was less feminine than masculine. Her hair was not like a girl’s hair” (209). As Hilda 
nears the house, Edwin loses sight of her: 
  Where was she? In the garden porch? She did not reappear. She  
  might be capable of getting into the house! She might even then  
  actually be getting into the house! She was queer, incalculable.  
  Supposing that she was in the habit of surreptitiously visiting the  
  house, and had found a key to fit one of the doors, or supposing  
  that she could push up a window—she would doubtless mount the  
  stairs and trap him! Absurd, these speculations; as absurd as a  
  nightmare! But they influenced his conduct. He felt himself  
  forced to provide against the wildest hazards. (209) 
 
The passage begins with the consciousness of Edwin, excited and panicked at the 
thought of Hilda penetrating his feminine body. She is “masculine.” She is out for a 
“nocturnal stroll” (208). Edwin imagines her getting through a “door” or “pushing” her 
way through a “window,” “mounting” the stairs and “trapping” him. His fears are 
exclamatory. All of the open spaces that had earlier created his pleasurable terror are 
susceptible to being violated. The imagined escalation of Hilda’s progress and the 
repetition of “supposing” each manner in which Hilda would get at him heighten his 
excitement—as an instance of wish-fulfillment. The narrator, signaled by the shift in 
language to “he” and “his” to refer to Edwin, interrupts to observe how absurd Edwin’s 
fears are. Edwin himself has no awareness of this. His only instinct is toward self-






One Body Meets Another 
 Hilda does not get into his house. Instead, Edwin goes out into the garden and 
pretends to be surprised by her presence there. He feels his “heart-beats”; his cheeks 
“burn” (210). “What she happened to have been saying seemed immaterial to the effect, 
which was physical, vibratory” (228). In fact, “the high and serious mood of complex 
emotion in which he had entered the new house” dissolves “in comparison with the 
feverish hand-clasp of the girl whom he so peculiarly disliked” (213-14). This first 
contact of his body with the body of another opens up an entirely new realm of bodily 
experience for Edwin. His self-absorbed body is confronted with an expanded field of 
physical sensation. 
 As he falls in love with Hilda, Edwin’s sense of his body is affected by his contact 
with Hilda’s body. He becomes more porous and impressionable. After a hand shake, a 
“delicate photograph of the palm of her hand” is “printed in minute sensations on the 
palm of his” (275). He waits in a state of turmoil for Hilda to visit him in the printer’s 
shop: 
  He was in love. Love had caught him, and had affected his vision  
  so that he no longer saw any phenomenon as it actually was [. . .].  
  He could not follow a train of thought. He could not remain of one  
  opinion nor in one mind [. . .]. She was marvellous! But was she?  
  She admired him! But did she? She had shown cunning! But was it  
  not simplicity? He did not even feel sure whether he liked  
  her [. . .]. He had no notion that he was in love [. . .]. Nevertheless  





  magically, by the force of desire and of pride, the refracting glass  
  was being specially ground which would enable him, which would  
  compel him, to see an ideal Hilda when he gazed at the real Hilda.  
  He would not see the real Hilda any more unless some cataclysm  
  should shatter the glass. And he might be likened to a prisoner on  
  whom the gate of freedom is shut for ever [. . .].  (276-77) 
 
The terror that Edwin earlier feels at the sight of Hilda making her way through the 
garden is now replaced by “the force of desire and pride.” Neither his vision nor his 
mind knows what to make of Hilda. What has until now been Edwin’s tendency to turn 
himself into an object, first conquered then adored, is in love transformed into the 
capacity to make an object of Hilda. Between them there is a “refracting glass,” which 
distorts how Edwin sees Hilda. He is compelled and no longer free. There are now two 
Hilda’s: the real and the ideal. In love, Hilda has become an object of Edwin’s will.  
 It is now possible for physical sensations to be exchanged and shared between 
them; they are no longer the strict province of a body engaged in solitary self-reflection. 
After their first kiss, Edwin thinks: “‘My God! She’s mine [. . .]. I’ve kissed her! I’ve got 
her [. . .].’ And he thought of his father and of vexations. But that night he was a man. 
She, Hilda, with her independence and her mystery, had inspired him with a full pride 
of manhood” (296, 299). Although Edwin’s sphere of physical sensation has expanded to 
include another person, there remains in Edwin a notion of ownership and possession 
that contradicts his idea of Hilda as independent of his will. By kissing her, he has 





cannot be fully masculine until he makes an object of Hilda as his father has made of 
him. Edwin has “got” Hilda in the same way that Darius has got Edwin—through 
mastery of will.  
 Soon after declaring their love for one another, Hilda leaves on some business to 
Brighton. Impatient to hear from her and eager to calm himself, Edwin muses: “And he 
now learnt that profound lesson that an individual must be taken or left in entirety, and 
that you cannot change an object merely because you love it” (302). Although the 
sentiment is indeed profound, the use of the word “object” is striking. It corresponds 
with Edwin’s continuing notion of distinct and separate bodies that either possess or are 
possessed. What is loved is an “object,” not an “individual.” Soon after Darius rebukes 
his attempt to talk to his father about marrying Hilda, Edwin learns that she has 
unexpectedly married a Mr. Cannon in Brighton. 
 
Darius Dies 
 Dismayed by his failed romance with Hilda, Edwin observes that true love 
“could not happen to such as he was [. . .]” (312).  He is right. He cannot be with Hilda 
because to Edwin she is still an object, not a person. What occurs to Edwin after he kisses 
Hilda is the “thought of his father.” Although he sweeps it aside with the idea of his 





him—that must be overcome in order for Edwin to truly experience his body. Edwin 
must first be a person in order to recognize Hilda as such. Darius is what has left Edwin 
“disfigured” and “marked.” For in his father’s presence he “slipped back insensibly into 
the boy whose right to an individual existence had never been formally admitted” (306).  
Individual existence and autonomy is essential to experiencing oneself and 
others as capable of an intimacy not of objects but of selves. Edwin can “expect no 
independence of any kind until his father’s death, and he had a direct and powerful 
interest in his father’s death” (306). “In his father’s presence he never could feel that he 
was a man. He remained a boy, with no rights, moral or material” (308).  
 The third book of Clayhanger is called “His Freedom.” Darius falls ill with a 
“softening of the brain” after Mr. Shushions, the man who saves a young Darius and his 
family from certain catastrophe in the workhouse, dies unnoticed and neglected in a 
workhouse. Every moment of Darius’s bodily decline is accompanied by a rise in 
Edwin’s sense of himself as independent. As Edwin assumes responsibility for the 
printing works, he examines his father’s private cash-book: “His father could keep 
nothing from him now. The interior of the safe was like a city that had capitulated; no 
law ran in it but his law, and he was absolute; he could commit infamies in the city and 
none might criticize” (360). Edwin’s assumption of control of the business renders 





“surrenders” when he finds “his son’s will working like a chemical agent in his 
defenceless mind” (363). 
 As Edwin increasingly comes to know himself as a person, Darius degenerates 
into a body, alternately characterized as that of an animal or child. Every morning and 
night, Edwin has to “manoeuvre and persuade that ponderous, irrational body in his 
father’s bedroom. Maggie helped the body to feed itself at table” (400). Darius has 
become an object, entirely subject to the needs and limitations of his body. Edwin and 
his brother-in-law Albert struggle to get Darius upstairs remarking that “either Darius 
was pretending to be a carcass, or [they] were pretending that a carcass was alive” (399). 
Darius is no longer reasonable but an “incalculable and mysterious beast,” whose body 
is “cumbrous” and “monstrous” (399, 401). The “child-man” who once toiled in the 
Bastille degenerates into a man-child (25). At the dinner table he tries “to hold a sausage 
firm on his plate with his knife, and to cut it with his fork” (375). “Like an unhappy 
child,” Darius sleeps to escape “the enormous, infantile problems of his existence” (402). 
As his illness progresses, “the body seemed to have that vague appearance of general 
movement which a multitude of insects will give to a piece of decaying matter. His skin 
was sick, and his hair, and his pale lips” (420). Whereas Edwin’s physical experience has 
developed from a sense of the body to his body, Darius, in his illness, is simply “the 





any sense of an integrated self but it is further dissected into its component parts. For 
Darius there is neither whole self nor whole body. 
 During a social banquet, Edwin realizes that he has “already finally and 
definitely taken the place of his father” (417). Not only does he realize it, but also he 
begins to take pleasure in that knowledge as he observes that “in comparison with his 
father he was a god of miraculous proud strength and domination” (421). Although 
compassionate towards his father’s struggle for life, Edwin nevertheless regards his vigil 
at Darius’s deathbed as a “nocturnal adventure” that sends “tremors down his spine” 
(423). The image very directly recalls the night that Hilda, out for a “nocturnal stroll,” 
confronts Edwin in the garden of the new house.25 Then too his “spine thrilled, as if a 
hand delicate and terrible had run down it in a caress.”26 Just as the episode with Hilda 
in the garden excites Edwin with the possibility of knowing his body in relation to 
another person, so the impending death of Darius excites Edwin with the possible 
“freedom” and “independence” of his physical life. Both encounters create physical 
excitement. He is “glad that an experience tremendous and supreme had been 
vouchsafed to him. He knew now what the will to live was. He saw life naked, stripped 
of everything unessential. He saw life and death together” (424). That he sees life 
                                                 
25 See above, p. 74. 
 
 





“naked” recalls the experience of the body. It is now “stripped” of all signification. What 
emerges is a body that is no longer an object, whether of will or language, and is 
therefore vulnerable. Objects do not die; persons do.  
 After Darius is dead, Edwin’s “distress was shot through and enlightened by his 
[. . .] experience of such profound and overwhelming grandeur. His father was, and lo! 
he was not. That was all, but it was ineffable” (434). The passing away of life, of a self, of 
a body is “all” there is, in the sense of profoundness and simplicity and inevitability. It is 
in Darius’s death that Edwin “first began to realize an individual freedom. [. . . ] he felt 
sturdily that he was free. The chain was at last broken that had bound together those 
two beings so dissimilar, antagonistic, and ill-matched—Edwin Clayhanger and his 
father” (436). But because Edwin’s freedom is contingent on Darius’s death, it is not 
absolute. There remains the notion that two free persons cannot exist at once—one must 
always be subject to the will of the other until the other is dead. This tenuous individual 
freedom gained through Darius’s death allows Edwin to begin relating to Hilda, 
although haltingly, as something other than an object.27   
 
                                                 
27 Robert Squillace characterizes this shift in Edwin from conqueror to companion as a “new 
masculinity” that “involves a learning of the other through sympathetic identification rather than 
force, a recognition of the other’s right to be other, an extension of the modern ideal of autonomy 
everywhere without exception.”  Modernism, Modernity, and Arnold Bennett, p. 108. Although 
Squillace is aware of this shift in Edwin, he fails to account for it in terms of Edwin’s own 






A New Possibility 
 The very next section of the book after Darius dies is called “His Start in Life” 
(437). Edwin learns that Hilda has had a son, is now widowed, and runs a boarding 
house in Brighton. Ten years after their last meeting, he goes to her and finds that she is 
heavily in debt and at risk of losing her house completely. Hilda admits that her 
husband is not dead but in prison, destroying Edwin’s hope of reconciliation. The 
troubled state of Hilda’s house reflects both her poverty as well as the transgression 
against her body. After her marriage to George Cannon, Hilda discovers that he is a 
bigamist and that their son has been born out of wedlock. Alternately cruel and 
compassionate, Edwin lends her the money to save her house. In a chapter called “The 
Bully,” Edwin confronts Hilda about her past actions and her current state: 
  He looked at her like a conqueror. He had taught her a thing or  
  two. He had been a man. He was proud of himself. He was proud 
  of all sorts of details in his conduct [. . .]. ‘This time yesterday,’ he  
  reflected, in his triumph, ‘I hadn’t even seen her, and didn’t know  
  where she was [. . .].’ With pity and with joy he watched her slowly 
  wiping her eyes [. . .]. He had shown her her master. He felt that  
  she had been profoundly wronged by destiny, and that gentleness  
  must be lavished upon her. (481-82) 
 
Although Edwin reverts to his former language of possession and triumph, it is now 
attenuated by the decade of suffering her loss. The short, declarative sentences further 





staccato rhetoric to shore up his position. Hilda and Edwin separate without 
reconciliation. 
 In the final scene of Clayhanger, Hilda visits Edwin in Bleakridge as he is 
recovering from a life-threatening flu. In his illness he is “aware of an intensified 
perception of himself as a physical organism. He thought calmly, ‘What a fine thing life 
is!’” (547).28 Reclining in his father’s easy chair, he knows, “‘No other woman was ever 
like this woman!’ He wanted to rise masterfully, to accomplish some gesture splendid 
and decisive, but he was held in the hollow of the easy chair as though by paralysis” 
(551). Unlike his mastery during their last meeting, Edwin now is paralyzed. His 
impaired body checks Edwin’s impulse to master—his physical vulnerability allows him 
to be open to Hilda. He sees Hilda as a unique and particular person whom “he could 
not read” (551). Her body is no longer an object to be possessed. She is irreducible and 
illegible, not a text to be deciphered. Edwin’s fantasies of mastery and possession have 
given way to the reality of the relationship. Hilda confesses to Edwin the circumstances 
of her marriage, renewing the hope of a relationship between them. Edwin thrills as he 
notices the significance of the situation: 
  (Somewhere within himself he smiled as he reflected that he, in his  
                                                 
28 Bennett describes his own physical state after an illness in nearly identical terms. He writes, “I 
had no real desire to conquer my gloom. Its cause must have been physical.…I began to have fine 
sensations. A perception that my gloom was passing, what a wonderful thing life was; an 
intensified consciousness of myself as an existing organism.…a physical pleasure in the half-
fatigued realization of my being…the whole experience was somehow voluptuous.”  Things That 





  father’s place, in his father’s very chair, was thus under the spell of  
  a woman whose child was nameless. He smiled grimly at the  
  thought of Auntie Hamps, of Clara, of the pietistic Albert! They  
  were of a different race, a different generation! They belonged to a  
  dead world!)  (553) 
 
They belong to the “dead world” of Darius, where possession and tyranny are the rule. 
It is striking that Edwin has this realization enclosed within parentheses. It is a reflection 
he has “within himself.” Unlike the passage which describes the last time he saw Hilda, 
in which the short, staccato reflections mirror Edwin’s bullying, this parenthetical 
realization is not acted out. Against the dead world of tyranny and piety, Edwin chooses 
life: 
  After a whole decade his nostrils quivered again to the odour of her  
  olive skin. Drowning amid the waves of her terrible devotion, he  
  was recompensed in the hundredth part of a second for all that  
  through her he had suffered or might hereafter suffer. The many  
  problems and difficulties which marriage with her would raise  
  seemed trivial in the light of her heart’s magnificent and furious  
  loyalty. He thought of the younger Edwin whom she had kissed  
  into rapture, as of a boy too inexperienced in sorrow to appreciate  
  this Hilda. He braced himself to the exquisite burden of life.    
  (553-54) 
 
Thus ends the novel. It is an uneasy ending, filled with an experience of sorrow and 
difficulty. In order to appreciate “this Hilda,” and not the one in his imagination, the 
“ideal Hilda” with whom he first falls in love, Edwin realizes that he has first to 
recognize his own bodily freedom, which freedom includes vulnerability, and then the 





 The next time we encounter Edwin and Hilda, in the last novel of the Clayhanger 
trilogy, These Twain (1916), they are newly married. The first section of the book is 
entitled “The Woman in the House.”  This time Edwin does not intercept Hilda in the 
garden. She is allowed inside. Edwin’s body is no longer separate and inviolable. Indeed, 
“the whole house was her affair. It was no longer his house [. . .]” (885). Hilda does “not 
simply live in the house; she pervaded it. As soon as he opened the front-door he felt 
her” (885). At the end of the story, despite passionate struggle and conflict with Hilda, 
Edwin marvels at the “greatness of the adventure of existence with this creature, to him 
unique [. . .]” (1301). 
 
 Edwin has progressed from the will to conquer the body he does not know to the 
impulse to become engrossed in the pleasure of his body. The move from the old, 
mechanical house to the new, organic one mirrors this transition in Edwin’s sense of his 
own body. In both circumstances, Edwin regards himself an object. It is therefore 
inevitable that he also considers Hilda an object when they first meet. As with himself, 
he alternately wishes to subdue her by force or to possess her in pleasure. Only after 
Darius dies is Edwin capable of recognizing himself a free person. Contingent on 





The problem is not that Edwin’s freedom is relational, but that the other person 
has to die for him to be free. He does not yet conceive the possibility of two free persons 
existing at once. Edwin remains solitary and self-enclosed in this freedom while others 
continue to exist as objects. His relationship with a living Hilda, precariously balanced 
as it is between mastery and surrender, will determine whether Edwin is free or not. As 
the passage from the old house to the new house indicates Edwin’s evolution from a 
rational to a sensate body, the change from the new house to “the woman in the house” 
signals Edwin’s movement from a self-conscious to an other-conscious body. Only when 
he first acknowledges Hilda’s right to an individual existence can Edwin fully recognize 
his own. Her freedom is also his.  
 Bennett does not resolve this issue at novel’s end. We know only that Edwin 
resigns himself to the “exquisite burden of life” that is contact with another person. 
Because human love is for Edwin primarily a function of physiological need and 
attraction, choice is not entirely free. Edwin’s options are either “rapture” or “burden,” 
both of which imply a passive subjection to his physical state. Although he has gained 





Edwin nevertheless remains tethered to a notion of relationship as conflict and 
suffering.29 
 The problem of the novel of artistic development is to bridge the gap between 
the protagonist’s isolated consciousness and the world. Edwin’s progress reflects the 
notion of the aesthetic as bodily sensation and relational struggle. Bennett attempts to 
resolve, albeit tentatively, the problem of the form through human contact. Edwin 
connects with the world by virtue of his physical relationship with Hilda. But in the 
process, he has to sacrifice his art in order to connect. Whereas Bennett begins this 
movement from artistic consciousness toward the world through an actual relationship 
with another person, Virginia Woolf completes it in The Voyage Out. James Joyce 
intervenes between Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Woolf. Edwin Clayhanger abandons his 
artistic aspirations in order to live in the world; Stephen Dedalus renounces the world in 
favor of an unfettered, creative consciousness. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Commenting in his journals about the relationship between men and women, Bennett writes, 
“The two sexes must forever remain distant, antagonistic, and mutually inexplicable.”  June 24, 





Chapter 3:  “We must neither love one another nor die” 
 
“Verily, it is well for the world that it sees only  
beauty of the completed work and not its origins  
nor the conditions whence it sprang; since  
knowledge of the artist’s inspiration might often  
                                           but confuse and alarm and so prevent the full effect of  
    its excellence. Strange hours, indeed, these were, and  
    strangely unnerving the labour that filled them!  
    Strangely fruitful intercourse this, between one body  
    and another mind!” 
 
Thomas Mann, “Death in Venice” 
 
 
 Whereas Edwin sacrifices his artistic ambitions to “the exquisite burden of life,” 
Stephen Dedalus flatly rejects everything but his impulse to create the world. A Portrait 
of the Artist as a Young Man had a series of incarnations. Joyce wrote “A Portrait of the 
Artist” first as a dramatic essay on aesthetics. Casting himself as the artist-protagonist of 
that essay, Joyce advocates an art that “liberate[s] from the personalised lumps of matter 
that which is their individuating rhythm, the first or formal relation of their parts.”1 
When the editors of Dana rejected the essay for publication in 1904, Joyce began to 
rewrite it as Stephen Hero. He then reworked the longer and more conventional 
                                                 






narrative of Stephen Hero into A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man.2 Throughout the 
different versions of the novel, Joyce remains focused on mining the hidden significance 
of various “lumps of matter.”   
 Virginia Woolf, more than any other contemporary critic, gets right what is at 
stake in Joyce’s first novel. The critical response to the serial publication of the novel, 
whether laudatory or outraged, principally addresses its minute and original inspection 
of bodily processes. This detailed focus on the goings on of the body is widely construed 
as evidence of Joyce’s materialism. Ezra Pound declares him a realist: “He gives the 
thing as it is.”3 H. G. Wells recommends its “quintessential and unfailing reality.”4 On 
the other hand, an anonymous reviewer finds Joyce clever but feels “he would really be 
at his best in a treatise on drains.”5 Critics, both sympathetic and indignant, mistake 
effusive physical description for materialism. 
 In an essay that later becomes “Modern Fiction,” Woolf too comments on Joyce’s 
closeness to life as he records “atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which 
                                                 
2 The novel was published as a serial in the Egoist from February 1914 to September 1915, and not 
in book form until the first American edition in 1916. 
 
3 James Joyce: The Critical Heritage, v. 1, ed. Robert H. Deming, p. 67. 
 
 
4 Ibid., p. 87. 
 
 





they fall” and as he traces the pattern “however disconnected and incoherent in 
appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness.”6 Unlike other 
contemporary critics, Woolf recognizes that, despite the abundance of physical 
description, Joyce is concerned primarily with the workings of the mind. Although she 
deems Bennett a materialist in the same essay, Woolf insists, “Mr. Joyce is spiritual; 
concerned at all costs to reveal the flickerings of that innermost flame which flashes its 
myriad messages through the brain.”7 She regards Joyce’s novel spiritual rather than 
material because she does not cease simply at a superficial reckoning of details. She 
considers the total effect, the use to which the body and life are put.  
Ultimately, in the novel “mind” and “consciousness” rule body and world. With 
characteristic sagacity, Woolf casually goes on to wonder: “Is it due to the method that 
we feel neither jovial nor magnanimous, but centred in a self which in spite of its tremor 
of susceptibility never reaches out or embraces or comprehends what is outside and 
beyond?”8 The material specificity of the story, serving simply as fodder for his 
consciousness, in no way pierces Stephen’s sense of innerness and isolation. He remains 
witness to and not participant in life or body. Stanislaus Joyce echoes Woolf’s perception: 
                                                 











“Though the treatment is objective, we are, as it were, from first to last in the centre of 
Stephen’s brain. The picture is an interior.”9 As Bennett embodies the aesthetic tradition 
of materialism, trumping consciousness with sensory fact, Joyce carries forward the 
idealist line by subordinating “lumps of matter” to flights of consciousness. 
 
Controlling the Body through External Authorities 
 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is perhaps the most well-known novel of 
artistic development. Like Edwin, Stephen has a conflicted relationship with his body 
and his physical sensations. Ultimately, he overcomes the pains and pleasures of his 
body and of life through an escape into imagination. As Auden writes of Yeats, Stephen 
is “hurt . . . into poetry.”10 Although his lack of ease with physical experience ends in 
flight, Stephen initially attempts to evade, sometimes order, his confused physical 
experiences by appealing to various external authorities. Often overwhelmed by his 
physical sensations, Stephen looks to others to rescue him from his physical responses. 
                                                 
9 My Bother’s Keeper, p. 18. Richard Ellmann agrees: “While he took pride in grounding his art 
on brute, honest fact, he insisted also on the mind’s supremacy over all it surveyed.” James Joyce, 
The Critical Writings, eds. Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann, p. 214. There are, though, 
many critics that insist exactly the opposite—that Stephen (and Joyce) is a champion of material 
reality and the body against the squeamishness of critics like Woolf. I find more compelling the 
views of critics, like Woolf and Ellmann, who focus not only on the existence of effusive and 
graphic physical description but also on its function in Stephen’s developing consciousness. 
 
 





As a young boy at Clongowes, Stephen applies to the rector of the school to 
protect him from an unjust physical punishment that he anticipates Father Dolan will 
inflict the next day. Years later, unable to cope with his growing sexual desire, Stephen 
submits his body to a prostitute. Then after a period of wanton surrender to his sexual 
impulses, Stephen subjects himself to a rigid religious program of self-abnegation. When 
that does not suffice to control his bodily experience, Stephen throws off his religious 
devotion in favor of an aesthetic one, invoking the theories of Aristotle and Aquinas in 
order to regulate his body. His final appeal for mediation is to the mythical Daedalus. In 
each section of the novel, Stephen attempts to bring his unruly sensations under the 
order of one authority or another. Although it is not clear whether Joyce intends 
Stephen’s final flight as a triumph or a failure, the narrative progression is of Stephen 
exhausting various possibilities of controlling his body via external authorities—
educational, sexual, religious, aesthetic, and mythical. 
 During his time in Clongowes, Stephen is physically frail. Playing a game of 
football, “He felt his body small and weak amid the throng of players and his eyes were 
weak and watery.”11 Rather than having a sense of a whole body, Stephen experiences 
bodies, his own and others, as a combination of discrete parts. He is easily overwhelmed 
by the rushing throng of body parts. Afraid of “the flashing eyes and muddy boots” of 
                                                 
11 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, ed. Jeri Johnson, p. 6. Subsequent references to the 





the other boys, Stephen is both fascinated by and terrified of his body (7). His young 
body is subject to various kinds of physical pain: a schoolmate shoves him into a muddy 
ditch; he suffers a serious cold; the prefect of studies strikes him for being idle. Stephen 
responds to these incidents by becoming absorbed in his immediate physical sensations, 
trying to understand what is happening, falling into confusion, and, finally, bringing 
some kind of order to his experience.  
After the prefect strikes him, “His whole body was shaking with fright, his arm 
was shaking and his crumpled burning livid hand shook like a loose leaf in the air” (42). 
Confused and unwilling to be beaten again, Stephen asks the rector to intervene on his 
behalf. When the rector excuses him from his lessons until his parents send him new 
eyeglasses, Stephen, unsatisfied, insists, “Yes, sir, but Father Dolan said he will come in 
tomorrow to pandy me again for it” (48). Stephen only relents when the rector promises 
to speak to Father Dolan directly. The first section of the novel ends with Stephen’s 
triumph in appealing to the rector. What he does, in effect, is control what is done to his 
body by appealing to a figure of authority to protect him from physical pain. More 
importantly, Stephen learns to manage his bodily sensations by ceding authority to an 
outside figure. 
 In the next section of the novel, Stephen has matured from a child avoiding pain 
to an adolescent seeking pleasure. Although his bodily sensations have evolved from 





surrendering to an external force persists. Stephen has his first sexual experience with a 
prostitute. He follows her into a room and notices a “huge doll [sitting] with her legs 
apart in the copious easychair beside the bed” (84). He cannot bring himself to admit his 
desire for the woman, instead displacing it onto the doll. Stephen is unable to kiss the 
prostitute. As she holds him to her, “he felt that he had suddenly become strong and 
fearless and sure of himself” (85). Although Stephen feels strong, the reality is that she is 
holding him “firmly” in her arms; she “bows” his head and kisses him (85). He “all but 
burst into hysterical weeping” (84).  In fact, “it was too much for him. He closed his eyes, 
surrendering himself to her . . .” (85). 
 Because neither the rector nor the prostitute has been able to relieve his 
tumultuous sensations, Stephen decides to do away with his bodily impulses altogether. 
In an effort to distance his soul from sin, Stephen wonders if that “bestial part of the 
body [. . .] feels and understands and desires [. . .] moved by a lower soul than his soul” 
(117-18). Could it be that an independent “torpid snaky life” had been “feeding” off of 
him (118)? Stephen’s solution is to conquer the body once and for all. “His body to 
which he had yielded was dying. Into the grave with it! Nail it down into a wooden box, 
the corpse [. . .] into the grave, to rot, to feed the mass of its creeping worms and to be 
devoured by scuttling plumpbellied rats” (94). Stephen sets out programmatically to 
mortify his senses, bringing each under a strict discipline of self-denial: he walks with 





subjects himself to “a certain stale fishy stink like that of longstanding urine;” practices 
“strict habits at table [. . .] observed [. . .] fasts;” and to mortify the sense of touch, “sat in 
the most uncomfortable positions, suffered patiently every itch and pain, kept away 
from the fire, remained on his knees all through the mass [. . .]” (127). The third section 
of the novel ends as Stephen kneels for morning communion at the end of the religious 
retreat at the college. His body is purified and ready for “a life of grace and virtue and 
happiness” (123). Perhaps religious authority has succeeded where others have failed. 
 But Stephen soon finds himself dissatisfied with religious devotion too and is 
unwilling to commit to life as a priest. He disavows the call of the Church and turns 
instead to fulfill the prophecy of his name. The mythical Daedalus will lead Stephen 
away from the dread of his own body. Echoing Joyce’s view of the artist as freeing from 
“personalised lumps of matter that which is their individuating rhythm,” Stephen finds 
in his namesake a “symbol of the artist forging anew in his workshop out of the sluggish 
matter of the earth a new soaring impalpable imperishable being” (142).12 Whereas the 
Church merely aims to purify his still human body, Daedalus holds the promise of a 
completely transformed body, intangible and immortal. “His soul was soaring in an air 
beyond the world and the body he knew was purified in a breath and delivered of 
incertitude and made radiant and commingled with the element of the spirit” (142). As 
                                                 
12 “A Portrait of the Artist,” in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Text, Criticism, and Notes, 





the novel proceeds, Stephen turns from earthly authorities—rector and prostitute—to 
symbolic ones—Daedalus and art—with the Church as the mediator between the two. 
He moves from managing the body he has to transcending it altogether. 
 The final authority to which Stephen subjects his body is art. In the last section of 
the book, Stephen sets out his aesthetic principles “by the light of one or two ideas of 
Aristotle and Aquinas” (157). Dividing art into three forms, Stephen values most the 
dramatic, which grants each person a “proper and intangible esthetic life” while the 
artist, “like the God of the creation,” is refined out of existence (180-81). Unlike the 
lyrical and epical forms that arouse desire and loathing, the dramatic form induces 
emotional stasis by “arresting” the mind in “an ideal pity or an ideal terror [. . .] 
prolonged and at last dissolved by what I call the rhythm of beauty” (173). The trouble 
with moving toward pleasure or away from pain is that “they are not more than 
physical” (173). The first three sections of the novel represent kinetic emotions: 
appealing to the rector to avoid pain, seeking pleasure with the prostitute, conquering 
both impulses in seeking pain and avoiding pleasure in religion. These worldly 
authorities have failed to regulate Stephen’s unruly body. Daedalus and art transcend 
the bind altogether, guaranteeing immortality and stasis. 
 Each of the putative triumphs that conclude the five sections is also a moment of 
defeat. All of Stephen’s appeals to external authority have been ineffectual, either 





laugh about Stephen’s bold visit. His sexual encounter with the prostitute is uneasy and 
anti-climactic. The religion through which he seeks redemption dwindles into 
skepticism. His art not only does not refine him out of existence but leaves him with 
heightened desire, for, as Auden continues in his poem to Yeats, “poetry makes nothing 
happen.”13 And his final mythical escape from Ireland places him in the unhappy 
position of Icarus. 
 
Disembodied Sex 
 Although it sounds counterintuitive to suggest that Stephen discounts his body, 
given the graphic descriptions of his sexual desire, it is nonetheless the case. No amount 
of shocking detail can bridge the distance between Stephen and his body. His physical 
desire remains always a suggestion, allusive, yet to come. Visiting Queen’s College with 
his father, Stephen is startled to see the word “foetus” carved into a desk: 
  [. . .] the word and the vision capered before his eyes as he walked  
  back across the quadrangle and towards the college gate. It  
  shocked him to find in the outer world a trace of what he had  
  deemed till then a brutish and individual malady of his own mind.  
  His recent monstrous reveries came thronging into his memory.  
  They too had sprung up before him, suddenly and furiously, out of  
  mere words [. . .]. [He wondered] always where they came from,  
  from what den of monstrous images [. . .]. (75-76) 
 
                                                 





This passage begins Stephen’s struggle toward pursuing his physical urges. His growing 
inner desire is confirmed and encouraged by an external and legible “trace.” The 
reveries “throng” and overwhelm him as did the players in the football match years 
earlier. Although the language is suggestive, what is actually given is a series of 
deferrals that are never made explicit: “the word,” “the vision,” “a trace,” “reveries,” 
and “images.”  Stephen experiences his body not directly but through substitution and 
delay.  
Later in the passage, we are told that “the letters cut in the stained wood of the 
desk stared upon him, mocking his bodily weakness and futile enthusiasms and making 
him loathe himself for his own mad and filthy orgies” (76). Stephen feels isolated by “his 
monstrous way of life” (77). Although the passage implies that Stephen is tortured by 
and has succumbed to some bodily tumult, the exact nature of it remains to be revealed. 
 Near the end of the second section of the novel, Stephen surrenders to his 
physical desires. His “blood was in revolt” (83). He is an animal seeking relief: 
  He wandered up and down the dark slimy streets peering into the 
  gloom of lanes and doorways, listening eagerly for any sound. He  
  moaned to himself like some baffled prowling beast. He wanted to  
  sin with another of his kind, to force another being to sin with him  
  and to exult with her in sin. He felt some dark presence moving  
  irresistibly upon him from the darkness, a presence subtle and  
  murmurous as a flood filling him wholly with itself. (83-84) 
 
The descriptive language—the “peering,” moaning, and forcing—evokes a sense of 





sin.” The idea of sin introduces a distance and abstraction in the experience of the body; 
it is a displacement of motive from the physical to the moral dimension. What Stephen 
wants to “force” and “exult” in, what he is moaning for, is not sex but sin. He is not 
seeking the fulfillment of physical desires but the transgression of religious codes. He 
desires not the physical release but the moral consequence of sex.14 Something always 
stands between Stephen and the immediate and direct experience of his body. 
 Stephen wanders further into the “maze” of the narrow alleyways, drawn along 
by some “dark presence”: 
  A trembling seized him and his eyes grew dim. The yellow  
  gasflames arose before his troubled vision against the vapoury sky,  
burning as if before an altar. Before the doors and in the lighted  
halls groups were gathered arrayed as for some rite. He was in  
another world: he has awakened from a slumber of centuries. (84) 
 
The language of religious transgression is now replaced by ritual sacrifice. The world of 
sex as an expression of physical desire holds no reality for Stephen; he is intent on 
“another world.” His “vision” is “troubled” both because he is nearsighted as well as 
because he is on the verge of some kind of bodily sacrifice. What is a sexual encounter 
with a prostitute has been refigured into some ritual sacrifice at an altar. Stephen cannot 
                                                 
14 In a letter to Joyce about Ulysses, his brother Stanislaus writes: “This brooding on the lower 
order of natural facts, this re-evocation and exaggeration of detail by detail and the spiritual 
dejection which accompanies them are purely in the spirit of the confessional.” Letters of James 





bear the immediacy of his sensations or his sexual desire. He must transform them into a 
visionary encounter far removed in time and space. 
 Some twenty pages after Stephen’s first bodily stirrings, he consummates his 
sexual desire with a prostitute: 
  He tried to bid his tongue speak that he might seem at ease [. . .].  
  Her round arms held him firmly to her and he [. . .] all but burst  
  into hysterical weeping [. . .]. His lips would not bend to kiss her  
  [. . .]. With a sudden movement she bowed his head and joined her  
  lips to his [. . .]. It was too much for him. He closed his eyes,  
  surrendering himself to her, body and mind [. . .]. [Her lips]  
  pressed upon his brain as upon his lips as though they were the  
  vehicle of a vague speech [. . .]. (84-85) 
 
This final scene of consummation is far from climactic. It does not fulfill the promise of 
the “prowling beast,” “mad and filthy orgies,” and “monstrous” behavior that we have 
been led to expect. The “trace” and “image” and “vision” of Stephen’s bodily 
experiences do not lead to what they connote. In this sense too is Stephen’s “vision 
troubled”—what he imagines and what actually happens are different. Throughout the 
encounter, Stephen remains at the mercy of the prostitute and bears no sense of an 
independent, bodily agency. 
 As Stephen struggles with the opposition between his desire and his senses, the 
chasm between his sexual acts and his actual physical body widens. After his sexual 
encounter, the “women” and “girls” that designated prostitutes before are now simply 





  [. . .] would pass them by calmly waiting for a sudden movement of  
  his own will or a sudden call to his sinloving soul from their soft  
  perfumed flesh. Yet as he prowled in quest of that call, his senses,  
  stultified only by his desire, would note keenly all that wounded or  
  shamed them; his eyes, a ring of porter froth on a clothless table or  
a photograph of two soldiers standing to attention or a gaudy  
playbill; his ears, the drawling jargon of greeting [. . .]. (86) 
 
It is still his “will” and “sinloving soul” that determine the form and substance of his 
physical gratification. Stephen’s “senses” and “desire,” rather than being integrated, are 
at odds, because his desire does not spring from his bodily sensations. His desire 
“stultifies” his senses rather than heightening them because what he desires is to be 
transported to “another world.” Furthermore, what “wounds” his senses are matters of 
decorum and taste: a stain on a table, a gaudy advertisement, unpleasant speech. 
Fearing that his body or soul may be “maimed by the excess” of experience, Stephen 
finds that not only are they not “maimed” but a “dark peace had been established 
between them” (87). In a reversal, Stephen’s soul is characterized as “reentering her 
dwelling shyly after the frenzy of his body’s lust had spent itself [. . .]” (88). His 
“sinloving” soul has been made “shy” and his timid body is now “frenzied.”   
 The end of this “riot” of the soul disguised as physical abandon comes with the 
school’s religious retreat in honor of Saint Francis Xavier. After the first day, Stephen 
goes home agitated: 
  He ate his dinner with surly appetite and, when the meal was over  
  and the greasestrewn plates lay abandoned on the table, he rose  





  with his tongue and licking it from his lips. So he had sunk to the  
  state of a beast that licks his chaps after meat. This was the end; and  
 a faint glimmer of fear began to pierce the fog of his mind [. . .]. His  
 soul was fattening and congealing into a gross grease, plunging  
 ever deeper in its dull fear into a somber threatening dusk, while  
 the body that was his stood, listless and dishonoured, gazing out of  
darkened eyes, helpless, perturbed and human for a bovine god to  
stare upon. (94) 
 
For all of the sexual intimations of “blood revolt” and “filthy orgies,” this scene of eating 
is more explicit and viscerally forceful than the scenes of Stephen’s dalliance with the 
prostitute. His bodily surrender to the prostitute is innocent compared to his licking his 
lips after a meal. That is why this is “the end” of his sexual adventures—because this is 
the first moment he experiences their impact bodily. Until now, Stephen has experienced 
his sexual exploits as moral or aesthetic transgressions. Because his sexual encounters 
are more about his morals than about his body, Stephen’s sexual riot ends at the 
religious retreat.  
As he distinguishes “his soul” from “the body that was his,” the distance 
between Stephen and his physical experience grows. He cannot bring himself to think of 
it as his body, the relationship remaining more an accident than an identity. In this 
passage describing a meal, more than in any of the scenes describing his sexual exploits, 
we first see Stephen “sunk to the state of a beast.” The soul is what is “fattened” and 
“congealed” through his transgressions; the body, in fact “helpless” before the 





suggests, when “degraded man outrages and defiles the temple of the Holy Ghost,” he is 
defiling the body (104).15 Although resolved to mortify his offending senses, Stephen’s 
penitence is short-lived precisely because he displaces onto his body what has been and 
remains a revolt of his soul.  
Each of the five sections of the novel, like the labyrinth at Crete, presents an 
obstacle for Stephen to overcome on his way to eventual flight. Stephen attempts to 
escape the experience of his body through various displacements, all of which fail to 
regulate his sensory experience. Each section of the novel concludes in a dead end that 
forces Stephen to turn another way. When he has finally exhausted his earthly and 
embodied possibilities, Stephen looks up. Although his sexual experiences verge on 
graphic materiality, Stephen remains disembodied throughout the novel. His sexual 





                                                 
15 Paul writes, “All other sins that someone may commit are done outside the body; but the 
sexually immoral person sins against his own body. Do you not realise that your body is the 
temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you and whom you received from God? You are not your 
own property, then; you have been bought at a price. So use your body for the glory of God.” 1 





Stephen the Creator 
 Frustrated by his inability to regulate his body by appealing to various external 
authorities, Stephen turns inward. He begins to focus on his own internal capacity to 
refashion himself and the world. His drive to actively create the world replaces his 
posture of passive surrender to external authorities, which now are so many “nets” 
flung at the soul “to hold it back from flight” (171). Art and myth allow him to 
internalize the authority he needs to control both his bodily impulses and his responses 
to the world. The movement from the dramatic third person narration that opens the 
novel to the first person journal entries that end it completes Stephen’s voyage in. The 
real boy with the real father has become the mythical boy with the mythical father. 
 The novel opens with an epigraph from Ovid’s Metamorphoses: “Et ignotas 
animum dimittit in artes” (3). The line refers to Daedalus as he sets out to make the wings 
with which he escapes the labyrinth of the Minotaur. “So then to unimagined arts he set 
his mind [and altered nature’s laws]” (224). As with Daedalus, where one unnatural 
invention necessitates another (the wooden bull that requires the labyrinth that requires 
the wings), Stephen’s art too becomes self-perpetuating. Designed to transcend the 
limitations of his body, Stephen’s alternate world of images and traces, visions and 
poems, creates an unbridgeable distance between him and the world. He does this 





connection with his own experience, with the world, and with others. Unsuccessful in 
his attempts to externally curb his bodily experience through a series of displacements, 
Stephen sets out to reimagine himself and the world. 
As Stephen’s faith falters, he no longer can cast his physical desires as moral 
transgressions. Instead, he retreats into a world of language and fantasy in order to 
avoid what is unruly in his body and in the world. In an entry titled “Esthetic” in the 
Trieste Notebook, Joyce writes that: 
  The instant of inspiration is a spark so brief as to be invisible. The  
reflection of it on many sides at once from a multitude of cloudy 
circumstances with no one of which it is united save by the bond of 
merest possibility veils its afterglow in an instant in a first confusion of 
form. This is the instant in which the word is made flesh.16 
 
The relationship between circumstance and inspiration is one of “merest possibility.” As 
the novel progresses, the connection between things and words loosens from simple 
representation to active creation. In an alchemical “confusion of form,” words come to 
stand apart from the things that they represent. This happens not naturally but as a 
consequence of a bold act of creation by “a priest of the eternal imagination,” who 
transmutes “the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everliving life” 
(186).17   
                                                 
16 Joyce made various entries about characters and themes in the Trieste Notebook beginning in 
1907, when he decided that he would rewrite Stephen Hero. In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 






 The novel follows Stephen’s transformation from passive witness to active 
creator. During the family’s boisterous Christmas dinner at the beginning of the novel, 
young Stephen tries to work out the difference between Protestant and Catholic. He 
remembers hearing that Protestants call the Virgin Mary a “Tower of Ivory.” He 
wonders, “How could a woman be a tower of ivory or a house of gold” (29). Stephen 
then thinks of his Protestant friend Eileen: “Eileen had long white hands. One evening 
when playing tig she had put her hands over his eyes: long and white and thin and cold 
and soft. That was ivory: a cold white thing” (29). Stephen associates the word with the 
qualities of the thing it represents. When Stephen is young, there is a correspondence 
between language and sensory perception.18  
Years later, things have changed considerably. Walking through a street of shops 
on his way to university, Stephen notices an advertisement: “His own consciousness of 
language was ebbing from his brain and trickling into the very words themselves which 
set to band and disband themselves in wayward rhythms [. . .]. The word now shone in 
his brain, clearer and brighter than any ivory sawn from the mottled tusks of elephants. 
Ivory, ivoire, avorio, ebur” (150). Rather than perceiving things as having an independent 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Speaking to his brother, Joyce characterizes his early poems as “converting the bread of 
everyday life into something that has a permanent artistic life of its own.” In Stanislaus Joyce, My 
Brother’s Keeper, p. 104. 
 
 
18 Examples abound of Stephen working out the meaning of words through sensory investigation: 





existence, Stephen focuses instead on his conscious capacity to create what he sees. Ivory 
is no longer “a cold white thing” but rather a shining word in Stephen’s brain, a word 
“clearer and brighter” than actual ivory.19  
The artist, Joyce writes in the essay that shares the novel’s name, “annihilated 
and rebuilt experience.”20 Perception of external phenomena gives way to their internal 
recreation, which is then projected outward as original creation. Stephen is increasingly 
self-enclosed: “Nothing moved him or spoke to him from the real world unless he heard 
in it an echo of the infuriated cries within him” (77). Words replace things as “the world 
perished about his feet as if it had been fire consumed [. . .]” (148). As Stephen says in 
Stephen Hero, “My own mind [. . .] is more interesting to me than the entire country.”21 
 As he exercises his inner capacity to create the world, Stephen’s artistry grows in 
scope. No longer relying on formal verse simply to transcend his physical shortcomings, 
Stephen uses the entire “sordid tide of life” as the occasion for his aesthetic flights of 
fancy. Stephen transforms his everyday life, particularly his bodily experiences, into 
expansive moments of being. Even infestation by lice becomes an opportunity to call 
                                                 
19 Of Stephen’s relationship with language, Frank Budgen notes that words “were much more 
potent than the objects, actions and relations they stood for.” James Joyce and the Making of 
Ulysses, p. 58. 
 
 
20 “A Portrait of the Artist,” in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Text, Criticism, and Notes, 
ed. Chester G. Anderson, p. 261. 
 
 





forth Thomas Nashe’s “A Litany in Time of Plague”: “The life of his body, illclad, illfed, 
louseeaten, made him close his eyelids in a sudden spasm of despair: and in the 
darkness he saw the brittle bright bodies of lice falling from the air and turning often as 
they fell. Yes; and it was not darkness that fell from the air. It was brightness. Brightness 
falls from the air. He had not even remembered rightly Nash’s line” (197). Stephen adjusts 
his sensory perception to accommodate the poetic line.  
 Stephen’s drive to create extends further outward, becomes more entrenched and 
pervasive. He begins to  
  defile with patience whatever image had attracted his eyes [. . .] he  
  moved among distorted images of the outer world. A figure that  
  had seemed to him by day demure and innocent came towards him  
  by night through the winding darkness of sleep, her face  
  transfigured by lecherous cunning [. . .]. (83) 
 
His daily experience is of “images” and “figures,” not of things or persons. Subject to his 
desire, he patiently defiles, distorts, and transfigures what he sees to suit his imagination.  
Instead of writing verse, he now speaks verse and experiences living verse: “Such 
moments passed and the wasting fires of lust sprang up again. The verses passed from 
his lips and the inarticulate cries and the unspoken brutal words rushed forth from his 
brain to force a passage (83). “Verses” and “words” actually “force a passage” between 
bodily desire and the world. They “pass” and “rush” out of him, casting aside any sense 
of agency he had in writing poems. “The world for all its solid substance and complexity 





 In Stephen’s drive to manage his relationship to his body and the world, not only 
is the word made flesh but the flesh is made word. What is real is fictionalized and what 
is fantasy is realized. He manipulates actual bodies, his own and others’, to conform to 
his notions. At the end of the fourth section of the novel, Stephen encounters some 
school friends wading by the sea. Naked, they look “characterless”: 
  Shuley without his deep unbuttoned collar, Ennis without his  
  scarlet belt with the snaky clasp and Connolly without his Norfolk  
coat with the flapless sidepockets! It was a pain to see them and a  
swordlike pain to see the signs of adolescence that made repellant  
their pitiable nakedness. Perhaps they had taken refuge in number  
and noise from the secret dread in their souls. But he, apart from  
them and in silence, remembered in what dread he stood of the  
mystery of his own body. (142) 
 
It physically “pains” Stephen to see things as they are, whether naked bodies or “a ring 
of porter froth on a clothless table” (86). There is no art to which Stephen can subject a 
naked body. It is literally “characterless,” because it is stripped. The exclamation mark 
emphasizes the impossibility of conceiving these boys without their emblematic signs. 
The sexuality of their adolescence, not displaced onto “unbuttoned collars,” “snaky 
clasps,” and “flapless sidepockets” is too immediate for Stephen to bear.  
 In this passage, Stephen leaves behind his schoolmates and the “dread” of his 
own body through a long sequence of identifications with Daedalus. He casts aside 
“fear” and “incertitude” and “shame” as so many “cerements shaken from the body of 





of archetype. His mythical and immortal body has no use for the world and its 
inhabitants. During this out of body flight, Stephen sees a girl “whom magic had 
changed into the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird” (144). There is a “sign upon 
[her] flesh” for Stephen to decipher (144). The “magic” that works on the girl is 
Stephen’s own imagination. Joyce describes Stephen’s conception of the artist more 
explicitly in Stephen Hero:  
  The artist, he imagined, standing in the position of mediator 
between the world of his experience and the world of his dreams— 
<<a mediator, consequently gifted with twin faculties, a selective  
faculty and a reproductive faculty.>>  To equate these faculties was  
the secret of artistic success: the artist who could disentangle the  
subtle soul of the image from its mesh of defining circumstances  
most exactly and <<re-embody>> it in artistic circumstances chosen  
as the most exact for it in its new office, he was the supreme artist.22   
 
Stephen splits the world in two, one outer and the other inner. The outer world 
comprises sensory perception and the “mesh of defining circumstances.” The 
circumstances of the inner world, on the other hand, are artistic and less entangling. The 
artist frees the “subtle soul of the image” from the outer world in which he finds it and 
“re-embodies” it in the world of dreams. The girl wading by the shore is divested of her 
real body and “re-embodied” as a seabird because “to press out again, from the gross 
earth or what it brings forth, from sound and shape and colour which are the prison 
gates of our soul, an image of the beauty we have come to understand—that is art” (173). 
                                                 





Art, then, is breaking free from the sensory perceptions and limitations of the body and 
creating a beautiful image from that struggle for freedom. 
 Stephen is disturbed by his own body, and can no better bear the reality of any 
other human body. Real human contact frightens him. Because he has not been able to 
live his bodily experiences, Stephen can only imagine relationship in magical terms. He 
fantasizes about meeting “in the real world the unsubstantial image which his soul so 
constantly beheld [. . .]. He would fade into something impalpable under her eyes and 
then in a moment, he would be transfigured. Weakness and timidity and inexperience 
would fall from him in that magic moment” (54). Although he desires real contact, when 
the situation arises, Stephen fails to act. As a young boy on the tram with E. C., Stephen 
thinks he “could easily catch hold of her when she comes up to my step [. . .]. I could 
hold her and kiss her. But he did neither: and, when he was sitting alone in the deserted 
tram, he tore his ticket into shreds and stared gloomily at the corrugated footboard” (58). 
This frustration of his physical desire is sublimated into writing an ode to E. C.: 
  During this process all those elements which he deemed common  
  and insignificant fell out of the scene. There remained no trace of  
  the tram itself nor of the trammen nor of the horses: nor did he and  
  she appear vividly. The verses told only of the night and the balmy  
  breeze and the maiden lustre of the moon. Some undefined sorrow  
  was hidden in the hearts of the protagonists as they stood in silence  
  beneath the leafless trees and when the moment of farewell had  
  come the kiss, which had been withheld by one, was given by both.  






In his fantasy, Stephen reimagines the incident without any of the physical details. 
Neither he nor E.C. is “vivid.” The scene is abstract and “undefined.” Not only are all of 
the sensory details excluded, but also what is frustrated in reality is enacted in poetry. In 
his poems Stephen can suffer human contact because his images lack the specificity of 
bodily experience. 
 Stephen’s frustrated relationship with E. C. continues to inspire his poems well 
into his university years. Alternately jealous of her relationship with Father Moran and 
his friend Cranly, Stephen refuses to speak to her on the steps of the library. The next 
morning, he wakes up and writes a villanelle: “in the virgin womb of the imagination 
the word was made flesh” (183). Not only is this Christ in Mary’s womb, but, more 
interestingly, it is yet another metaphorical reversal of what is happening in the 
narrative. In Stephen’s imagination, flesh is made word. Imagination displaces 
incarnation as bodies are turned to verse. Stephen’s “rude brutal anger” with the girl 
breaks up her “fair image” into “fragments” and “distorts the reflections of her image” 
(185). His “bitter and despairing thoughts” about her evoke the villanelle (186). In the 
final moment of creation, “the temptress of his villanelle [. . .] yields” to Stephen, 
“radiant, warm, odorous and lavishlimbed” (187). As with the earlier poem, what 





eludes Stephen in life can be fulfilled in verse.23 Throughout the novel, the bodily origin 
of creation is usurped by a disembodied consciousness. 
 
The Isolated Artist 
As the novel progresses, Stephen increasingly finds futile his appeals to various 
external authorities. He hasn’t been able to control either his own body or the world: 
  How foolish his aim had been! He had tried to build a breakwater  
  of order and elegance against the sordid tide of life without him  
and to dam up, by rules of conduct and active interests and new  
filial relations, the powerful recurrence of the tides within him.  
Useless. From without as from within the water flowed over his  
barriers [. . .]. (82) 
   
Faced with this failure, Stephen turns next to artistic creation to mitigate between the 
external world of sensory experience and the inner world of desire. By emptying outer 
forms and “re-embodying” them as inner forms, Stephen superficially avoids discomfort 
and temporarily fulfills his desires. Aestheticizing his daily life and writing poems 
allows him to maintain an uneasy balance between outer and inner worlds. This too 
eventually fails to curtail his restlessness. Posed as a question to himself, Stephen 
wonders if 
                                                 
23 During one of his separations from his wife Nora, Joyce writes to her: “It is perhaps in art, Nora 
dearest, that you and I will find a solace for our own love.”  Letters of James Joyce, v. 2, ed. 
Richard Ellmann, p. 242. Years later, Arnold Bennett remarks about the couple: “We met James 
Joyce yesterday. Nearly blind, & totally self-centred: a very strong personality indeed. I should 





[. . .] he drew less pleasure from the reflection of the glowing sensible 
world through the prism of language many coloured and richly storied 
than from the contemplation of an inner world of individual emotions 
mirrored perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose? (140)  
 
Art that “re-embodies” the sensible world, no matter how beautifully, no longer suffices. 
Stephen aims to withdraw completely and begin from an inner world that is reflected in 
his art. This passage echoes Pater’s conclusion in The Renaissance. Describing the mind 
as it reflects on external objects, he writes that  
[. . .] the whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow chamber 
of the individual mind. Experience, already reduced to a group of 
impressions, is ringed round for each of us by that thick wall of 
personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, 
or from us to that which we can only conjecture to be without. Every one 
of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, 
each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world.24 
 
So thoroughgoing is the withdrawal of consciousness here that the dream is not of the 
world but of a world. Like Stephen’s inner world, the dream of an indefinite world is 
doubly removed from the actual world. The final sentence can be read in two ways: each 
mind keeping as a solitary prisoner does its own dream of a world, or each mind keeping 
its dream of a world as a solitary prisoner. So either the mind is a solitary prisoner or the 
world is. Like Russian nesting dolls, the dream of a world is the solitary prisoner of the 
solitary mind that is, in turn, the solitary prisoner of an isolated individual.  
                                                 





In Stephen’s case, his isolation is complete when he abandons the “glowing 
sensible world” to the “contemplation of an inner world.” When he is a student at 
Clongowes, Stephen’s sense of self inheres in his idea of his relationship to the external 
environment. He writes in a textbook: 
 Stephen Dedalus 
 Class of Elements 
 Clongowes Wood College 
 Sallins 
 County Kildare 
 Ireland 
 Europe 
 The World 
 The Universe (12) 
 
As a child, he begins with “Stephen Dedalus” and moves outward in the search for 
meaning. Stephen soon exhausts these possibilities, rejecting relationships with 
classmates, family, church, and nation. Instead, he withdraws inward and anchors his 
sense of self in the reflexive inner workings of his mind.  
 That the novel begins with third person narration and ends in first person journal 
mirrors Stephen’s retreat into an inner world. Although his aesthetic hierarchy places 
the dramatic form above the epical and lyrical forms, Stephen himself progresses in the 
reverse order. The novel begins dramatic, moves through romantic and religious epic, 
and concludes in a self-enclosed lyrical mode. The forward march of the novel depletes 
the number of other persons present until there is no one left but Stephen, and even he is 





school and family life, is peopled with characters. The next section ends with Stephen 
and one other person, the prostitute. As the middle section concludes, Stephen 
communes alone with God. He is caught in a solitary vision on the shore in the final 
sentence of the fourth section. In the final journal entry, the novel ends with Stephen 
absent, present only in his self-conscious address to himself and, secondarily, to 
Daedalus. 
 Stephen’s prevailing sense of isolation from life and from others is reflected in 
the ending of the novel. The lyrical form is one in which the artist “presents his image in 
immediate relation to himself” (180). Even as a teenager, Stephen “could respond to no 
earthly or human appeal, dumb and insensible to the call of summer and gladness and 
companionship [. . .]” (77). Before his experience with the prostitute, Stephen sees 
“clearly too his own futile isolation. He had not gone one step nearer the lives he had 
sought to approach nor bridged the restless shame and rancour” that divides him from 
others (82). Stephen’s “constant failure” to “merge his life in the common tide of other 
lives” causes him eventually to abandon his faith (128). When the director of the college 
suggests Stephen consider becoming a priest, he declines, setting out instead “to learn 
his own wisdom apart from others or to learn the wisdom of others himself wandering 
among the snares of the world” (136). Either he will learn through isolated withdrawal 





Satisfied by his solitary vision, Stephen “turns away” from the girl on the seashore 
without making contact (144). 
 Because he is unable to embody his actual lived experience, Stephen cannot make 
contact with another human being. When Cranly asks him if he has ever loved anyone, 
Stephen responds, “I tried to love God” (203). The same exchange is amplified in 
Stephen Hero: 
  —Love, said Stephen, is a name, if you like, for something  
  inexpressible [. . .]. I believe it might be a test of love to see what  
  exchanges it offers. What do people give when they love? 
  —A wedding breakfast, said Cranly. 
  —Their bodies, isn’t it: that, at the very least. It is something to  
  give one’s body even for hire. 
  —Then you think that women who give their bodies for hire, as  
  you say, love the people they give them to? 
  —When we love, we give. In a way they love too. We give  
  something, a tall hat or a book of music or one’s time and labour or  
  one’s body, in exchange for love.25 
 
Stephen has been unable to love because he believes it to be an exchange between bodies. 
And he cannot give what he does not have, what he does not identify with. His final 
encounter with Cranly urges separation from his friend: “Away then: it is time to go. A 
voice spoke softly to Stephen’s lonely heart, bidding him go and telling him that his 
friendship was coming to an end. Yes; he would go. He could not strive against another. 
He knew his part” (206). Before leaving, Stephen declares, “I do not fear to be alone or to 
be spurned for another or to leave whatever I have to leave. And I am not afraid to make 
                                                 





a mistake, even a great mistake, a lifelong mistake and perhaps as long as eternity too” 
(208). In his second to last journal entry, Stephen writes that his mother “prays now [. . .] 
that I may learn in my own life and away from home and friends what the heart is and 
what it feels. Amen” (213). 
 Stephen is capable neither of love—whether of family, friends, or lovers—nor of 
death, because he is not embodied. As a schoolboy, when he first imagines dying, 
Stephen conceives death as “passing out of existence [. . .] by fading out in the sun or by 
being lost and forgotten somewhere in the universe” (78). His notion of the artist, who 
“like the God of creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, 
invisible, refined out of existence,” closely resembles his idea of death. Hearing the “call 
of life” from his mythical namesake, Stephen throws aside “the fear he had walked in 
night and day, the incertitude that had ringed him round, the shame that had abased 
him within and without” as nothing but “cerements shaken from the body of death” 
(143). Being beyond death also means being beyond life. Without a mortal body, neither 
love nor life is possible. Woolf keenly notes that despite Stephen’s “tremor of 
susceptibility,” he “never reaches out or embraces or comprehends what is outside and 
beyond.”26   
 
                                                 





Stephen is no closer than Edwin to answering the central question of the genre: 
how can an artist-protagonist connect with the world through his creative activity? Both 
novels suggest that cannot be done. Like Bennett, Joyce maintains the opposition 
between an artistic sensibility rooted in a disembodied consciousness and an ever-
pressing world experienced through heightened physical sensations. Unlike Bennett, 
Joyce’s protagonist chooses to remain isolated, suffering neither love nor death. Whereas 
Edwin feels compelled to make a choice, Stephen abstains altogether. Both novels, by 
either being resigned to a burdensome life or escaping defensively into imagination, end 
in Pyrrhic victories: nothing has been resolved. Determined to have his body controlled 
from without or regulated from within, Stephen forestalls any possibility of actually 
making contact with another human being. Neither friends, nor family, nor lust, nor 
religion, nor art has sufficed. His final appeal to Daedalus as father does not bode well 





Chapter 4:  “We must love one another and die” 
 
“Everything I am is not mine; yet I am it completely.  
Everything I have is not mine; yet I have it completely.  
Everything I make is not mine; yet I make it completely. 
The infinitely transparent I is the surface identifying body 
and world absolutely. This is the foundation of an 
unqualifiedly total engagement with the world. This is the 
foundation for an essential transformation of the world 
order. Every I that I meet objectively is not me; yet I meet it 
completely in differentiating it. The face-to-face of 
perfectly other I’s is a unity perfectly differentiated.” 
 
D. G. Leahy, Faith and Philosophy 
 
 
 If Joyce’s solution to the problem of the Künstlerroman is to move inward, 
Virginia Woolf attempts instead to voyage out. In her first novel, she deals with themes 
that persist throughout her fictional, critical, and autobiographical writing—the 
relationship between art and life, between mind and body, between self and other. Often 
presenting a wide range of responses to these dilemmas, Woolf does not offer any easy 
resolutions. Nevertheless, beginning with The Voyage Out (1915), she does present a 
possibility other than either abandoning art in order to be related or escaping from 
relationship into art. 
 Although artists abound in Woolf’s novels, this first work is the only one that 





adulthood.1 The story follows Rachel Vinrace, a sheltered, music-loving introvert, on a 
sea voyage to a coastal town in South America. Her aunt, Helen Ridley, undertakes the 
task of educating Rachel about life and the world. Over the course of eight months in 
Santa Marina, Rachel interacts with English tourists staying at the local hotel, falls in 
love, becomes engaged, and dies. Most critics consider Rachel’s death Woolf’s statement 
about the impossibility of marriage for a woman artist.2 This conclusion not only 
contradicts Woolf’s life (she married Leonard Woolf in 1912 after completing an early 
draft of The Voyage Out, which is dedicated to him), but also overlooks that Rachel’s 
death presents an new alternative—neither Edwin’s burdened marriage nor Stephen’s 
metaphorical flight—to the bind between art and life that is characteristic of the 
Künstlerroman genre. And that new alternative—death—is not simply a defeated 
                                                 
1 Neither Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse (1927) nor Miss LaTrobe in Between the Acts (1941) 
assumes the central narrative position that Rachel Vinrace does. Also, those novels do not focus 
primarily on the development of the artist figure. Orlando (1928) bends genre as much as it does 
gender. Spanning nearly five hundred years of Orlando’s life, multiple adventures including a 
change in gender, and the entire history of English literature, the novel has been variously read 
as picaresque, biography, magical realist, and Künstlerroman. Although The Voyage Out might 
also be read in other generic contexts, its most salient features are those of a development novel; 
and, of all of Woolf’s novels, this is the one most explicitly about the development of a young 
artistic consciousness from adolescence to maturity. I am grateful to Victoria Rosner for raising 
the issue of other artist figures in Woolf’s novels. 
 
 
2 See Patricia Moran, Word of Mouth: Body Language in Katherine Mansfield and Virginia 
Woolf; Louise DeSalvo, Virginia Woolf’s First Voyage; Harvena Richter, Virginia Woolf: The 





surrender to the problem. In the narrative world of the novel, Rachel’s death signals a 
developmental achievement in Rachel, in the notion of what an artist is, and in the genre.  
 
Art and Life 
 Throughout the novel, the characters consider and discuss the role of art in life. 
As Rachel encounters these different opinions, her own ideas suffer various shocks. 
Early in the novel, when we first find Rachel alone in her room, she is caught in a reverie 
about growing up in the care of her spinster aunts. She determines that 
It was far better to play the piano and forget all the rest. The conclusion 
was very welcome. Let these odd men and women—her aunts, the Hunts, 
Ridley, Helen, Mr. Pepper, and the rest—be symbols—featureless but 
dignified, symbols of age, of youth, of motherhood, of learning, and 
beautiful often as people on the stage are beautiful. It appeared that 
nobody ever said a thing they meant, or ever talked of a feeling they felt, 
but that was what music was for. [. . .] Absorbed by her music she 
accepted her lot very complacently, blazing into indignation perhaps 
once a fortnight, and subsiding as she subsided now.3  
 
This is the first statement of Rachel’s artistic temperament.4 Her world consists of herself 
and music—everyone else is a “symbol” of abstract qualities. Other people are “odd” 
                                                 
3 The Voyage Out, ed. Jane Wheare, p. 29. Subsequent references to the novel appear in the text. 
 
 
4 Although Rachel mainly plays the piano, during the dance at the hotel, she does create a daring 
piece of music by stitching together various unlikely melodies and rhythms. The Voyage Out, pp. 





and “featureless,” distinguished only in that they are unlike her. The scene ends with 
Rachel fast asleep. 
Woolf herself, in a letter she writes when she is nineteen years old, declaims, 
“The only thing in this world is music—music and books and one or two pictures. I am 
going to found a colony where there shall be no marrying—unless you happen to fall in 
love with a symphony of Beethoven—no human element at all, except what comes 
through Art—nothing but ideal peace and endless meditation.”5 These could be Rachel’s 
words. Other than music, her sympathies are only for nature and animals. When she 
laments the fate of the “poor little goats” that are transported by her father’s shipping 
business, he replies, “If it weren’t for the goats there’d be no music, my dear; music 
depends upon goats” (16). Rachel is unaffected by her father’s admonition. After a long 
passage where she remembers the death of her mother and her domestic life in 
Richmond, Rachel impatiently casts aside that effort and returns to her love of music. 
She is a “fanatic about music,” and any energy “that might have made her friends, or 
shown her the world, poured straight into music” (26). 
 But on the voyage to Santa Marina, Rachel faces various challenges to her artistic 
solipsism. When the cargo boat, owned by Rachel’s father, stops in Lisbon, Richard and 
Clarissa Dalloway join the others on board. Rachel is immediately impressed by 
Richard’s charm and Clarissa’s pedigree. The couple dismisses the artistic temperaments 
                                                 





of those on board. During dinner, Richard ventures about the difference between 
politicians and artists: “Now your artists find things in a mess, shrug their shoulders, 
turn aside to their visions—which I grant may be very beautiful—and leave things in a 
mess. Now that seems to me evading one’s responsibilities” (36). Moments later, 
Clarissa adds: 
  ‘When I’m with artists I feel so intensely the delights of shutting  
  oneself up in a little world of one’s own, with pictures and music  
and everything beautiful, and then I go out into the streets and the  
first child I meet with its poor, hungry, dirty little face makes me  
turn round and say, “No, I can’t shut myself up—I won’t live in a  
world of my own. I should like to stop all the painting and writing and 
music until this kind of thing exists no longer.”’ (36) 
 
These ideas that artists shirk political and social responsibility in favor of moments of 
isolated vision and beauty repeatedly find expression through many minor characters in 
the book. 
 What’s extraordinary about this conversation at dinner is the effect it has on 
Rachel. Until she meets the Dalloways, Rachel is certain that nothing matters except her 
music. After this conversation, she follows her aunt and Clarissa out of the dining room:  
She had taken no part in the talk; no one had spoken to her; but she  
had listened to every word that was said. She had looked from Mrs.  
Dalloway to Mr. Dalloway, and from Mr. Dalloway back again. [. . .]  
As she followed, Rachel thought with supreme self-abasement,  
taking in the whole course of her life and the lives of all her friends,  







She has come under some “trance” that shakes her most fundamental beliefs about art 
(38). She passively receives what is going on around her. That Rachel is impressionable 
is clear from this scene, as is that she has not been exposed to much life or talk. Her 
adolescence in Richmond consisted of playing music, walking through the park, and 
“doing [. . .] absolutely nothing” as suited her “fine natural indolence” (26). 
 Feeling strongly impacted by Richard and Clarissa’s views, Rachel attempts 
“first to recollect and then to expose her shivering private visions” to Richard (57).6 She 
puts to him the case of a widow in the suburb of Leeds. She wonders whether the 
politician or the artist gets closer to the life of the widow. Certainly the bills that Richard 
supports in Parliament might mean that the widow “goes to her cupboard and finds a 
little more tea, a few lumps of sugar, or a little less tea and a newspaper,” but what’s 
more important—“the mind of the widow . . . the affections”—remains “untouched” 
(57).7 Although Richard tends to the widow’s physical needs, what about her mind and 
heart? Richard answers that human beings are “not a set of compartments” but are 
                                                 
6 In 1908, Woolf uses much the same language but to a different end in an early journal entry. 
Whereas Rachel simply wants to expose her “shivering visions,” Woolf wants to “[. . .] achieve a 
symmetry by means of infinite discords, [. . .] & achieve in the end, some kind of whole made of 
shivering fragments [. . .].” The beauty she wants to express is “of life and the world, in action.” A 
Passionate Apprentice, pp. 392-93. 
 
 
7 Woolf makes a similar argument about Arnold Bennett’s materialist style in her essay, “Mr. 
Bennett and Mrs. Brown.” The essay first appears in Nation and Athenaeum on December 1, 1923. 
A revised version of the essay was given as a lecture to the Cambridge Heretics on May 18, 1924. 





organisms that must be taken “as a whole” (57). But his idea of that whole is quite 
abstract. He continues, replacing the image of the widow with that of society as a 
complex machine with each citizen acting as one kind of screw or another. Unable to 
“combine the image of a lean black widow, gazing out of her window, and longing for 
some one to talk to, with the image of a vast machine,” Rachel is thwarted and deems 
that “the attempt at communication had been a failure” (57). Communication cannot 
happen at the level of sharing “shivering private visions” and speaking in “images.” 
How can Rachel navigate the breach between her inner world and a life with others? 
This is one of the primary questions of the novel and of the genre—how does an artist 
connect with the world? 
 Rachel’s fiancé, Terence Hewet, presents a possibility that lies somewhere 
between the Dalloways’ critique of the artist’s fecklessness and Rachel’s withdrawal into 
isolated vision. Himself an artist (he’s working on a novel about silence), Terence is on 
holiday in Santa Marina when Rachel arrives with her aunt and uncle. Their courtship, 
by turns mystical and comical, occupies the main action of the novel after the sea voyage. 
During their first conversation about art, Rachel declares writing inferior to music. 
Writing is so much “scratching on the match-box,” trying again and again to say things 
and to connect things without ever reaching what matters (196). Music, on the other 





Rachel’s idea of art as an intense moment of vision, an instant flame unmediated by so 
much “scratching on the match-box.” 
 At the end of this conversation, Terence tries to mediate their different positions. 
He says that writing and music are not so different after all. “‘We want to find out 
what’s behind things, don’t we? [. . .] Things I feel come to me like lights…I want to 
combine them…Have you ever seen fireworks that make figures?...I want to make 
figures…’” (207).8 Terence maintains Rachel’s moments of vision as “lights” and adds 
the impulse of wanting to combine vision with life. Rachel considers what he says, and 
counters, “‘Music is different…But I see what you mean’” (207). They continue walking 
and talking, inventing theories and trying to “make their theories agree” (207). This kind 
of mediation, of coming to agree somewhere in the middle, characterizes their 
relationship. Ultimately, neither one is wholly satisfied by these agreements. 
 In an earlier draft of the novel, during this same conversation, Rachel asks 
Terence why he isn’t content simply to feel. He answers that 
  ‘Behind every sensation there is a shape. Have you ever seen great  
  flowers made of fireworks? They are made of dots of light.  
  Sensations are dots; combine them and you have a flower or a cow  
  or a tea pot. To combine them, to find out their shape, that is my  
  trade. I’ve never done it so far, because the sensations themselves  
  are so overwhelming.’9 
                                                 
8 Woolf echoes this sentiment in a journal entry from 1908: “[. . .] I should like to write not only 
with the eye, but with the mind; & discover real things beneath the show.” A Passionate 






Terence offers the possibility that art can combine intense sensations to give experience 
shape and coherence. Otherwise, sensations can simply overwhelm conscious 
experience. When Rachel becomes caught in a fit of indignation about how impossible it 
is to bridge differences, Terence says, “Try this plan [. . .] Forget yourself.”10 He means to 
encourage her to see other points of view. But Rachel cannot forget herself because she is 
not yet a self, not yet an autonomous person. For her to forget herself would mean to 
forget her visions, without which she would not exist because she has no other mode of 
being, of existing. She, like Stephen Dedalus, lives only in her visions. When she 
hesitates to answer, Terence adds, “We must be our own Shakespeares. We must see 
things new. If I try, will you?”11 Whereas Rachel lives enclosed in her inner world of 
vision, Terence offers her the conventional promise of the Künstlerroman genre: through 
the act of creation, she can connect her visions to life. 
But it is precisely this fundamental assumption of the genre that Woolf questions 
throughout the novel. Can art bridge the distance between a self-conscious subject and 
the world? What is art anyway? What exactly is the nature of the consciousness that can 
give rise to such an act of creation? Is the primary characteristic of this consciousness 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Melymbrosia: A Novel, ed. Louise DeSalvo, p. 226. 
 
 








that it is centered in solitary vision? Rachel’s death says otherwise. If intense visionary 
experience were the source of the creative act that connects self and world, then Rachel 
would be able to connect with Terence. Woolf remains occupied with these questions 
throughout her life. All of the points of view about art in the novel—Rachel’s isolated 
visions, Terence’s shape-making, Helen’s matter of fact attitude, the Dalloways’ 
denigration—reflect Woolf’s own various ideas, and all of them come under scrutiny. 
Nearly forty years after she writes that there is “no human element at all, except 
what comes through Art,” Woolf describes her experience of writing: 
  From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a  
  constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a  
pattern; that we—I mean all human beings—are connected with  
this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the  
work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this  
vast mass that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there is no 
Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the words; 
we are the music; we are the thing itself.12 
 
This is a starkly different picture than Woolf’s earlier characterization of art as “ideal 
peace and endless meditation.”13 The idea of a creative consciousness that stands outside 
                                                 
12 “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being, p. 72. Woolf wrote this autobiographical essay 
between April 1939 and November 1940. 
 
 
13 Woolf held and expressed many contradictory ideas about the nature and role of art. Her 
criticism, letters, and journals can equally give the impression that she was a snobby aesthete or a 
champion of the oppressed, and everything in between. In using the autobiographical material, 
my aim is to show that, first of all, she thought extensively and ongoingly about the nature and 





the world and creates “Art” is gone. The ideal of (capitalized) Art is replaced with the 
lived experience of the whole world as a work of (lowercase) art. Unlike Terence who 
exhorts Rachel to be her own Shakespeare, Woolf says there is no Shakespeare. But she 
does not say that there is no art. Human beings are the words, are the music, are the 
thing itself. What does this mean? What is this art without artist? 
 
“The Thing Itself” 
 Rachel has lived twenty-four years without any significant challenges to her 
ideas about life. Her only passions are music and lying around in visionary trance. But 
her brief interactions with Richard Dalloway begin to disturb this equilibrium. As she 
dresses for dinner, Rachel feels “tense melancholy, for she had come to the conclusion, 
since the arrival of the Dalloways, that her face was not the face she wanted, and in all 
probability never would be” (33). Something about the Dalloways focuses Rachel’s 
attention on her body. She notes Richard’s “rich, deliberate voice,” and observes that “he 
seemed to come from the humming oily center of the machine where the polished rods 
are sliding, and the pistons thumping [. . .]” (38). She sits silently listening through their 
first dinner on board, and afterwards succumbs to the Dalloways’ views about artists. 
                                                                                                                                                 






 The next morning, Richard sits next to Rachel at breakfast. She is “curiously 
conscious of his presence and appearance” (47). Incredulous that a man like Richard 
wants to talk to her, she imagines saying to him, “‘Please tell me—everything’” (48). 
Instead, she stirs her tea and “the bubbles which swam and clustered in the cup seemed 
to her like the union of their minds” (48). Rather than attempt to communicate with him, 
Rachel is satisfied to imagine their abstract union. A few pages later, she begins to 
wonder why it is that people marry (51). After Richard falls asleep in a deck chair next to 
Rachel, she “looked him all over until it seemed to her that he must protest” (54). When 
he wakes up, he begins to extol the virtues of political activism over writing poetry. 
Rachel again capitulates, feeling it “painful [. . .] to be one of those who write Keats and 
Shelley. She liked Richard Dalloway, and warmed as he warmed” (56). Talking to him 
makes “her heart beat” (57). Where nothing else so far has sufficed, what seems to 
penetrate Rachel’s fixed ideas about art and solitary vision is her physical 
responsiveness to Richard Dalloway. It is through the medium of the body that her 
views are impacted. Neither her aunts nor her father have been able to affect her in this 
way. Her thoughts begin to be carried along by physical sensation. 
 But even though Rachel warms as Richard warms, there remains a difference 
between them. Feeling a “thrusting desire to be understood,” Rachel tries to conceive 
what Richard means by the image of society as a machine (58). She asks, “Under the 





what you mean?” (58). “Certainly,” Richard replies, “I understand you to mean that the 
whole of modern society is based on co-operative effort” (58). But this is not what Rachel 
means. The disconnect between the images is on the level of body from which each 
speaks. Richard addresses the historically determined body—the body as a category of a 
specific intersection of time and space. Rachel, on the other hand, is considering the 
evolutionary body, diffused over a large scale of time. Rachel pauses after Richard’s 
comment and tries to work out how it is that people have anything in common. She 
reasons that “the mammoths who pastured in the fields of Richmond High Street had 
turned into paving stones and boxes full of ribbon, and her aunts” (58). This is the only 
way she can understand what Richard means by cooperative effort. 
 At the end of this conversation, Rachel presses Richard to say what it is that 
matters. He answers that what stands out is “the misery of the poor [. . . ] and ‘love’!” 
(59). He adds that he doesn’t mean love in the conventional sense, but uses the word “as 
young men use it” (59). He asks Rachel if she knows what that means. She answers no, 
“scarcely speaking above her breath” (59). Clarissa interrupts their conversation. We 
next see Rachel at lunch looking “queer and flushed” (60). Within hours, a storm hits; 
the Dalloways are seasick and confined to bed for a few days. 
Recovering before Clarissa does, Richard shows up at breakfast discouraged “to 
find what a slave one is to one’s body in this world” (64). As he pushes against the wind 





he had run into” (65). Theirs is a collision of the materialist body and the idealist body, 
one a slave to sensation, the other to vision. They step into her room to avoid the wind. 
Feeling the full vigor of his body after being ill, Richard returns to their last conversation 
about love: 
    ‘You have beauty,’ he said. The ship lurched. Rachel fell slightly  
 forward. Richard took her in his arms and kissed her. Holding her  
 tight, he kissed her passionately, so that she felt the hardness of his  
 body and the roughness of his cheek printed upon hers. She fell  
 back in her chair, with tremendous beats of the heart, each of which  
sent black waves across her eyes. He clasped his forehead in his  
hands. 
   ‘You tempt me,’ he said. The tone of his voice was terrifying. He  
seemed choked in fight. They were both trembling. Rachel stood up  
and went. Her head was cold, her knees shaking, and the physical  
pain of the emotion was so great that she could only keep herself  
moving above the great leaps of her heart. She leant upon the rail of  
the ship, and gradually ceased to feel, for a chill of body and mind  
crept over her. Far out between the waves little black and white  
seabirds were riding. Rising and falling with smooth and graceful  
movements in the hollows of the waves they seemed singularly  
detached and unconcerned. 
   ‘You’re peaceful,’ she said. She became peaceful too, at the same  
time possessed with a strange exultation. Life seemed to hold  
infinite possibilities she had never guessed at. (66-67) 
 
Rachel is beginning to experience her emotions physically. Although she is terrified, she 
also sees that “something wonderful had happened” (67). She chooses though to restore 
balance and to “cease to feel” by focusing on the sea and the seabirds. The inhuman 
regularity and detachment of nature calms her. She avoids the particular, physical body 





he addresses Rachel; and when Rachel speaks, she addresses the sea. She returns to the 
order of experience with which she is familiar. Rachel regulates her bodily state in the 
act of identifying with the peacefulness of nature. But something has been awakened in 
her and she begins to sense that life “seemed to hold infinite possibilities she had never 
guessed at.” 
 That night Rachel has terrible nightmares. As she begins to become aware of her 
bodily existence, like Edwin and Stephen, Rachel feels terror. She dreams that she is 
walking down a dark, narrowing tunnel that ends in a vault. There she is trapped “alone 
with a little deformed man who squatted on the floor gibbering, with long nails” (68).14 
She is now more terrified than exalted. She wakes up and locks her door. “A voice 
moaned for her; eyes desired her. All night long barbarian men harassed the ship; they 
came scuffling down the passages, and stopped to snuffle at her door. She could not 
sleep again” (68). No matter what she tries, Rachel is never again able to recover her pre-
Richard state of pure innerness. Her first flight of vision in the novel, when she decides 
that “it’s far better to play the piano” than to bother with people, ends with Rachel 
drifting to sleep (29). It is also in this sense that “she could not sleep again” after Richard 
kisses her. Throughout the rest of the novel, Rachel struggles with this growing 
awareness of her bodily existence and its implications. 
                                                 
14 In a letter to Ethel Smyth, Woolf describes the approach of madness as “that end of a drainpipe 





 The day after Richard kisses Rachel, the Dalloways disembark. Rachel confides 
in Helen, who makes light of the incident. Helen’s matter of fact attitude “hewed down 
great blocks which had stood there always, and the light which came in was cold” (72). 
“By this new light,” Rachel sees “her life for the first time a creeping hedged-in thing, 
driven cautiously between high walls, here turned aside, there plunged in darkness, 
made dull and crippled forever—her life that was the only chance she had [. . .]” (72). 
This image of her constrained life is reminiscent of her sense of her body in the 
nightmare: trapped in a dark, narrowing tunnel that ends in the company of a deformed 
man. Rachel is beginning to connect her bodily responses with insights about her life. 
And, more importantly, she begins to recognize that how she lives her life does matter. 
In this conversation with her aunt, Rachel begins to imagine a new kind of life. 
She recalls “the image of the world as a live thing that Richard had given her, with 
drains like nerves, and bad houses like patches of diseased skin” (73). Richard, in fact, 
gives no such explicit image. Far from it, he speaks of society only as a machine with 
ideals of cooperation and unity. That Rachel is left with this sense of a live world has to 
do with how Richard has impacted her: bodily. What Richard gives her is not an image, 
but a budding felt sense of her body. 
 Rachel explains to Helen that until now, people had been only symbols, but that 
in talking to her, “they ceased to be symbols, and became—‘I could listen to them for 





people become when they are no longer symbols. She has had only this one experience 
with Richard. It is also striking that people stop being symbols when they talk to her, not 
when she talks to them. Although Rachel still lacks agency in her sense of self, the range 
of her receptivity to others, by including her bodily awareness, has expanded.15 
 During this conversation, Helen decides to mentor Rachel and invites her to stay 
on in Santa Marina with them. Excited by the prospect of interacting with new people, 
Rachel asks her how she might begin to know them. Helen tells her that she has to find 
out for herself, that she can “go ahead and be a person on [her] own account” (75). 
Rachel is stunned: 
     The vision of her own personality, of herself as a real everlasting  
  thing, different from anything else, unmergeable, like the sea or the  
  wind, flashed into Rachel’s mind, and she became profoundly  
excited at the thought of living. 
     ‘I can be m-m-myself,’ she stammered, ‘in spite of you, in spite of  
  the Dalloways, and Mr. Pepper, and Father, and my Aunts, in spite  
  of these?’ She swept her hand across a whole page of statesmen and  
  soldiers. (75) 
 
Although Rachel’s growing bodily awareness broadens her field of experience to include 
others, her language retains the old framework. Her distinct personality remains a 
“vision.” She confers eternity to her particular self, identifying with the sea and the wind 
instead of with mortal human beings. She imagines that her distinct self comes “in spite 
                                                 
15 Renée Dickinson considers this lack of agency a specifically feminine issue. That does not seem 
to be the case in this novel—Terence Hewet, Rachel’s fiancé, is equally adrift. Female 





of” others, rather than as a result of being connected with them. The last scene on board 
ship is this conversation between Helen and Rachel. It marks Rachel’s transition from a 
disembodied, solitary existence to a more embodied, relational sense of self. What 
sparks this is the kiss with Richard, which brings about Rachel’s burgeoning awareness 
of her body. 
 
The Sea and the Land 
 This conversation between Helen and Rachel also marks the shift from sea to 
land, from ship to shore. Throughout the novel, Rachel identifies with natural forces like 
the wind and the sea.16 They represent freedom from “roads [. . .] and mankind” (20). 
Rachel spends her time gazing into “the depth of the sea,” which grows “dimmer and 
dimmer” until it is “only a pale blur” (20). In forces like the sea and wind, Rachel can 
lose any sense of distinct existence and blend into an undifferentiated union. The land, 
on the other hand, is specific, the realm of old ladies snipping flowers, young people 
expressing love, and men smoking cigars (23-24). 
                                                 
16 In an earlier version of the novel, when a guest at the hotel asks Rachel who she lives with, 
Rachel answers, “With my father and two Aunts [. . .] and the spirits and the sea.” And when 
Terence finally declares his love, Rachel laments her life wasted on “spirits and the sea.” 





As the ship makes its way further into the sea, people seem “aimless ants” that 
eventually become “completely mute” (24). As the land shrinks, the ship becomes 
ennobled: 
  [. . .] an immense dignity had descended upon her; she was an  
  inhabitant of the great world, which has so few inhabitants,  
  travelling all day across an empty universe, with veils drawn  
  before her and behind. She was more lonely than a caravan  
  crossing the desert; she was infinitely more mysterious, moving by  
her own power and sustained by her own resources. The sea might  
give her death or some unexampled joy, and none would know of  
it. She was a bride going forth to her husband, a virgin unknown of  
men; in her vigour and purity she might be likened to all beautiful  
things, for as a ship she had a life of her own. (24-25) 
 
This description also characterizes Rachel’s inner world: empty, veiled, lonely, 
mysterious, self-sufficient. She too has “a life of her own,” apart from real human 
interaction. It is the purity and intensity of her inner world that life on land begins to 
challenge—and challenge in a new way precisely because of Rachel’s dawning 
awareness of her body. After the shock of being kissed, she is no longer able as easily to 
evade her body and withdraw into undifferentiated union. 
 Months later, Rachel is sitting on the edge of a cliff in Santa Marina with land on 
one side and the sea on the other. She is alone with Terence and they have not yet 
disclosed that they love each other. They look once toward the land and turn next 
toward the sea, “and for the rest of the time sat looking at the sea” (194). Whereas the 





same one “that flowed up to the mouth of the Thames” (194). Rachel continues to find 
comfort in this sameness even though she is increasingly aware of difference. The water 
is calm and “so it had been at the birth of the world, and so it had remained ever since. 
Probably no human being had ever broken that water with boat or with body” (194). As 
the courtship with Terence proceeds, Rachel senses that the body breaks the calm of the 
sea with which she remains identified to some extent. She describes being a girl as “like 
being the wind or the sea,” free from the care and attention of others (203). When she 
begins to ask Terence questions about himself, Rachel turns “her back on the sea” (203). 
Relating with him and communing with the sea are two separate modes of being for her; 
one mode comes at the cost of another. This untenable dualism—between mind and 
body, between self and other—becomes her constant dilemma for the remainder of the 
novel. 
 
Narrative Modes of Describing the Body 
 These various realms—of vision and image, of mammoths and sea—are so many 
versions of Rachel’s physical experience. She is able to live her body in different ways, 
most of which lack a sense of personal agency. To the extent that she can avoid the direct 
experience of being an embodied individual, she can avoid relating with others. She 





of experience. In Melymbrosia, an earlier draft of The Voyage Out, Rachel calls this 
struggle between the visible and the invisible worlds “The Great War.”17 She delights “at 
the assurance that the world of things that aren’t there was splendidly vigorous and far 
more real than the other.”18 “Her quarrel with the living” is that they don’t sufficiently 
value this world buried beneath time.19 She thinks ridiculous the one proposal of 
marriage that she has gotten: “Why, she half expected to come up next year as a bed of 
white flowers.”20 What allows her to imagine that she might at any moment appear as a 
bed of flowers is her lack of physical embodiment. To the extent that Rachel’s sense of 
self is anchored in her mind rather than her body, she is susceptible to the vacillating 
movements of her thoughts. 
 In this earlier draft of the novel, when she talks to Helen about Richard kissing 
her, Rachel admits, “You see I thought people were images. Somehow they’re becoming 
real.”21 And again on the cliff, when Terence asks her what she thinks about, Rachel 
                                                 

















replies, “About images and spirits and the sea [. . .]. There is a great war you understand; 
or there was a great war. But now the images are becoming real.”22 Her primary 
identification with the world of vision persists in her thinking that the images are 
becoming real, rather than that the real had become images. Her point of origin, where 
her consciousness is located, still harbors traces of the invisible world. Nevertheless, 
because of her kiss with Richard and her courtship with Terence, the great war begins to 
subside. Rachel experiments with an alternate mode of being, one in which her thinking 
and her feeling and her sensations are integrated—and through this wholeness she is 
able to connect with others, not in a generalized way, but through particular 
relationships. But because of her habitual pull to the invisible world, Rachel struggles to 
maintain some kind of autonomy in her relationships. She begins to see beyond the 
impulse to submerge in undifferentiated union but has not yet learned how to connect 
as an autonomous self. Rachel shuttles uneasily between various tenuous modes of 
being her body.    
 Beginning with this first novel, Woolf experiments with how to narrate lived 
experience. In a talk delivered to The Women’s Service League in 1931, Woolf says that 
of the two “adventures of [her] professional life,” she did not solve the one of “telling 
the truth about [her] experiences as a body.”23 Although she is referring explicitly to the 
                                                 






challenges that women writers face, Woolf’s novels deal more subtly with issues of 
embodiment and creativity. The Voyage Out, both in narration and in theme, is 
constructed through the overlap and intersection of different modes of narrating 
physical being. Each of these levels is tied to different scales of time and space. There are 
six main modes in which Woolf conceives the body in this novel: the natural, the 
historical, the archetypal, the semiotic, the philosophical, and the ethical. By 
discriminating these modes, which are simply different perspectives from which Woolf 
writes about being human, I will show what is new in this Künstlerroman. 
 The first two modes, the natural and the historical, regard the body a function of 
various material processes. The natural body extends from the notion of the body as an 
ongoing series of immediate physical sensations all the way to the physical body 
extended in evolutionary process. The natural body is infinitely extended in time and 
space, without beginning or end. Although alive, this body does not die—it simply 
evolves. It is in continual process, either immediate or evolutionary. It is in this mood 
that Rachel becomes flooded with sensory impressions and wants “to run all the days 
into one long continuity of sensation” (211). She can consider “her own body [. . .] the 
source of all the life in the world” (244). This natural mode also encompasses Rachel’s 
physical identification with the “everlasting” and “unmergeable” sea and wind (75). 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 The other adventure was “killing the Angel in the House,” by which Woolf means overcoming 
the constraint to be charming and conciliatory in her writing. In this, she believed herself 





After an uncomfortable encounter with a young man at a dance, Rachel steps into the 
night and says out loud, “‘There are trees,’ [. . .] Would the trees make up for St John 
Hirst?” (142). The sea did, after all, make up for Richard Dalloway after he kissed her. 
This kind of displacement, from one order of being to another (person to tree) 
characterizes the natural mode. In its widest focus, the mode of natural body views 
particulars as an endless succession of evolutionary manifestations. Rachel can imagine 
that “the mammoths who pastured in the fields of Richmond High Street had turned 
into paving stones and boxes full of ribbon, and her aunts” (58). 
 The mode of historical body is equally as concerned with material processes, but 
toward a different end. Rather than extending the material body throughout 
undifferentiated time and space, this way of conceiving the body fixes it in one 
particular time and space. Although this narrative mode is somewhat more concerned 
with particularity than the natural mode, it deals chiefly in generalized categories—of 
gender, class, race, nation.24 The beginning and the end are subsumed in a static now. 
The historical body is a function of so many power struggles and conflicts between 
impersonal forces. The Dalloways, and other characters in the story, represent the 
                                                 
24 Considering To the Lighthouse, Randi Koppen writes about the perceived modern aesthetic 
turn away from life. Woolf critics have responded to this by various “returns to the body”—the 
materialist feminist line of body as biological/social limit or unlimitable desire, and the 
phenomenological line of body as perceptual medium. Koppen argues that Woolf’s own 
conception of the body is more apt than either of these: “the ground of Woolf’s writing is the 
experiencing, physical body in a spatiotemporal, kinetic field.” “Embodied Form: Art and Life in 





various concerns of the historical body. Listening to conversation about women’s 
suffrage and the poor, Clarissa deems life “a perpetual conflict” (36). Alone after dinner, 
she and Richard “both laughed, thinking of the same things, so that there was no need to 
compare their impressions” (42). They find the company “a set of cranks,” of a different 
class where “the men always are so much better than the women” (42). There is no need 
to consider anyone’s specificity—the general outline suffices for the purpose of 
agreement, or discord. As Clarissa talks about the glory of being English, Richard thinks 
about the “[. . .] continuity [. . .] of English history, King following King, Prime Minister 
Prime Minister, and Law Law [. . .]. He [runs] his mind along the line of conservative 
policy, which went steadily from Lord Salisbury to Alfred, and gradually enclosed, as 
though it were a lasso that opened and caught things, enormous chunks of the habitable 
globe” (42-43). His history begins now with Lord Salisbury and proceeds backwards to 
Alfred the Great. The mode of historical body catches and encloses changing particulars 
in fixed and continuing categories—conservative, English, male.  
Like Richard, Terence’s close friend St. John Hirst regards people as “types.” He 
considers the dozens of guests at the hotel in Santa Marina and declares that he “could 
draw circles round the whole lot of them, and they’d never stray outside” (97). He then 
classifies them according to education, class, race, so many “hens in a circle” (97). 





from the nearest human being,” given that “age puts one barrier between human beings, 
and learning another, and sex a third [. . .]” (156). 
 Although materially concerned with the body, both the natural and historical 
perspectives of describing human experience subject lived experience to various 
impersonal forces—nature, evolutionary time, power, society. By divorcing sensory 
experience from personal agency, these modes render life either completely beyond 
localized difference or absolutely determined by it. The particularities of physical 
existence are either stretched into an insensible universality or enclosed in inescapable 
categories. These two narrative modes correlate with the materialist aesthetics of British 
thinkers, which is primarily concerned with the determinism of immediate sensory 
experience and unfolding physical processes.25 With its proliferation of discrete bodies—
Edwin, Hilda, the new house, Darius—engaged in various antagonisms, Bennett’s 
Clayhanger chronicles these two modes in Edwin’s final options of either rapture or 
burden.26 
 Stephen Dedalus’s final flight, on the other hand, does not descend into a 
determined materialism, but transcends the body by resorting to idealist escape.27 
                                                 
25 See above, pp. 24-28.  
 
 
26 See above, pp. 84-87. 
 
 





Joyce’s novel exemplifies the next two modes of bodily experience—the archetypal and 
the semiotic. In the archetypal mode, the particularity of the person gives way to 
original patterns and cycles. This is the realm of mythic identification. If the natural 
mode stretches time out, the archetypal dimension is altogether outside of time. In 
cleaving to origins, this narrative and bodily mode is always and only beginning. 
Reading Gibbon, Rachel feels “the book of the world turned back to the very first page” 
(160). Every particular is some variation of ideal source. As the historical mode fixes 
bodies as intersections of contemporary categories, the mythical mode sees people as 
iterations of original types and patterns. Power struggles become mythical agon. 
Rachel has various mythical precursors in the novel.28 She is figured at times as 
Antigone, and critics have read her death as a voluntary act in the face of being buried 
alive in marriage (37, 331). Late in the book, lines from Milton’s Comus begin the 
chapter in which Rachel falls ill and dies (308). The lines tell of the nymph Sabrina, the 
goddess of the silver lake, who frees the Lady from Comus’s enchanted chair. The Lady 
represents the virtues of chastity and rational mind against Comus’s vice of bodily 
excess. Whereas the Lady returns to life after Sabrina frees her from physical captivity, 
in the imagery of the novel, Rachel descends with the goddess to the bottom of the sea. 
                                                 
28 See Roger Poole on the prevalence of Greek myth in Woolf’s novels, The Unknown Virginia 
Woolf, pp. 173-184; also, Gerhard Joseph, “The Antigone as Cultural Touchstone: Matthew 





By being figured as Antigone and Sabrina, Rachel assumes a mythic body outside of 
time, and her struggles are merely a repetition of ancient cycles. 
Related to the idealism of the archetypal mode is the infinite withdrawal of the 
semiotic mode. Whereas the archetypal mode locates meaning outside of time in eternal 
cycles, the semiotic mode simply defers all meaning in the play of subjectivity. This is 
the world of endless signs and traces and images, all leading one to the other, all 
creating a sense of insurmountable indeterminacy. Both the mythical and the semiotic 
modes represent disembodied consciousness, where the mind is able to transcend 
particularity and flit from image to myth without the encumbrance of the body.29 The 
processes of consciousness in this mode are self-enclosed, self-sufficient, and self- and 
other-perpetuating. Early in the novel, as Rachel contemplates her life, “from one scene 
she [passes], half-hearing, half-seeing, to another” (28). In this mode, not only does she 
regard her life as a succession of “scenes,” but also her sensory experience is diminished. 
“Her mind [is] fixed upon the characters of her aunts,” who “blot out the trees and the 
people and the deer” (28). She regards real people as characters and fails to see the 
actual world around her. People seem “like a thing in a play” (121). Everything goes 
“round and round,” and everyone is a “featureless but dignified” sort of “symbol” (29). 
                                                 
29 Woolf travels through Italy in 1909 as she is working on this novel. In her travel journal, she 
writes of the difficulty of describing the landscape: “As a matter of fact, the subject is probably 
infinitely subtle, no more amenable to impressionist treatment than the human character. What 
one records is really the state of one’s own mind.” A Passionate Apprentice, p. 396. This could as 
easily be said of the impressionist mode of the semiotic body—one records really the state of 





Late in the book, Rachel attends a Sunday sermon and is infuriated by “the vast 
flock of the audience” that pretends to understand “a beautiful idea, an idea like a 
butterfly” that “floats” above and is “always escaping out of reach” (215). Although 
these floating ideas and characters and scenes seem freer than the repeating patterns of 
the archetypal mode, they are nonetheless dependent on the disavowal of an embodied 
consciousness. The fatalism of endless cycles is replaced by the fatalism of a dissociated 
mind. In the semiotic mode, nothing ever ends. Everything goes “round and round,” 
and one image leads always to another (29). 
Often in the novel, when Rachel is reading, this mode of runaway consciousness 
is the “enchanted place” that characterizes “the transition from the imaginary world to 
the real world” (112). She thinks that she is Ibsen’s Nora, or Meredith’s Diana, or a 
romantic Persian princess and speaks “partly as herself, and partly as the heroine” of 
whatever book she has been reading (112, 142). “Her whole body [is] constrained by the 
working of her mind” (112). During one of these imaginative flights, Rachel’s mind is 
“[. . .] contracting and expanding like the mainspring of a clock. The sounds in the 
garden outside join with the clock [. . .] in a regular rhythm” (114). The noises inside and 
outside the house become part of the wound energy of Rachel’s mind. It is as if her mind 
is making the world happen. This Rachel-made world is “all very real, very big, very 
impersonal, and after a moment or two she [begins] to raise her finger and to let it fall on 





existence” (114). This impersonal world that Rachel creates comes at the cost of her 
bodily existence.  
In the semiotic mode, consciousness is dissociated from the body. Rachel 
wonders from this place who people are and what life is. She decides that life is “only a 
light passing over the surface and vanishing, as in time she would vanish [. . .]. Her 
dissolution became so complete that she could not raise her finger any more [. . .]. She 
was overcome with awe that things should exist at all. . . She forgot that she had any 
fingers to raise . . .  [. . .] the clock still ticking in the midst of the universal silence” (114). 
The semiotic body does not die—like light it vanishes out of existence. The difference is 
one of embodiment. A disembodied consciousness dissipates into bare nothingness; an 
embodied consciousness dies. As the workings of the mind assume center stage in the 
semiotic mode, the body becomes increasingly unconscious. Rachel forgets that she has 
any fingers. There is only silence and the ticking clock of the mind. 
 In their novels, Bennett, Joyce, and Woolf each use these four narrative 
perspectives of the body—the natural, the historical, the archetypal, and the semiotic—
to varying degrees and toward different ends. The natural and historical modes hew to 
the materialist aesthetics of British thinkers; the archetypal and semiotic modes reflect 
the idealist line of thinking.30 The materialist modes determine individual experience 
                                                 
30 See Chapter 1, pp. 24-33. I am not saying that these writers read the history of aesthetics and 





through physical processes and historical categories. The idealist modes determine 
individual experience through Ur-patterns and imaginative play. The former root 
consciousness in a limited sense of the body and the latter transcend the body altogether 
in favor of an unfettered mind. 
In The Voyage Out, Woolf employs these four narrative modes and also two 
others that Bennett and Joyce don’t. What distinguishes Woolf’s Künstlerroman is the 
possibility of lived experience that is neither physically determined nor mentally created, 
neither pure sensation nor pure idea. This allows Woolf the freedom to conceive anew 
the central problem of the genre. Instead of asking whether art can bridge the gap 
between self and world, and answering “no” as do Bennett and Joyce, Woolf explores 
the exact nature of the consciousness that can bridge self and world in a creative act. 
Whereas Bennett and Joyce maintain the duality between mind and body in the artist-
protagonists, plots, imagery, and endings of their novels, Woolf tries something new. In 
the modes of the philosophical body and the ethical body, she discovers the narrative 
techniques that she uses in all of her novels. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Künstlerroman necessarily includes the struggles between art/world, mind/body, and self/other, 
which issues have been the concern of the field of aesthetics and have traditionally been resolved 
either through a materialist or an idealist perspective. I am discriminating these narrative modes 





The philosophical mode of description is best characterized by what Woolf has 
called “moments of being.”31 In this mode, “[. . .] one’s life is not confined to one’s body 
and what one says and does; one is living all the time in relation to certain background 
rods or conceptions.”32 These background rods penetrate conscious awareness in 
“blows” or “shocks” that produce concentrated moments of being, which are flashes of 
insight and intuition.33 The moments of being arise when consciousness momentarily is 
able to see some pattern hidden in “non-being,” which is “a kind of nondescript cotton 
wool” that is the majority of life.34  
Like the natural, historical, archetypal, and semiotic modes of conceiving the 
body, the philosophical mode contains a sense of union. But it’s a different kind of union. 
Unlike the natural mode of extending the body temporally and spatially to include 
everything else, the philosophical mode appears as an instant of intense experience. 
Whereas the natural body extends horizontally, these moments of philosophical being 
are discrete vertical flashes. Unlike the unity of type and category in the historical mode, 
moments of being cannot be predicted along any markers. Unlike the atemporal oneness 
                                                 
31 “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being, pp. 70-73. 
 
 
32 Ibid., p. 73. 
 
 
33 Ibid., pp. 70-73. 
 
 





of archetypes, the moment of philosophical unity is instantaneous and not repeatable. 
Unlike the inescapably pervasive unity of the semiotic mode, the philosophical mode is 
fleeting—it begins and ends in an instant. The sense of union in the philosophical mode 
has to do with the spontaneous and complete meeting of being and nonbeing an in 
instant.35 It’s a bright flash of significance that is not sustainable in extended experience. 
The chief characteristic of the philosophical body is absorption in a moment of 
total depth. This absorption includes body and mind. After a long period of agitation, 
Rachel emerges from the hotel to have tea outside with a party of guests. As she 
approaches them, “the group appeared with startling intensity, as though the dusty 
surface had been peeled off everything, leaving only the reality and the instant” (245). 
The philosophical body discerns meaning and finds significance in moments of instant 
depth. Its functioning is not determined by mind or body; neither thinking nor sensing 
is its primary mode.  
Before Rachel walks out onto the lawn, she is restless and can no longer bear to 
sit: “Thinking was no escape. Physical movement was the only refuge, in and out of 
rooms, in and out of peoples’ minds, seeking she knew not what” (245). The mind does 
                                                 
35 Mark Hussey considers Woolf’s novels, based on this meeting of being and nonbeing, as 
essentially “religious” or “theological” in character. The Singing of the Real World, pp. 115, 130-
55. Although that’s a fine way to characterize this particular narrative strain, Hussey does not 
discriminate the other bodily dimensions in her work. His work shares some of the concerns of 
this study, but he reads issues of embodiment and relationship through the thought of Merleau-
Ponty and Laing. It is because he doesn’t discern the mode of the ethical body that Hussey can 





not quiet her—she cannot think; neither does the body—she cannot sit. What helps is 
movement and action. She is in an active mode, “seeking she knew not what”: she rises, 
she pushes back the table, she goes downstairs, she goes out the door, she turns the 
corner, and she sees the group (245). It is in the midst of this headlong activity that 
Rachel is seized by “the reality and the instant.” As soon as “for a moment nothing 
seemed to happen” and “it all stood still,” Rachel recognizes someone and “the dust 
again began to settle” (245). The moment of being is an active moment of recognition 
that happens and is gone. 
Early in the novel, the narrator describes Rachel playing the piano: “In three 
minutes she was deep in a very difficult, very classical fugue in A, and over her face 
came a queer remote impersonal expression of complete absorption and anxious 
satisfaction” (48-49). But the absorption is temporary—“Now she stumbled; now she 
faltered” (49). The repeated “now” signals how precarious this moment of absorption is. 
As Rachel plays “the same bar twice over [. . .] an invisible line seemed to string the 
notes together, from which rose a shape, a building” (49). Rachel is actively engaged and 
some shape begins to appear. Being absorbed does not obliterate shape and form, as in 
the other modes of union, but rather allows them to emerge.36 What connects absorption 
with form is doing, is acting, is playing the same bar twice. 
                                                 
36 Taking issue with critics’ reductionist analyses of the body in To the Lighthouse, Randi Koppen 





Throughout the novel, Rachel is many times “absorbed” in moments of intense 
experience (29, 70, 74, 195, 202, 232, 248, 262, 263, 269). Often, nothing comes of these 
moments because the experience alone is not the creative act; something more is needed. 
The philosophical mode, the sudden experience of immediate being, needs personal and 
active agency in order to create something meaningful in the world. In “A Sketch of the 
Past,” Woolf supposes that “the shock-receiving capacity is what makes [her] a writer.”37 
The shocks themselves, the moments of being, do not make her a writer; her capacity to 
receive the “revelation” and “make it real by putting it into words” constitutes the act of 
creation.38 The possibility to create arises in the instant where being and nonbeing meet 
in lived experience. 
The creative dimension of action that is receptive to these shocks of being is the 
dimension of the ethical body. The Voyage Out can be read as Rachel’s attempt to 
become an autonomous individual with personal agency. The ethical mode is the only 
personal mode of the body—it includes not only acting in the world but also relating 
with autonomous others. Whereas all of the other bodily modes erase difference in 
                                                                                                                                                 
form.” Although she does not fully pursue her notion of “embodied form” to the ethical 
dimension of embodied consciousness, Koppen does recognize that the relationship between 
disembodied moments of vision and embodied creation is through the body. “Embodied Form: 
Art and Life in Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse,” p. 378. 
 
 








various kinds of unity—of sensation, of types, of cycles, of imagination, of absorption—
the ethical mode is based on difference. This difference does not isolate consciousness in 
separate enclosures, but allows connection that is neither union nor insensible merging 
but free interaction. The more definite and embodied is the self-consciousness, the more 
freely it can include an other-consciousness.39 
The acting and relating of the ethical mode is not the political and social activism 
of Richard Dalloway and various other characters in the novel. The ethical mode, in this 
and other of Woolf’s novels, is closely related to the moments of being. The two modes 
hinge one on the other. Or rather, the moments of being, of seeing “that behind the 
cotton wool is hidden a pattern,” anchor creative doing and relating.40 As the meeting of 
being and nonbeing, the moments of being are an integrated flash of body and mind. 
The “background rods and conceptions” do not determine but give a dimension of 
meaning to “what one says and does.”41 The ethical body acts and relates with an 
awareness, even though momentary and often ineffable, of the significance of life. The 
                                                 
39 Reading Mrs. Dalloway, Gillian Beer cites the characters’ closeness to their bodies as the source 




40 Moments of Being, p. 72. 
 
 





best way to examine Rachel’s struggle to be an autonomous individual is through her 
particular relationships with Helen and Terence. 
These six ways of narrating bodily experience don’t exist in linear sequence or 
isolated one from the other. Most often they appear intricately layered in one passage.42 I 
have discriminated them here, first, to show the complexity of how Woolf thinks and 
writes about the self. But more importantly, by discriminating these dimensions and 
considering them within the larger frame of the novel and the genre, we can begin to see 
what might be the nature of the consciousness that can connect self and world, self and 
other in a creative act. This novel is the beginning of Woolf’s literary preoccupation with 
what an embodied or ethical aesthetics might be. 
This table shows in an abbreviated form various qualities of these modes of 






                                                 
42 Focusing on the phenomenology of conscious experience, Harvena Richter calls consciousness 
a “microcosm of being.” She writes with great sensitivity about the intersection of perception and 
feeling in Woolf’s characters. The Inward Voyage, pp. 27-41. Although the content and purpose 
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Rachel and Helen 
 In an essay about the state of the novel, Woolf writes that Stephen Dedalus is 
“centred in a self which in spite of its tremor of susceptibility never reaches out or 
embraces or comprehends what is outside and beyond.”43 Rachel too is susceptible, but 
she does try to understand “what is outside and beyond.” Moments of being encompass 
what is beyond; the world and others encompass what is outside. Rachel’s earliest 
memory in the novel is that of her mother’s death when she is eleven years old. In the 
thirteen years between then and setting off on the voyage to Santa Marina, Rachel lives 
cloistered in Richmond with her spinster aunts. An introverted only child with few 
friends, she is interested only in music.  
 Helen is initially not looking forward to being on a month-long voyage with 
Rachel. She finds “nothing to take hold of in girls—nothing hard, permanent, 
satisfactory” (13). She considers Rachel’s face “weak rather than decided,” without 
“colour and definite outline” (13). The “one definite gift” Rachel has is her musical 
capacity (26). Rachel’s development as an autonomous self through the novel can be 
gauged by how “definite” and distinct she feels and appears. Finding Rachel asleep in 
her cabin, Helen considers her “aesthetically” for some minutes and then leaves to avoid 
“the awkwardness of speech between them” (29). For her part, Rachel braces herself for 
                                                 





the company of her “elderly” uncle and his wife, “as though they were of the nature of 
an approaching physical discomfort,—a tight shoe or a draughty window” (7).  
 But Rachel changes when Richard kisses her after the storm. Sensing this change 
in her niece, Helen decides to breach the distance between herself and Rachel. Instead of 
avoiding speech, Helen tells Rachel, “‘Come and talk to me instead of practicing’” (70). 
They become Helen and Rachel to each other, instead of aunt and niece (74). Helen 
pushes Rachel to think for herself and to “be a person on [her] own account” (75). She 
suggests that they can “talk to each other as human beings”—“because we like each 
other,” Rachel adds (75). After three months together in the villa, “a keen observer might 
have thought that the girl was more definite and self-confident in her manner than 
before. [. . .] and she attended to what was said as though she might be going to 
contradict it” (87). Rachel’s growing confidence makes her seem less vague and more 
willing to engage as a distinct person, with her own opinions. Although she’s “still a 
good deal prejudiced and liable to exaggerate,” Helen thinks Rachel is now “more or 
less a reasonable human being” (86).  
Talking becomes the primary relational mode between Helen and Rachel, and 
presents an alternative to being vague and indefinite. Considering Rachel again after a 
few months of being together in Santa Marina, Helen is aware: 
  [. . .] that some sort of change was taking place in the human being.  
 [. . .]. She saw her less shy, and less serious, which was all to the  





led to that result were usually not even guessed at by her. Talk was the 
medicine she trusted to, talk about everything, talk that was free, 
unguarded, and as candid as a habit of talking with men made natural in 
her own case. Nor did she encourage those habits of unselfishness and 
amiability founded upon insincerity which are put at so high value in 
mixed households of men and women. She desired that Rachel should 
think, and for this reason offered books and discouraged too entire a 
dependence upon Bach and Beethoven and Wagner. (113) 
 
Talking and reading invite Rachel into form, into difference, into thinking for herself. 
She is free to choose books as she pleases and comes “to conclusions, which had to be 
remodeled according to the adventures of the day, [. . .] leaving always a small grain of 
belief behind them” (113). Rachel is learning in increments and is practicing how to be 
an autonomous person. But she often feels restless and impatient with the process. This 
interactional mode is slower and more difficult than the solitude she is used to. She 
prefers the mode of music, which gets to things all at once; talking and thinking is more 
like books, which are so much “scratching on the match-box” (195-96). Despite Helen’s 
attempts to draw her into distinct form, Rachel remains “a live if unformed human 
being” (190).  
Although she cares for Helen, Rachel is ultimately unable to find a definite sense 
of self only in talking and thinking.44 In the only moment of conflict between them, 
Rachel accuses Helen of being “only half alive” (248). Rachel is angry because Helen 
                                                 
44 In an earlier draft of the novel, Terence asks Rachel whether she cares for anyone.  “‘My mother 
was the person I cared for,’” Rachel answers. “‘And now Helen. When she speaks it’s like the 





won’t do things; in this case she doesn’t want to join an expedition to a native village. 
Helen doesn’t “do anything but exist!” (248). Rachel continues, “‘You see that things are 
bad, and you pride yourself on saying so. It’s what you call being honest; as a matter of 
fact it’s being lazy, being dull, being nothing. You don’t help; you put an end to things’” 
(248). What Rachel is objecting to is Helen’s tendency to stand apart, observing and 
judging things from a distance. Rachel craves something more active and more engaged. 
In her relationship with Helen, Rachel discovers the possibility of thinking for herself, 
even when that means realizing that there is more to life than only thinking and talking. 
 
Rachel and Terence 
The first time Rachel is alone with Terence is during their walk to the edge of a 
cliff that overlooks the coast. She tells him all about her life in Richmond and listens to 
him talk about his life. She feels irritated by all the “spinning out words” and wonders, 
“Why did they not kiss each other simply?” (203). When he walks her back to the villa, 
Rachel turns at the gate in silence: “She could not say [. . .] there was nothing to be said 
[. . .] without a word she went” (207). Terence too is unsatisfied with the encounter. The 
chapter ends: “What was the use of talking, talking, merely talking?” (207). In the 
beginning of the next chapter, we see that “Helen and Rachel had become very silent” 





as they used to. Rather than seeking a differentiated sense of self in her distinct thinking, 
Rachel begins to experiment with finding differentiation through her distinct feelings. 
From the time she meets Terence until the moment he proposes marriage, 
Rachel’s primary preoccupation is trying to work out what it is that she feels for him. 
The morning after a dance at the hotel, Rachel considers Terence and his friend Hirst:  
Any clear analysis of them was impossible owing to the haze of wonder 
in which they were enveloped. She could not reason about them as about 
people whose feelings went by the same rule as her own did, and her 
mind dwelt on them with a kind of physical pleasure such as is caused by 
the contemplation of bright things hanging in the sun. From them all life 
seemed to radiate [. . . ]. (160-61) 
 
Just as her thinking begins vague and becomes more differentiated as she interacts with 
Helen, who thinks differently than she does, Rachel’s feelings too begin in “a haze of 
wonder” and become more definite as she encounters Terence’s different feelings. These 
encounters with real and different others allow Rachel to develop an autonomous sense 
of self. At the end of this passage, Rachel, sitting alone under a tree, says out loud: 
“‘What is it to be in love?’ [. . .] each word as it came into being seemed to shove itself 
out into an unknown sea” (161). The “unknown sea” is Rachel’s habitual mode of 
undifferentiated being. As these words and her feelings come into differentiated being, 
Rachel discovers “a terrible possibility in life” and braces herself “much as a soldier 





 Terence too is struggling to find what it is that matters in life. After leaving 
Cambridge “owing to a difference with the authorities,” he has drifted from place to 
place, and has enough money that he doesn’t need to work (98). He is writing at least 
three novels: one about “Silence,” one “about a young man who is obsessed by an idea,” 
and a Stuart tragedy (204-05). Arguing with Hirst’s idea that people are types, Terence 
declares himself “a dove on a tree-top,” flitting “from branch to branch” (97). When 
Hirst asks him what it is he means by saying that “one is never alone, and one is never 
in company,” Terence falters: 
  ‘Meaning? Oh, something about bubbles—auras—what d’you  
  call ’em? You can’t see my bubble; I can’t see yours; all we see of  
each other is a speck, like the wick in the middle of that flame. The  
flame goes about with us everywhere; it’s not ourselves exactly, but  
what we feel; the world is short, or people mainly; all kinds of  
people.’ (98) 
 
When two bubbles coalesce, the world becomes an “e—nor—mous” “billowy universe” 
(98). This is one possibility of the kind of relationship that Terence offers Rachel: 
fluctuating, indeterminate, neither alone nor together. 
 After he has organized an expedition to the top of a local mountain, Terence 
wonders why he has bothered to do so: 
  ‘Cows,’ he reflected, ‘draw together in a field; ships in a calm; and  
  we’re just the same when we’ve nothing else to do. But why do we  
  do it?—is it to prevent ourselves from seeing to the bottom of  
  things [. . .] making cities and mountains and whole universes out  
of nothing, or do we really love each other, or do we, on the other  





leaping from moment to moment as from world to world?—which  
is, on the whole, the view I incline to.’ (116) 
 
Because Terence does not have much to do in life, he considers relationships a way to 
pass time. Relating with others only happens when he doesn’t have anything else to do. 
He is both lonely and unable to connect in a meaningful way with others. His view of 
life as perpetually uncertain and of relationship as leaping from one thing to another is 
reminiscent of the inescapable deferral of the semiotic mode. 
Terence expresses these views about the nature of human relationships to Hirst 
before he has met Rachel. They meet for the first time on the expedition to the top of the 
mountain. As he falls in love with her, his views change some. But, like Rachel, his old 
patterns and habits persist despite the various changes. Terence, like Rachel, becomes 
agitated as he discovers that he is falling in love. While in one of these moods, a guest at 
the hotel intercepts him to ask his advice about her romantic troubles. Terence feels 
impatient with her: “‘We don’t care for people because of their qualities,’ he tried to 
explain. ‘It’s just them that we care for,’—he struck a match—‘just that,’ he said, pointing 
to the flames” (177). Terence is trying to articulate something for which he does not yet 
have the words. He is aware that he cannot attribute his feelings for Rachel to any of her 
qualities or to the sum of all of her qualities, but he is not able to discern just what it is 
that he does love. He returns to the image of the flame, which he has described to Hirst 





As he sits talking with Rachel on the cliff, Terence thinks that he knows “all the 
things that were important about her; he felt them in the air around them” (206). He is 
unable to pierce the vagueness of his feelings and speak with her directly. Rachel is the 
one that ventures forth, “‘I like you; d’you like me?’” (206). He is relieved by her candor 
and asks whether they might call each other Terence and Rachel (206). Up to this 
moment in the chapter, Terence is referred to by his surname Hewet; after this, he 
becomes Terence. Rachel’s personal relationships with both Helen and Rachel begin 
when she calls them by their first names, when they become particular human beings (74, 
206).  
But Terence is not altogether able to consider Rachel a distinct person. When he 
thinks about her afterwards, Terence cannot think of her with distinct qualities, but 
rather grasps her “instinctively” (230). He does not know her “and yet he was in love 
with her” (230). He opens “his arms wide as if to hold her and the world in one 
embrace” (231). Of the possibilities he presents about why people draw together, 
Terence embodies all three: he is avoiding seeing Rachel and himself clearly and 
distinctly; he feels love for her; and he is perpetually drifting from one experience to 
another. 
Rachel and Terence become engaged during the course of the river expedition to 
the native village. They leave the others and walk in silence into the depth of the forest. 





    ‘You like being with me?’ Terence asked. 
    ‘Yes, with you,’ she replied 
   He was silent for a moment. Silence seemed to have fallen upon  
the world. 
   ‘That is what I have felt ever since I knew you,’ he replied. ‘We  
are happy together.’ He did not seem to be speaking, or she to be  
hearing. 
   ‘Very happy,’ she answered. 
   They continued to walk for some time in silence. Their steps  
unconsciously quickened. 
   ‘We love each other,’ Terence said. 
   ‘We love each other,’ she repeated. (256-57) 
 
Neither one is particularly embodied or interacting with a distinct other. The exchange is 
hypnotic, Rachel parroting whatever Terence says. There is neither speaking nor hearing. 
The dim light and the “sighing sounds [. . .] suggest to the traveller in a forest that he is 
walking at the bottom of the sea” (256). When Terence finally declares love, it is not his 
for her but theirs for each other. He speaks for her too rather than only for himself. They 
embrace and fall to the ground. As they rise to return to the boat, Rachel looks very tired 
and pale (257).45 
 Walking back to the others “in silence as people walking in their sleep,” Rachel 
and Terence pass the remainder of the expedition as if in a trance (258). The others 
interact “high in the air above,” and Terence and Rachel have “dropped to the bottom of 
the world together” (259, 261). Their union is disembodied, isolated from the company 
of others. Rachel loses the capacity to distinguish herself and other objects: “The eyes of 
                                                 
45 Some critics cite these as the beginning symptoms of Rachel’s illness, suggesting she contracts 





Rachel saw nothing. Yellow and green shapes did, it is true, pass before them, but she 
only knew that one was large and another small; she did not know that they were trees” 
(262). Not only is Rachel unable to recognize outer objects, but her own eyes are 
somehow separate from her sense of self. 
 The next day, the party draws close to the native village and decides to walk the 
final mile there. Alone for the first time since the scene in the forest, Terence asks Rachel 
whether she loves him. “She murmured inarticulately, ending, ‘And you?’” (265). This is 
the first time that Terence addresses her directly; and Rachel’s answer is an inarticulate 
murmur. Thinking that they cannot be “united” until he discloses all of his faults, 
Terence begins listing his affairs with other women, his “sense of futility,” his 
“incompetence” (265-66). As he carries on talking about his friends and the sights in 
London, “with every word the mist which had enveloped them, making them seem 
unreal to each other, since the previous afternoon melted a little further, and their 
contact became more and more natural” (266). It is the particular details of Terence’s life 
that finally penetrates the haze of their union. For the first time, Rachel, “observing his 
grey coat and his purple tie,” can say, “‘Yes, I’m in love. There’s no doubt; I’m in love 
with you’” (266). It’s not “the eyes of Rachel” but Rachel herself who observes; and 
instead of seeing “nothing,” she sees Terence in particular detail. 
 Their relationship alternates between these modes of union and difference for the 





struggle between two particular human beings who choose to love one another and the 
tendency to dissolve into a unitive trance. “Feeling this painfully”—the movement 
between having “no division between them” and being “separate and far away”—
Rachel exclaims, “‘It will be a fight’” (266). She again braces for the battle that she had 
predicted weeks earlier (161). The struggle is no longer only internal but now with 
another person. 
Just as Rachel learns the independence of her own thinking in interacting with 
Helen, with Terence she learns the independence of her feelings. She feels love and 
connection in an embodied way. “With a little surprise at recognising in her own person 
so famous a thing,” Rachel describes her feeling of happiness “almost as if it were the 
blood singing in her veins” (267). She and Terence talk about and compare their feelings, 
“for they were very different” (268).  
Rachel faces the battle of maintaining her difference not only in relationship to 
Terence but also in relationship to her lifelong identification with abstract natural forces. 
On one side is union with Terence, on the other union with nature, and autonomous 
Rachel is in the middle. On the last night of the expedition, Rachel and Terence stand at 
the railing of the boat and look out at the dark world. After a long silence, Terence 
accuses Rachel, “‘You’d forgotten completely about me [. . .] and I never forget you’” 
(273). “‘Oh, no,’ she whispered, she had not forgotten, only the stars—the night—the 





old ways of being pull at her. Hers is not a simple linear development. Her life has 
become much like her piano playing: “Now she stumbled; now she faltered and had to 
play the same bar twice over; but an invisible line seemed to string the notes together, 
from which rose a shape, a building” (49). 
Once they are back in Santa Marina, the couple receives congratulations from the 
guests at the hotel. When they are alone, Rachel plays the piano and Terence reads. They 
imagine the children they will have and pity those “outside the warm mysterious globe 
full of changes and miracles” in which they find themselves (279). At the same time, 
Rachel feels herself “far apart” from Terence (279). She wonders, “Would there ever be a 
time when the world was one and indivisible?” (279). Terence suggests that she 
overcome this sense of a disconnected world by imagining a “common quality” between 
herself and others; “and once linked together by one such tie she would find them not 
separate and formidable, but practically indistinguishable, and she would come to love 
them when she found out that they were like herself” (282). This, ultimately, is the 
problem with Terence’s notion of love. His mode of connection is insensible merging, 
becoming “indistinguishable” from others. He suggests that love is based on discovering 
likeness rather than respecting difference. 
But Rachel believes “that human beings [are] as various as the beasts at the Zoo” 
(282-83). Terence minds that she is “able to cut herself adrift from him and to pass away 





becoming one with nature but also by recognizing her autonomy. Rachel questions 
whether they ought not to break off the engagement, and they immediately cling 
together as answer. They feel “soothed” and “the divisions disappeared” (286). But as 
they compose themselves to go down to lunch, “it chilled them to see themselves in the 
glass, for instead of being vast and indivisible they were really very small and separate, 
the size of the glass leaving a large space for the reflection of other things” (286). The 
question they face is how to be distinct and yet in love, and how to be in love and also 
include the rest of the world. 
 In the chapter before she falls ill, Rachel has gone to the hotel with Terence to 
have tea with some hotel guests. She remembers distinctly previous occasions of being 
at the hotel: “She felt herself amazingly secure as she sat in her arm-chair, and able to 
review not only the night of the dance, but the entire past, tenderly and humorously, as 
if she had been turning in a fog for a long time, and could now see exactly where she 
had turned” (297). Her sense of self and of life is definite. Even though she was not 
aware of it at the time, “one thing led to another and by degrees something had formed 
itself out of nothing, and so one reached at last this calm, this quiet, this certainty, and it 
was this process that people called living” (297). In this clarity, which is different than 
the mode of thinking that distances her from the world and the mode of feeling that 
dissolves her into union, Rachel is able to find meaning in the world as it is. She does not 





where she finds herself. And, she is not alone. This calm certainty allows Rachel to see 
the value of other lives as well: “When she looked back she could see that a meaning of 
some kind was apparent in the lives of her aunts, and in the brief visit of the Dalloways 
whom she would never see again, and in the life of her father” (297). Other people exist 
and their lives have meaning independently of Rachel. Connection can happen even 
between people who will never see each other again. 
 Rachel looks over at Terence, who has fallen asleep next to her. She considers his 
face and his faults, imagining all of the struggles that lie ahead of them “because they 
[are] so different” (298). She continues: 
  But all this was superficial, and had nothing to do with the life that 
went on beneath the eyes and the mouth and the chin, for that life  
was independent of her, and independent of everything else. So too,  
although she was going to marry him and to live with him for  
thirty, or forty, or fifty years, and to quarrel, and to be close to him,  
she was independent of him; she was independent of everything  
else. Nevertheless, as St. John said, it was love that made her  
understand this, for she had never felt this independence, this calm,  
and this certainty until she fell in love with him, and perhaps this  
too was love. She wanted nothing else. (298) 
 
This is a change from the beginning of the novel, when Rachel believes that it is “far 
better to play the piano and forget all the rest” because “to feel anything strongly was to 
create an abyss between oneself and others who feel strongly perhaps but differently” 
(29). Rachel now recognizes and finds meaning in difference. And what has allowed this 





a love that differentiates. What used to be underneath the surface of life was isolated 
consciousness, or undifferentiated union with wind and sea, or identification with 
characters in books. But now, what is underneath the surface of life is personal 
difference and individual autonomy. This is a new independence and not the solitary 
isolation that marked her at the beginning of the novel. This independence is not 
discovered in self-enclosed vision but in differentiated love. Connection now is a choice 
Rachel makes, rather than being only determined by evolution or attraction or cycles or 
belonging to the same types.  
This is the ethical mode: a distinct and autonomous person able to act in the 
world and connect with others without being either submerged or withdrawn. And this 
mode of being human is discovered precisely in interacting with others. Rachel finds 
this independence in actively relating with Helen and Terence. With Helen, she 
discovers what she thinks and how to articulate that without rupturing the relationship. 
With Terence, she discovers what she feels and how to connect without losing her sense 
of self. This passage where Rachel recognizes the relationship between love and 
autonomy is the last extended passage from her point of view before she falls ill. In other 
words, this is the Rachel that falls ill—calm, definite, certain, independent.  
Her final realization before getting sick reveals the relationship between self-
consciousness and other-consciousness. What allows her to be embodied as a distinct 





independent before seeing that she herself is. This is a subtle point. She does not grant 
freedom and independence to Terence by virtue of his likeness to herself. Terence’s 
autonomy is independent of Rachel. But only in seeing his clearly can she see her own. 
As Rachel’s thinking and feeling and sensing becomes embodied, she is able to see 
others and the world with more clarity and certainty. Her recognition of Terence’s basic 
freedom confers the agency that allows her to see her own. She cannot begin with herself, 
as does Stephen, because there is then no way out to the other. She cannot begin with the 
other and simply end there, as does Edwin, because there is then no personal, creative 
agency. By virtue of recognizing Terence’s absolute difference, Rachel can recognize her 
own. This ethical and relational mode of understanding is love.46 
 
Rachel Dies 
Rachel’s voyage out from self to world, which begins with kissing Richard and 
ends with her death, is far from a stable or linear development. But the stumbling and 
faltering are not hindrances.47 Rather, precisely because of the false starts, Rachel is able 
                                                 
46 While working on The Voyage Out, Woolf writes to Violet Dickinson: “You will be glad to hear 
that I am seething with fragments of love, morals, ethics, comedy tragedy, and so on; and every 
morning pour them out into a manuscript book.” November 14, 1910. Letters, v. 1, p. 438. 
 
 
47 Jed Esty reads both The Voyage Out and Portrait as “antidevelopment fictions set in colonial 





to discover an autonomous self through engaged interaction with others. In the chapter 
immediately after she recognizes her independence, Rachel’s head begins to ache and 
she soon falls ill with typhoid. Ten days later, she dies. Critics most often read her death 
as an escape into the mythical world of Milton’s Comus; but the novel suggests 
otherwise.48  
As the chapter opens, Terence is reading out loud from Comus: 
 Sabrina fair, 
    Listen where thou are sitting 
 Under the glassy, cool, translucent wave, 
    In twisted braids of lilies knitting 
 The loose train of thy amber dropping hair, 
 Listen for dear honour’s sake, 
    Goddess of the silver lake, 
    Listen and save! (309) 
 
In Milton’s masque, Comus is a debauched mythical figure that traps the chaste Lady in 
a magical chair. Her brothers find her but are unable to free her from the enchanted 
                                                                                                                                                 
life.” Unseasonable Youth: Modernism, Colonialism, and the Fiction of Development, p. 2. Esty 
equates uneven development with antidevelopment. But Rachel does develop; so does Stephen. 
Although the linear development of classical Bildungsromane plots is subverted in these novels, 
the consequence, especially for Rachel,  is not the “frozen youth” that Esty posits. In the narrative 
world of this novel, that Rachel dies is a development. She has developed from a disembodied 
youth identified with the wind and the sea to an embodied woman capable both of love and 
death. Esty’s notion of development is chiefly social, political, and economic in nature. Woolf is 
concerned, above all, with ethical development, the extent to which Rachel can act and interact as 
a definite and free person. 
 
 
48 See Louise DeSalvo, Virginia Woolf’s First Voyage; Mark Hussey, The Singing of the Real 
World; Patricia Moran, Word of Mouth: Body Language in Katherine Mansfield and Virginia 
Woolf; George Ella Lyon, “Virginia Woolf and the Problem of the Body”; Theresa Fulker, 





chair. They appeal to Sabrina, a water nymph, to save the Lady. She does, and the Lady 
returns to life with her parents. As Rachel listens to these lines, she is overcome by a 
headache and goes to bed. These lines appealing to Sabrina for help continue to pass in 
and out of her consciousness while she is sick. 
 On the first day of being in bed, Rachel feels “a gulf between her world and the 
ordinary world which she could not bridge” (311). This gulf increases as the days pass. 
She repeats the lines from Comus to herself. By the second day, the world appears 
“distinctly further off” and “the glassy, cool, translucent wave” has reached the foot of 
Rachel’s bed (311). The coolness of the wave is a relief from the heat of the fever. By the 
third day, “all landmarks were obliterated, and the outer world was so far away” (311). 
Everything distinct recedes and Rachel is engulfed in various hallucinations. She is 
“completely cut off, and unable to communicate with the rest of the world, isolated 
alone with her body” (312). In her delirium, she imagines her room is the damp, 
narrowing tunnel from the nightmare she had after Richard kissed her (313). Between 
the fourth and seventh days, Rachel loses all contact with the outside world. She is 
“suddenly unable to keep Helen’s face distinct” from the content of her hallucinations 
(322). Rachel falls 
   [. . .] into a deep pool of sticky water, which eventually closed over  
  her head. She saw nothing and heard nothing but a faint booming  
  sound, which was the sound of the sea rolling over her head. While  
all her tormentors thought that she was dead, she was not dead,  





seeing darkness, sometimes light, while every now and then some  
one turned her over at the bottom of the sea. (322) 
 
This echoes the disembodied moment of her engagement with Terence, when they fall 
together to “the bottom of the sea” (256). Now she is with Sabrina at the bottom of the 
lake, not dead but hiding. Unlike the Lady, who returns to her life after Sabrina frees her, 
Rachel stays in the mythical world of the nymph. She chooses the sea over life. But the 
novel does not end here. And Rachel lives for another three days. 
 On the eight day, a more qualified doctor arrives to treat her. By the ninth day, 
Rachel is “conscious of what went on round her” (327). More “like herself,” she asks 
what day of the week it is (327). She is riding up and down on a wave and has come “to 
the surface of the dark, sticky pool” (327). Soon though, “the wave was replaced by a 
mountain” (327). She is no longer figured as the undifferentiated sea, but now as 
differentiated land. Her body begins to have more substance and she recognizes Helen 
and the surroundings. Rachel is still weak and wishes “for nothing else in the world” 
than to be alone (328). More than anyone, it is Terence who vexes her because he “forced 
her to join mind to body in the desire to remember something” (328).  
Throughout her illness, what Terence has been trying to make Rachel remember 
is their engaged bliss. Although he has been in a state of hopeless despair, it seems to 
him unimaginable that Rachel might die. It is on the ninth day, when she improves, 





  To realise what they meant by saying that she had a chance of life  
  was beyond him, knowing as he did that they were engaged. He  
turned, still enveloped in the same dreary mist, and walked towards the 
door. Suddenly he saw it all. He saw the room and  the garden, and the 
trees moving in the air, they could go on without her; she could die. For 
the first time since she fell ill he remembered exactly what she looked like 
and the way in which they cared for each other. [. . .] He could not let her 
die; he could not live without her. But after a momentary struggle, the 
curtain fell again, and he saw nothing and felt nothing clearly. It was all 
going on—going on still, in the same way as before. Save for the physical 
pain when his heart beat, and the fact that his fingers were icy cold, he 
did not realise that he was anxious about anything. Within his mind he 
seemed to feel nothing about Rachel or about any one or anything in the 
world. (328-29) 
 
To Terence, being engaged is a bulwark against any kind of separation from Rachel. In 
his experience, they are so merged that it is inconceivable that she might die and he 
continue to live. But briefly, he is able to see that she could die. In that moment, he sees 
the world more clearly and more distinctly. He remembers “exactly” what she looks like. 
What pierces the “dreary mist” that Terence has been living in is Rachel becoming more 
“like herself.” As she becomes distinct and emerges from the bottom of the sea, Terence 
has to face that she can die. So long as she was a consort of Sabrina’s (or of Terence’s), 
Rachel could not die. But when she is herself—distinct and definite—she can die. But 
Terence can only see this possibility momentarily. His body knows it but his mind will 
not allow it.  
 Once Rachel comes “to the surface of the dark, sticky pool,” she does not 





two days of her life. On the tenth day, the doctor tells them that Rachel is worse. “It 
seemed as if they were at last brought together face to face with something definite” 
(332). What is definite is not only the seriousness of her illness but also Rachel herself. 
This is the most lucid she has been since she has fallen ill. She is not withdrawn and is 
able to communicate. The “attempt at communication” that “had been a failure” with 
Richard succeeds with Terence (57). Instead of trying “first to recollect and then to 
expose her shivering private visions,” as she wanted to do with Richard, Rachel 
addresses Terence simply (57). When Terence goes to sit by her bedside, “she saw him 
and knew him” (333). She smiles at him and says, “‘Hullo, Terence’” (333). These are her 
last words.  
The “gulf” that opens between her and the world when she first falls ill is not 
there when she dies (311). Rachel dies seeing and knowing clearly. She is distinct and 
sees Terence distinctly, as “Terence.” She closes her eyes and, in a few moments, “she 
had ceased to breathe” (334). Sabrina does not save her; nor does Rachel slip to the 
bottom of the sea. Rachel’s death is not a descent into mythical consciousness; it is 
ordinary and embodied—she stops breathing. 
 Two storms bookend Rachel’s story of becoming embodied. The first storm 
happens on water, during the sea voyage to Santa Marina. Richard kisses her after the 
storm subsides and she has nightmares that night. During her illness, the imagery from 





kiss at the beginning of the novel. The kiss brings her body to life and the illness ends it. 
After she dies, there is another storm—this one on land. The storm that disturbs sea-
Rachel, who is undifferentiated, leads to the awareness of her body; the storm that 
disturbs land-Rachel, who is embodied, is the possibility of death. The storm at sea 
nudges Rachel from undifferentiated being to a budding embodiment. The storm on 
land completes this embodiment by admitting death.  
 That Rachel dies means that she lived. Terence, still in his “dreary mist,” makes 
her death a moment of mystical merger, thinking that they now have “the complete 
union” that was not possible while Rachel lived (328, 334). In one way, he is right. As 
Rachel becomes differentiated during the course of the novel, she is no longer able to 
merge completely, whether with Terence or with the sea. The ethical body, the 
autonomous person with agency, is the only one that can die.49 In the other narrative 
modes, the body simply continues in various attenuated ways: the natural body evolves; 
the historical body struggles; the archetypal body repeats; the semiotic body defers; the 
philosophical body is absorbed. In the narrative modes of the novel, Rachel can die only 
if she is embodied as a particular person.50 Although counterintuitive to consider the 
                                                 
49 In Melymbrosia, talking to Terence about her mother’s death, Rachel says, “‘So I love the sea 
and music because they don’t die.’” p. 224.  
 
 
50 Elisabeth Ladenson and Victoria Rosner have raised valuable objections to my reading Rachel’s 
death as a developmental achievement, particularly given the history of reading women’s 





death of the heroine a triumph, within the narrative world of The Voyage Out, that 
Rachel can die is proof that she exists as a differentiated individual. Her primary 
struggle throughout the novel has been between identifying with abstract forces and 
experiencing herself as a definite individual. When she is like the wind and the sea, or 
like characters from novels, she cannot die; nor, though, does she live. 
 
Art without the Artist 
 Unlike Portrait, which ends with Stephen’s flight, and Clayhanger, which ends 
with Edwin’s burden, The Voyage Out continues for another two chapters after Rachel 
dies.51 We don’t see any more of Terence or Helen. The story returns to the minor 
characters at the hotel, who react to Rachel’s death and then carry on with the business 
of life. As the guests are eating dinner, a storm hits and the novel ends with the 
consciousness of St. John Hirst. Throughout the novel, Hirst figures as the brilliant, 
cynical, and socially inept intellectual. In the end, he finds comfort surrounded by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
triumph, but a specific one that follows closely Rachel’s particular arc of personal development. 
Also, from a formal perspective, by having the novel continue without its central character, 
Woolf signals what becomes one of her distinctive narrative innovations—a creative 
consciousness that is not only reflexive but also shared—not enclosed, centered, or located in 
only the artist figure. 
 
 
51 Woolf writes to Lytton Strachey about the novel: “What I wanted to do was to give the feeling 
of a vast tumult of life, as various and disorderly as possible, which should be cut short for a 
moment by the death, and go on again—and the whole was to have a sort of pattern, and be 





people that he has characterized as so many “hens in a circle” (97). Sitting in the social 
hall after ten days of caring for Rachel and Terence, Hirst feels a “profound happiness” 
watching the others: “The movements and the voices seemed to draw together from 
different parts of the room, and to combine themselves into a pattern before his eyes” 
(352). When he first appears in the novel, Hirst is reading Gibbon and “a whole 
procession of splendid sentences entered his capacious brow and went marching 
through his brain in order” (95-96). The novel ends as “across his eyes passed a 
procession of objects, black and indistinct, the figures of people picking up their books, 
their cards, their balls of wool, their work-baskets, and passing him one after another on 
the way to bed” (353). Hirst too has become more human during the course the novel. 
The “splendid sentences” that used to occupy him are now “figures of people.” 
Although they are “black and indistinct,” his relationship to them has changed—their 
movements and voices “soothed him” (352). 
 Returning now to Woolf’s ideas about art and life, we can see more of what she 
means:   
  From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is a  
  constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a  
pattern; that we—I mean all human beings—are connected with  
this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the  
work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this  





is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically there is no God; we are the 
words; we are the music; we are the thing itself. And I see this when I 
have a shock.52 
 
There is no Shakespeare and no Beethoven in the sense that Rachel dies and life (and the 
novel) continues. There is no isolated artist figure that is the sole creator or source of 
meaning. Hirst, a decidedly unpleasant fellow, is as connected to and has as much 
access to the pattern as does everyone else. Vision and creation are not the province of 
only the artist. A creative, engaged life is each person’s responsibility. Art does not 
transcend life, nor is the artist impervious to death. We are the words and the music and 
the thing itself in that there is nowhere else to get to and nothing else to be—the creative 
act is not deferred in time or extended in space. Being embodied means living and 
creating exactly where you find yourself. This is how Rachel learns to be definite 
without being isolated and to be connected without being submerged.  
 
In this novel, Woolf debunks the notion of the isolated, visionary artist in the 
very genre created to convey that myth.53 Rather than accepting the inherited model of 
                                                 
52 “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being, p. 72. 
 
 
53 Pamela Caughie recognizes that Woolf deconstructs the myth of the artist in her later novels, 
but suggests that what takes its place is a notion of art and narrative as inconclusive and artificial. 
“‘I must not settle into a figure’: The Woman Artist in Virginia Woolf’s Writings,” pp. 371-97. To 
me, this seems to trivialize Woolf’s actual sense of life as a creative act, not only for the artists in 





the Künstlerroman—a sensitive artist bandied about by an unsympathetic world—Woolf 
works out how an artist might actually bridge the divide between self and world, self 
and other, in a creative life. Neither abandoning art for daily life (as Edwin does) nor 
escaping life into art (as Stephen does), Rachel learns how to be an autonomous human 
being that can connect freely with others. In this and her other novels, Woolf is working 
out an embodied aesthetics.54 To the extent that the consciousness of her characters (and 
not only the artist figures) is anchored in a lived, physical experience, their imaginations 
are free to connect with others. Thoughts and feelings and sensations can pass from one 
character to another without direct exchange. When the body holds the center of 
individual being, self-consciousness can exist alongside other-consciousness. 
Consciousness that is embodied in a distinct sense of self can neither escape into vision 
nor dissolve into insensible union.  
Descartes moors the being of the self in conscious thinking. The British 
empiricists locate the self in pure sensation. Both possibilities, by enclosing the self in 
either mind or body, limit the capacity of the self to connect with the world and with 
others. Life becomes various continuities of either thought or sensation. The genre of 
                                                                                                                                                 
says, “I feel things matter quite immensely.  [. . .] there is significance [. . .] I’m annoyed to be told 
that I am nothing but a stringer together of words and words and words.” October 27, 1931. 
Letters, v. 4, p. 397.  
 
 
54 Roger Poole writes of Woolf, “The ways the body is ‘lived,’ is active in creating, and 
participating in, a world of meanings, is her theme throughout her fictional career.” The 





Künstlerroman examines the development of an artistic consciousness in life. How might 
a young artist bridge the gap between self and world in the act of creation? Beginning 
with The Voyage Out, Woolf takes up this question. She experiments with what an 
embodied aesthetics, tethered exclusively to neither sensation nor vision, might look like. 
The usual modes of bodily experience—the natural, the historical, the archetypal, and 
the semiotic—cannot govern creation because nothing new ever happens in these modes.  
What Rachel discovers is an ethical mode, a personal mode based on acting and 
relating. An embodied aesthetics is not given from above; it requires personal effort. 
Rachel learns to live in the same spirit in which she plays music: “Now she stumbled; 
now she faltered and had to play the same bar twice over; but an invisible line seemed to 
string the notes together, from which rose a shape, a building” (49). What arises is not a 
vision or image, but a shape and a building.55 In this first novel, Woolf suggests what a 
creative life might be, not only for the artist figure but for all human beings. The self that 
can live a creative life is actively embodied—distinct without being isolated and 
connected without being fused. 
                                                 
55 From OE gesceap, shape means “creation, form, destiny.” From late ME, it refers to the “external 
form or contour of the body.” (OED) Also, building in the sense that Paul talks of the body as 
God’s building: “[. . .] you are God’s farm, God’s building. By the grace of God which was given 
to me, I laid the foundations like a trained master-builder, and someone else is building on them. 
[. . .]” 1 Cor. 3: 9-10. For echoes of this sense of body as building for Edwin, see pp. 66-67 above; 









 The primary concern of the novel of artistic development is how an artist bridges 
the gap between self-consciousness and the world through the creative act. This includes 
how the isolated artist learns to relate to others. Bennett, Joyce, and Woolf create artists 
that offer different solutions to the main problem of the genre. In Clayhanger, Edwin is 
not able to balance his creative inner life with his actual outer life. He abandons his 
drawings, takes over the family printing press, and surrenders himself to an uneasy 
marriage. Stephen Dedalus, on the other hand, renounces the world. Family, 
relationships, and country are distractions from his impulse to create. Stephen chooses 
instead to withdraw into visionary flight. It is Woolf who suggests a new possibility. 
Rather than sacrificing art for the world or the world for art, Woolf questions the nature 
of the dilemma. In the genre based precisely on the premise of the isolated artist figure 
reflecting from a distance on an external world, Woolf debunks that idea. She does not 
dismiss artist, art, or world, but questions the exact nature of these terms. In other words, 
she challenges the inherited assumptions of the genre. She does this not for sport, but in 
order to think anew the relationship between artist and world. In the development of 
Rachel’s consciousness, Woolf reveals the possibility of an embodied aesthetics that is 





The main dynamic of the Künstlerroman genre can be visually represented as: 
 
art 
                                               consciousness   →   world 
 
 
     Figure 1 
 
    
These novels are preoccupied with telling the story of how an artist-protagonist 
develops over time and whether he is able to strike out, through his art, from solitary 
vision to connection with the world. As I argue in the first chapter of this study, the 
original sense of aisthesis did not have much to do with art specifically.1 Rather, the 
notion conveyed the entirety of man’s sensory responses to the world. Aisthesis was the 
counterpart to the pure intellection of noesis. As the field developed, particularly with 
the contribution of eighteenth-century German thinkers, the central position of sensation 
and the body was supplanted by art and matters of taste.  
Both materialist and idealist aesthetics, either enshrining the body or 
transcending it, neglect the actual significance of the body. Because the Künstlerroman 
genre inherits this bodiless aesthetics, issues of embodiment emerge as central to these 
novels. Not only does the body resurface thematically in the sexual development of the 
artist figures, but also it becomes the key to the solution of the genre’s chief dilemma. 
                                                 





How does an artist integrate his visions with the world through his creative life? 
Bennett, in Clayhanger, suggests this can’t be done. Although Edwin gains some 
measure of autonomy from his father and is able to fall in love with Hilda, he does so at 
the expense of his creative life. The novel ends with Edwin surrendering to the passion 
and burden of his marriage. Edwin develops from a shy, disembodied artist to a 
beleaguered, disembodied husband. Bennett offers a realist surrender to the material 
burdens of life as an alternative to visionary escapism. Although Edwin becomes more 
embodied as the novel proceeds, he is also more determined by and consciously driven 
by his physical needs and desires. His development is incomplete and uneasy. On the 
one hand, he is more aware of himself as a living organism; on the other hand, he is as 
subject to his physiology as he was to his imagination. Bennett’s solution to the question 
of the genre is that relationship, not art, bridges the chasm between self and world: 
 
                                                                           marriage 






There is both passion and defeat in Edwin’s final surrender to a life with Hilda. The 





is now the Edwin who lacks creative autonomy because he is submerged in marital 
struggle. Edwin simply trades masters from mind to body. 
 Like Bennett, Joyce rejects the possibility of the genre. Whereas Bennett sacrifices 
art, Joyce sacrifices the world. Throughout Portrait, Stephen struggles to connect with 
classmates, girls, family, and the church. For all of his perseveration about sensation and 
sex, Stephen is never able to become embodied in a real way. “We are,” as Stanislaus 
Joyce notes, “from first to last in the centre of Stephen’s brain. The picture is an 
interior.”2 Stephen’s physical experiences of self, of others, and of the world remain 
figurative—always couched in visions, traces, and images. Because Stephen is not 
embodied, he is unable to pierce the bubble of his solipsistic innerness. The world and 
others exist as functions of his imagination. What doesn’t happen in life, he makes 
happen in verse.  
As the novel proceeds, Stephen exhausts all possibilities of connection and 
withdraws into isolated vision. He is no longer satisfied by simply using the material 
world as fodder for his visions. Rather, he turns completely to “the contemplation of an 
inner world.”3 In a final act of renunciation, Stephen dedicates himself to writing the 
story of his own inner world: 
                                                 
2 My Bother’s Keeper, p. 18. See above, pp. 90-91. 
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His self-enclosure is complete. Gone is “the glowing sensible world”; instead, Stephen 
pursues an art that will mirror his private inner world.4 
 In these novels, both Bennett and Joyce accept the main premise of the genre—an 
isolated artist enclosed in self-conscious reflection—and offer different escapes out of the 
bind between vision and world. But neither Edwin nor Stephen is able to bridge the gap 
between self and the world through a creative act. Woolf, on the other hand, by virtue of 
questioning the basic assumptions of the genre, does present the possibility of an 
engaged, creative life. Rather than rejecting either the world or art, Woolf redefines the 
terms. What is art? What is the world? What is the nature of the consciousness that can 
reach out in a creative act? In The Voyage Out, Woolf works out provisional answers to 
these questions that are integral to all of her novels and to her life. In doing so, she also 
provides an ethical alternative to the dueling aesthetics of realism and idealism.  
 
 







 One of the main themes in the novel of artistic development is the artist-
protagonist’s relationship to his body. This emphasis on the body can be understood in 
many ways: as a practical issue of developing from an adolescent to an adult; as an 
integral part of any romantic or sexual relationship with another person; as a balance to 
the isolating tendency of the visionary mind; as the root of aisthesis, which is based on 
sensory experience; as a basis of securing a sense of autonomous self and agency. We 
can read all three novels as different versions of the relationship between vision and 
embodiment. 
 What does embodiment mean in the context of this genre? On the most basic 
level, it has to do with the extent to which these artist-protagonists are aware of their 
bodies. We have seen some of the ways in which the body can be understood—as pure 
physiology, as evolutionary process, as historical site of struggle, as archetypal 
repetition, as indeterminate sign, as manifestation of being, and as personal agency. 
Throughout the novels, all three artist-protagonists become increasingly aware of their 
physical sensations. To varying degrees, their immediate, lived experience begins to 
include the dimension of bodily existence. Each artist responds differently to the 
pressures of becoming embodied. Being disembodied includes both rejecting physical 





range of possible experience, becoming embodied is what allows their capacity for 
creative agency and relationship. In other words, embodiment is the basis for a creative 
agency that is connected with the world. 
 Because Stephen secures his sense of self and his existence entirely through his 
mental and imaginative activity, he is never able to connect with the world. Because 
Edwin secures his sense of self and his existence entirely through his physical sensations, 
he is never able to be free in his actions. Both live in closed circles—of the mind and of 
the body. Neither the mind nor the body can exclusively vouchsafe human agency and 
relationship. This is precisely what Woolf works out in The Voyage Out. Rachel 
discovers her independence and freedom precisely in the act of being related to Helen 
and Terence.5 And the nature of these relationships is not insensible merger but creative 
difference. As her consciousness becomes increasingly embodied, Rachel learns to act 
and to relate freely. If we return to the central issue of the Künstlerroman, this is Woolf’s 
solution: 
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She maintains that self and world can be connected in a creative act. But she reinvents 
what self, world, and art mean. Woolf narrates many intermingling levels of bodily 
experience. The characters that represent these various views of the body all come under 
scrutiny. It is Rachel’s development and eventual death that presents a new possibility 
for the genre. Woolf solves the dilemma of the isolated artist disconnected from the 
world by first offering the possibility of an embodied consciousness. It is Rachel’s 
increasing awareness of her bodily experience that allows her to connect not only with 
others, but also with herself as a creative agent.  
As her consciousness becomes embodied, she is both more open to interaction 
with others and more able to sense her own definite and different existence. Rachel 
develops from identifying with abstractions—the wind and the sea, vast evolutionary 
processes, literary characters, mythical figures—to identifying with her actual lived 
experience. Her development is not linear or simple. She struggles with herself and with 
others. Rather than being a failure of possibility, Rachel’s death is a triumph of her 
development. Rachel is able to die, and die in an ordinary way, because she has learned 
to live in an embodied way. 
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In following Rachel’s development from visionary self-enclosure to autonomous agency, 
we can discern three kinds of conscious experience: self-consciousness, body-
consciousness, and other-consciousness. These three types of conscious experience are 
fluid and often overlap in the novel. Self-conscious experience is primarily characterized 
by flights of solitary vision and imagination—this is Rachel playing the piano at the 
beginning of the novel. Body-conscious experience introduces the awareness of and 
openness to physical sensation and responsiveness. Rachel’s kiss with Richard Dalloway 
begins her life as a self-aware body. Other-consciousness refers to the ability to connect 
with autonomous and different others through mutual and free interaction.  
Through the medium of an embodied consciousness, Woolf interjects others and 
the world into the very nature of consciousness itself. Consciousness no longer simply 
designates solipsistic self-reflection. In this way, Rachel’s growing sense of bodily 





later novels, this notion of an expanded consciousness includes the ability to connect 
with others without any direct contact.6 
 In The Voyage Out, Woolf suggests that any personal consciousness, insofar as it 
is embodied, can connect with the world and with others in a creative act. Rachel’s 
growing embodiment mediates between self-consciousness and other-consciousness. As 
Rachel’s lived experience begins to include her bodily awareness, she gains a sense of 
herself both as capable of autonomous action as well as capable of free interaction. The 
body, which had been shoved out of the field of aesthetics, returns as the element 
essential to the resolution of the novelistic genre based on aesthetics. The artist who is 
centered in an embodied consciousness is free to connect both with others and with the 
world. 
Rachel’s coherent sense of self, which includes action and interaction, is based on 
her growing awareness of her bodily consciousness. What keeps self-consciousness from 
becoming a recoiling solipsism (a la Stephen) is embodiment. What keeps other-
consciousness from becoming an insensible union (a la Edwin) is embodiment. In both 
her flights of fancy and her relationships with others, what gives Rachel a sense of being 
an autonomous, creative agent is the lived experience of her body. 
                                                 
6 Beginning with Jacob’s Room, Woolf experiments with a roving consciousness that questions 
the separation between self and other. Thoughts, feelings, images, and experiences pass between 
characters without any actual contact. This technique, characteristic of Woolf’s later fiction, is a 





Against Descartes, Woolf shows that existence is not secured by an isolated 
consciousness reflecting on its own disembodied musings. Nor is existence based on 
pure physiology. The idealist solution, like Joyce’s, severs the artist from life and others. 
The materialist solution, like Bennett’s, renders the artist unable to create. Both 
alternatives are forms of determinism, of either mind or body. Woolf discovers an 
embodiment that does not trap consciousness in physical processes, but rather anchors 
the self in such a way that frees the artist to create and relate. When personal existence is 
secured by an embodied consciousness, the artist can feel independent and related at 
once. Woolf undoes the dichotomy—between mind and body, between consciousness 
and sensation, between self and world—that has plagued the field of aesthetics since 















     
 
 
self           body        other 
                  reflection                     agency                               relation 
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     Joyce:         +              −            −     : idealist 
 





True embodiment is not becoming more entrenched in the body or in sensation, but 
gaining enough confidence in being and existing that consciousness is free to wander 
and connect. But, as in the “moments of being,” this sense—of existence, of being and 
nonbeing at once, of significance—does not persist through time and space.7 It is an 
immediate and momentary awareness that makes action and interaction possible. 
Paradoxically, the more definite the lived experience of the body, the more freedom 
there is to strike out, to act and to interact. This roving, creative consciousness rooted in 
embodied experience comes to characterize Woolf’s later novels. At the heart of creation 
                                                 





is difference that does not separate and relationship that does not merge. This is the 
double function of embodiment: to secure agency for the person and, simultaneously, to 
allow connection with the world.8 
Both Bennett and Joyce conceive self and other, consciousness and world, mind 
and body as at odds with each other. Neither recognizes the mediating and liberating 
role of embodiment. Bennett turns objects into bodies; Joyce turns the body into an 
object. Edwin’s new house is a body with which he develops a relationship; Stephen’s 
body is a discursive sign. Stephen begins as an interacting other-consciousness and ends 
as a sequestered self-consciousness, with various failed attempts at connection in 
between. Edwin begins hemmed in by ignorance and ends indentured in marriage, 
having in the process abandoned all creative ambitions. It is Rachel who discovers her 
independent existence in the process of having embodied relationships with others. This 
is Woolf’s singular contribution to the genre of the Künstlerroman—what connects self 




                                                 
8 In the philosophical mode, this double function of embodiment is actually single, because there 
is no notion of temporal duration or spatial extension. So what seems double and simultaneous 
from the perspective of the personal is single and one from the perspective of being. See 






 An embodied consciousness secures for Rachel the capacity to act and interact in 
the world. As she becomes more definite, Rachel is able to recognize difference and 
independence—her own and others’. Embodiment, therefore, is not simply heightened 
physical sensation or awareness. More importantly, it is being able to act and interact 
with a definite and autonomous sense of self. Embodiment allows both the immediacy 
of the entirety of one’s experience as well as the capacity to respond. Unlike Stephen, 
who despite his “tremor of susceptibility never reaches out or embraces or comprehends 
what is outside and beyond,” Rachel manages to do just that.9 
 One way we can view these novels is as an arc of growing understanding about 
embodiment, moving from the abstract to the personal.10 Clayhanger proceeds mostly 
along the lines of the natural and historical modes of describing the body. Sensation and 
struggle dominate Edwin’s experience. The novel begins with Edwin at odds with 
himself and ends with Edwin bracing for conflict with Hilda. The novel begins and ends 
in enclosure: it opens with Edwin alone with his thoughts and ends with Edwin and 
Hilda as a combined unit of experience. During the course of the story, the body is 
                                                 
9 Virginia Woolf, “Modern Novels,” in James Joyce: The Critical Heritage, v. 1, ed. Robert H. 
Deming, p. 126. 
 
 
10 See Appendix B below, p. 231, for a table that outlines the implications of the various 





stretched into various continuities—of sensation, of struggle, of evolution, of categories. 
Personal agency disappears as the body becomes subject to various impersonal forces. 
“Clayhanger” designates not only Edwin, but first his father, Darius, and also the 
Potteries in the Five Towns setting of the novel. Edwin is anchored in name not only to 
his father but also to the entire region and its chief industry. The novel considers Edwin 
along the lines of its title—as an intersection of various forces of heredity, geography, 
physiology, class, and history.  
The differences in the narrative structures of the novels mirror the artists’ 
experiences of their bodies and of development. Clayhanger proceeds linearly in 
chronological time and reflects the progressive development of Edwin’s consciousness. 
Divided into four books, the story begins with “his vocation” as an artist, follows 
Edwin’s physical awakening to “his love,” continues to “his freedom” from his father, 
and ends with “his start in life” with Hilda. Although the five chapters of Portrait also 
follow a larger arc of chronological time, many words, rhythms, sounds, and images 
recur throughout the book. The cumulative effect of these repetitions is a narrative 
characterized by patterns, cycles, and echoes—a vast labyrinth of concentric circles with 
many dead ends and a final escape upward. 
Although it expands to include semiotic and archetypal experiences of the body, 
Portrait like Clayhanger is devoid of any sense of personal agency. Even though Stephen 





world. Both his poems and his relationships fail to connect him with the world. Instead, 
Stephen is inscribed in the endless deferral of representation. He lives in a world of signs. 
This is, after all, a “portrait,” yet another layer of artifact and representation. And it is a 
portrait of “the artist” as an ideal. It is in his identification with archetype that Stephen 
transcends the world of time altogether and reverts to mythical cycles of repetition. In 
both semiotic and archetypal notions of physical existence, consciousness withdraws 
from the world as it is. So does Stephen. The novel begins with third person narration, a 
scene of Stephen with his father; it ends in first person address, Stephen appealing to 
Daedalus for support. 
 Woolf too employs these four modes in describing Rachel’s physical experience. 
To these she adds the philosophical and personal experiences of the body. In her 
“moments of being,” Woolf identifies a dimension of experience that is characterized by 
immediate and instantaneous significance.11 From this kind of absorption in lived 
significance arises a personal mode of experience. The ethical dimension is the only 
mode of experiencing the body that allows creative action, that allows something new to 
happen. The “voyage out” is an active endeavor, unlike Edwin’s over-determined 
surname and Stephen’s static portrait. In the other modes of physical experience, 
nothing much happens that is new: the natural body evolves, the historical body 
struggles, the semiotic body defers, and the archetypal body repeats. Unlike the other 
                                                 





modes of bodily experience, which are based on various notions of ongoing unity, the 
ethical body is based on difference. Rachel learns this mode of being in the world 
through her relationships with Terence and Helen. The novel begins and ends in a 
procession: it opens with Helen and Ridley walking arm in arm through London and 
expands in its ending to include all of the characters in the hotel as they head to bed. 
Unlike Clayhanger and Portrait, which begin and end with their artist-protagonists, The 
Voyage Out neither begins nor ends with the consciousness of Rachel. 
  What Woolf offers that is new in the genre is the possibility of an artist whose 
creativity is based in action and relation rather than in solitary vision. Although artists 
abound in her later novels, their development qua artist is never again central. This is 
due, in part, to the fact that Woolf also expands the notion of art to an aesthetics of 
everyday life. The fundamental nature of any embodied consciousness is creative. 
Whereas Bennett and Joyce end their novels with their artist-protagonists—Edwin 
surrendering to Hilda and Stephen readying for flight—Woolf’s novel continues for two 
chapters after Rachel’s death. Neither the novel nor life hinges on Rachel’s consciousness. 
Art is not the special province of isolated, visionary artists. The novel ends with the 
consciousness of St. John Hirst observing the different movements and sounds in the 
hotel’s main hall “drawing together” and “combining” “into a pattern before his eyes.”12  
                                                 





 This is reminiscent of Woolf’s description of art in “A Sketch of the Past”: 
“Behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we—I mean all human beings—are 
connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work 
of art.”13 Hirst has as much access to the creative pattern of life as does Rachel. In a letter 
to Lytton Strachey, Woolf describes the novel: “What I wanted to do was to give the 
feeling of a vast tumult of life, as various and disorderly as possible, which should be 
cut short for a moment by the death, and go on again—and the whole was to have a sort 
of pattern, and be somehow controlled.”14 The actual fact of death, that Rachel can die, 
opens the possibility of a real life. 
 If we return now to the definition of the Künstlerroman, we can see more clearly 
Woolf’s innovation. The two chief characteristics of the artist novel are that the novel 
centers on the consciousness of the young artist figure and that the artist figure develops 
during the course of the novel. In The Voyage Out, Woolf challenges both of these 
propositions. The novel and life carry on after Rachel is dead. And Woolf’s subsequent 
novels do not center on the consciousness of any single protagonist. The very nature of 
narrative consciousness expands from being purely reflexive to being shared among 
characters. Thoughts, images, memories, and feelings are fluid, seamlessly passing 
                                                 
13 In Moments of Being, p. 72. 
 
 





between various characters who have little or no direct contact with each other. In a way, 
each character assumes the role of artist and creator, culminating in the aesthetics of 
everyday life that comes to mark Woolf’s major novels. 
 Woolf also undoes the prevailing notion of development in this novel. Rachel 
develops not linearly but in fits and starts. She “falters” and “stumbles” her way to 
learning how to act and interact as an autonomous individual. That her final moment of 
development is death seems counterintuitive. Artist novels typically end in integration, 
withdrawal, or some uneasy mixture of the two. Given her developmental trajectory in 
the novel, that Rachel dies means that her embodiment is real. She does not drift off to 
the bottom of the sea with Sabrina; she simply stops breathing. Woolf displaces 
development from the social register to the ethical one. 
 
Love and Death 
Considering war, history, and human agency in “September 1, 1939,” Auden 
writes, “Hunger allows no choice / To the citizen or the police; / We must love one 
another or die.” In this poem, personal love is identified with physiological need, which 





as dishonest.15 We can read the development of the relationship between love and death 
along similar lines in these novels. Through his sense of “the exquisite burden of life” 
with Hilda, Bennett conveys a notion of personal love as biological imperative. Edwin 
cannot help himself. He is as beholden to his physical need for Hilda as he was to his 
imaginary flights of vision. Loving Hilda is a matter of Edwin’s physical survival. This is 
the world of relationship as a function of physiology and evolution.16 Joyce, on the other 
hand, flatly rejects the physical necessity of both love and death. Stephen is subject to 
neither. Rather, both are so many “nets flung at [the soul] to hold it back from flight.”17 
The world and others are banished from the creative act, which is a function of a 
visionary consciousness “liberat[ing] from the personalised lumps of matter that which 
is their individuating rhythm, the first or formal relation of their parts.”18 
Like Edwin, Terence considers love a bulwark against death. Confronted with 
Rachel’s illness, he cannot fathom “what they meant by saying that she had a chance of 
                                                 
15 See Edward Mendelson, Early Auden, pp. 324-30. Mendelson’s exposition of this shift in 
Auden’s thinking has suggested the chapter titles in this dissertation. 
 
 
16 Much like Darwin’s The Temple of Nature, which begins with the “long nerves” of “sensation” 
that lead to emotions of “volition” and, finally, to mental “associations.” Quoted above, p. 52. 
 
 
17 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, p. 136. 
 
 






life [. . .] knowing as he did that they were engaged.”19 Terence’s mode of love is based 
primarily on merged union (rather than differentiated union), so it seems unthinkable to 
him that Rachel might die while he continues to live. Because Rachel’s development is 
one of increasing differentiation, both love and death have bodily implications for her.20 
Her death is not fading out of existence, as is Stephen’s metaphorical death. Her love is 
not surrender into undifferentiated union, as is Edwin’s capitulation to Hilda. Nor is 
love, as Terence finally conceives it, a barrier against death. Rachel both falls in love and 
dies. Taken together, they indicate that her embodiment is complete. She is able to 
connect and she does so as a distinct, free person. Observing Terence as he sleeps, 
Rachel sees: 
  But all this was superficial, and had nothing to do with the life that  
  went on beneath the eyes and the mouth and the chin, for that life  
was independent of her, and independent of everything else. So too,  
although she was going to marry him and to live with him for  
thirty, or forty, or fifty years, and to quarrel, and to be close to him,  
she was independent of him; she was independent of everything  
else. Nevertheless, as St. John said, it was love that made her 
understand this, for she had never felt this independence, this calm,  
and this certainty until she fell in love with him, and perhaps this  
too was love. She wanted nothing else.21 
                                                 
19 The Voyage Out, p. 328. 
 
 
20 After Roger Fry’s death, Woolf writes in 1934, “I had a notion that I could describe the 
tremendous feeling at R.’s funeral: but of course I cant. I mean the universal feeling: how we 
all fought with our brains loves & so on; and must be vanquished. [. . .] I felt the vainness of 
this perpetual fight, with our brains & loving each other against the other thing: if Roger 






This relationship of personal love to the embodiment of consciousness and to the 
freedom to create is a recurring theme in Woolf’s novels.  
 
This dissertation proceeds along a number of different lines of inquiry—generic, 
philosophic, and narrative. Given that the literary genre of Künstlerroman is based on the 
eighteenth-century emergence of aesthetics, I argue that the genre bears the imprint of 
what has been excised from the philosophical field, namely, the body. Sensation and 
issues of embodiment dominate these novels, often as obstructions to the free reign of a 
solipsistic consciousness and, finally, as the solution to the genre’s chief dilemma.22  
 Another thread in this dissertation is the dueling aesthetics of materialism and 
idealism. These novels show that a simple allegiance to sensory experience fares no 
better in the drive to create than does a simple allegiance to solitary consciousness. 
Neither Edwin nor Stephen is able to bridge the gap between self and world through a 
creative act. Most critics that write about the body consider it along certain lines—as 
pure physiology, as an intersection of historical categories, as the bearer of archetypal 
patterns, as a discursive sign. Although all of these are valid ways of conceiving the 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 The Voyage Out, p. 298. 
 
 
22 Although I have focused exclusively on Bennett, Joyce, and Woolf, my sense is that these issues 
extend to the genre as a whole. One way to augment the study would be to extend the range of 
novels that are considered. A broader sampling, in time and region, would likely reveal further 





body, none of them allows a sense of creative agency. Woolf presents the possibility of 
an ethical aesthetics, one that considers embodiment a constitutional component of 
consciousness and, in doing so, resurrects the original sense of aisthesis as knowing 
through the senses. Gone is the Cartesian possibility of a disembodied consciousness 
reflecting on its own solitary existence or the existence of an outside world. By asserting 
the lived experience of the body as a fundamental characteristic of consciousness, Woolf 
gets beyond the dualism—of mind and body, of self and other, of subject and object—
that plagues the genre and the field of aesthetics. 
 She does this not in abstract theory, but in the narrative practice of writing The 
Voyage Out. Rachel’s development from self-involved adolescent to engaged woman 
proceeds in fits and starts. This is the ethical mode—trial and error. Development is not 
the result of evolving, or struggling against fixed categories, or repeating established 
patterns, or endlessly deferring meaning, but the fruition of acting as a distinct self and 
interacting with distinct others. In the process of working this out, Woolf discovers what 
becomes the signature narrative style of her later fiction—a roving, shared consciousness 
that moves freely between characters, creating a sense of union that is not based on 






I had originally intended this dissertation to span the 1910s artist novels, the 
1920s marriage novels, and the 1930s death novels of all three writers.23 There is a 
natural development of embodiment that happens as we follow the issues that arise in 
these Künstlerromane into marriage and, eventually, death. Although it has not been 
possible to do that here, it seems to me productive to consider questions of embodiment, 
of love and death, and of an ethical aesthetics in the context of these authors’ later works. 
These artist novels depict the beginnings of a sense of self in relation to the world and to 
others. The marriage novels test this sense of self in an actual relationship. And the late 
novels consider embodiment against the limit of physical death. 
Also, as I’ve worked closely with The Voyage Out, my interest in the exact 
nature of consciousness in Woolf’s novels has been renewed. In this first novel, there is a 
particular relationship between self-consciousness and other-consciousness that comes 
to characterize all of Woolf’s fiction. In The Voyage Out, embodiment is the pivot or 
hinge or mediator between the two kinds of consciousness. This meeting of self and 
other in embodied consciousness seems to be at the heart of Woolf’s enduring sense of 
an aesthetics of everyday life. Which aesthetics is at the same time an ethics, not 
withdrawn from the world of action, interaction, and significance.  
                                                 
23 That is, Ulysses (1922), Riceyman Steps (1923), and To the Lighthouse (1927), as well as 






One of the chief characteristics of this embodied consciousness is the sense of 
creative agency. At the heart of this creative agency is consciousness that is shared 
without being collective and that is autonomous without being separate. Woolf not only 
undoes the idea of the isolated artist in the very genre created to convey that notion, but 
also she resurrects the original sense of aesthetics as an embodied relationship with the 
world and with others. In her literary practice, she gets beyond the isolated, centered, 
and reflexive Cartesian cogito without, in the process, having to sacrifice human 
agency.24 
Against Descartes, Woolf suggests that we cannot proceed causally and directly 
from consciousness to things. Against Kant, Woolf insists that res cogitans and res extensa 
are not two separate realms, that human consciousness is not other than the thing itself. 
It is in this sense that, “Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass 
that we call the world. But there is no Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and 
                                                 
24 The emerging field of post-human studies also poses a challenge to the idea of a centered, 
omniscient human consciousness ever reflecting on an outside world. These thinkers operate 
under the general term “speculative realism,” with Graham Harman and Levi Bryant more 
specifically espousing an “object-oriented ontology.” Objects (human, inanimate, animal, abstract, 
digital) are absolutely withdrawn from self- and other-knowledge, and collisions between them 
become various sorts of uncanny performance. What I have described as the ethical dimension of 
conscious experience in Woolf, where self and other are identical without being the same and 
different without being separate, gets beyond the Cartesian cogito without rendering all 
interaction therefore “speculative.” See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude; Graham Harman, 
The Quadruple Object; Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects. The journal New Literary History 






emphatically there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing 
itself.”25 
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Appendix A:  A Selected List of Künstlerromane 
 
Schlegel, Lucinde (1799)  
Novalis, Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1802) 
 
Staël, Corrine, or Italy (1807) 
Stendhal, Life of Henry Brulard (1835-36) 
Balzac, Lost Illusions (1837-39) 
Sand, Consuelo (1842)  
Flaubert, L’Éducation Sentimentale (1869) 
 
Chopin, The Awakening (1899) 
 
Browning, Aurora Leigh (1856)  
Pater, Marius the Epicurean (1885) 
 
Mann, “Tonio Kröger” (1903)  
Hesse, Peter Camezind (1904) 
 
Rolland, Jean-Christophe (1904-12)  
Proust, À la recherche du temp perdu (1913-27) 
 
Richardson, Maurice Guest (1908) 
 
London, Martin Eden (1909) 
 
Bennett, Clayhanger (1910) 
Lawrence, Sons and Lovers (1913) 
 
Cather, The Song of the Lark (1915)  






Maugham, Of Human Bondage (1915) 
Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) 
Woolf, The Voyage Out (1915) 
Lewis, Tarr (1918) 
 
Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel (1929) 
 





Appendix B:  Narrative Modes of Describing the Body 
 
 














Action evolves struggles repeats withdraws is absorbed creates 
Method evolution conflict repetition delay cessation 

















































one type one source one play one instant 
personal 
love 
 
 
